Suchergebnisse

This paper analyzes the effects of influence activities on organizational efficiency in a principal-agent framework with endogenous rent. It shows that, with endogenous rent, influence activities can improve efficiency even if their informative value is low. Effects on the dissipation rate of rent are also considered. In particular, it is shown that, with endogenous rent, more powerful incentives on influence activities only increase the dissipation rate when the sum of the elasticities of the influence costs function & of the production function is greater than one. 1 Table, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 11 References. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
We test the welfare magnet hypothesis for Europe. We modify the existing theoretical frameworks assuming that: (a) welfare services, intended as the output of welfare expenditure, not the poor's income or social expenditure, enter the median voter's utility function; (b) preferences depend on the position of the median voter in the income distribution; and (c) the total amount of welfare services provided may differ from the amount needed to finance them, because of inefficiencies in the transfer process. We then test the welfare magnet hypothesis for 22 European countries by estimating a reaction function corresponding to the generic form adopted by the literature, but using the variables inspired by the model. We find evidence of a positive strategic interaction among countries, which suggests a downward bias in the choice of the protection level because of welfare competition. The level of social protection also positively depends on GDP, the redistributive attitudes of residents and their weight in the population, vis-à-vis the migrants' share, and the efficiency of social expenditure.

Abstract We test the welfare magnet hypothesis for Europe. We modify the existing theoretical frameworks assuming that: (a) welfare services, intended as the output of welfare expenditure, not the poor's income or social expenditure, enter the median voter's utility function; (b) preferences depend on the position of the median voter in the income distribution; and (c) the total amount of welfare services provided may differ from the amount needed to finance them, because of inefficiencies in the transfer process. We then test the welfare magnet hypothesis for 22 European countries by estimating a reaction function corresponding to the generic form adopted by the literature, but using the variables inspired by the model. We find evidence of a positive strategic interaction among countries, which suggests a downward bias in the choice of the protection level because of welfare competition. The level of social protection also positively depends on GDP, the redistributive attitudes of residents and their weight in the population, vis-à-vis the migrants' share, and the efficiency of social expenditure.

L'obiettivo di questo capitolo è testare l'ipotesi del magnete del welfare per l'Europa. A tal fine modifichiamo i framework teorici utilizzati in letteratura introducendo due nuove ipotesi: a) la funzione di utilità dell'elettore mediano dipende dai servizi di welfare, intesi come l'output della spesa pubblica, non dal reddito del percettore dei trasferimenti sociali o dall'ammontare della spesa; b) le preferenze dell'elettore mediano dipendono dalla sua posizione nella distribuzione del reddito; e c) l'ammontare complessivo dei servizi di welfare forniti può differire dall'ammontare necessario al loro finanziamento, a causa di inefficienze nel processo di trasferimento. Su questa base testiamo l'ipotesi del magnete del welfare per 22 paesi europei, stimando una funzione di reazione che corrisponde alla forma generalmente adottata in letteratura, ma usando variabili ispirate dal nostro modello. Troviamo evidenza dell'esistenza di spillover internazionali positivi, il che suggerisce l'esistenza di una distorsione al ribasso nella scelta del livello di protezione sociale. I risultati indicano anche che il livello di protezione sociale dipende dal PIL, dalle preferenze verso la redistribuzione dei residenti e dal loro peso nella popolazione, rispetto a quello dei migranti, e dall'efficienza della spesa sociale.

Abstract
Based on the construction of a composite index to assess the relative performance of welfare policies, we show that the variability of performances cannot be explained only by the amount of resources devoted to social policies, but also by its composition: countries with higher shares of social public expenditure, specifically aimed at reducing income concentration, obtain better results. This associates the traditional classification of the European welfare systems to the performance obtained in the social sector.