Suchergebnisse

Corruption is not a new phenomenon; we are living with it since the birth of government's institutions. Corruption has two dimensions; public sector corruption and private sector corruption. The public sector corruption means, "misuse of public office for private benefits". For cross country analysis, public sector corruption is mainly focused. In this study, we have analyzed the 41 developing countries to investigate the determinants of corruption. Corruption determinants are sub-divided into economic determinants and non-economic determinants. The economic determinants include economic freedom, globalization, level of education, distribution of income and average level of income. The non-economic determinants list consists on press freedom, democracy and share of population affiliated with particular religion. The empirical findings of the study indicates that; all economic determinants are negatively related to the perceived level of corruption except distribution of income and non-economic determinants are not significantly explaining the variations in the level of corruption. This shows that the socio-political and religious norms are so weak that they can not affect the corruption level in these countries. The contribution of religion in people's practical life is very little, so the cultural values of developing countries are not religion based. Therefore, perceived level of corruption is not affected by the religion. This study concluded that government should focus the economic factors to curb the level of corruption.

All political decision making processes reflect the interaction of different utility maximising actors: politicians, voters, bureaucrats and interest groups. Theoretical literature on the subject is not conclusive, and thus far, little empirical work exists. This study presents an econometric analysis of the allocation of development aid to Pakistan based on a political economic framework of aid allocation. Looking at bi- and multilateral aid to Pakistan from 1960 to 2002, results suggest that aid flows to Pakistan are highly motivated by special interests within donor countries and international financial institutions (IFIs). Looking more specifically at bilateral aid, and especially aid by the single largest donor to Pakistan, i.e. the US, analysis suggests that Pakistan and Indian ethnic lobbies could play a role in aid flows, and in the passage of two important amendments, the Pressler and Brown Amendments, in US aid authorisation bills regarding aid to Pakistan. Analysis of multilateral financial flows to Pakistan shows that Pakistan receives a large amount of lending but with considerable variations over time. To some extent personal contacts of Pakistani international civil servants appear to play a role in multilateral lending to Pakistan, along with major shareholders economic interests

This paper analyzes the determinants of international financial institutions (IFIs)'s lending decisions to Pakistan. At the example of three major IFIs, the World Bank, IMF and ADB, this paper suggests that political economic factors, notably bureaucratic interest of international civil servants and major shareholders' economic interest belong to the most relevant determinants of international lending. Pooled Tobit estimation analysis for the period ever since when these institutions established their lending instruments to developing countries, confirm this hypothesis. Recipients' need is shown to have some relevance as well but not as strong as bureaucratic interest. Further analysis suggests that IDA and ADB lending is more interest oriented than lending by the IBRD and IMF.

This study is an attempt to check some political factors determining budget deficit in Pakistan. It examines the short and long-run relationship between the Budget deficit, democracy and cabinet size for Pakistan's economy. The bounds testing approach to co-integration and (ECM) error-correction models, developed within an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) framework is applied to annual data for the period 1976 to 2009 in order to investigate whether a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between the budget deficit and these factors. The result of the bounds test indicates that there exist long-run relationship between the budget deficit and political variables. The results provide strong evidence that large government size will significantly add to the budget deficit. The democracy can help in reducing budget deficit but shows a weaker influence in case of Pakistan for the sample period.

Corruption is a limp in the walk of human progress. It is not
a new phenomenon; it is as old as the history of mankind itself. The
corruption made itself visible when the institution of the government
was established. According to Glynn, et al. (1997), "…..no region, and
hardly any country, has been immune from corruption". Like a cancer, it
strikes almost all parts of the society and destroys the functioning of
vital organs, means cultural, political and economic structure of
society Amundsen (1999). All this was proved by the major corruption
scandals of France, Italy, Japan, Philippine, South Korea, Mexico,
United States etc. These scandals bring the corruption problem on the
agenda of major international institutions like International Monetary
Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organisation, Transparency International
and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

Variations of bilateral aid flows are difficult to explain on the basis of official development objectives or recipient need. At the example of US aid to Pakistan, this paper suggests alternative political economic explanations, notably the relevance of ethnic lobbying and the relevance of US business interests. Time series regressions for the period from 1980 to 2002 and logistic regressions based on votes for the Pressler and the Brown Amendment confirm the significance of these political economic determinants. While in case of the Pressler Amendment, the direct influence of population groups of Indian and Pakistani origins seems to have played a predominant role, the role of ethnic business lobbies appears to have dominated in the context of the Brown Amendment. Time series analysis also provides some evidence for the impact of US business interests based on FDI and exports, but these effects appear to be comparatively small.

Maternal mortality is a critical global public health issue, particularly in developing countries like Pakistan. Interventions to improve mothers' usage of skilled birth attendant (SBA) may reduce maternal mortality. The aim of this work to conduct the spatial analysis of socioeconomic inequality of opportunity in access to SBA in districts of Punjab, Pakistan and explore the circumstance variables that contribute the most to the socioeconomic inequality. The study is conducted by using Punjab's Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2017-18 and the data analyzed are taken from women of 15 to 49 years with a live birth in the last 2 years. The Human Opportunity Index is used to measure the coverage rate, inequality, and universal access of opportunity across the districts of Punjab. Further, Shapley Decomposition is utilized to identify the contribution of the circumstance factors to the inequality. It is noted that most of the southern districts of Punjab have poor coverage rates and low universal access to SBA and northern districts have high coverage and universal access for the SBA. There is also higher inequality in southern districts of Punjab. Further, in decomposition analysis, it is found that household wealth status, ANC, birth order, birth interval, household head education, ethnicity, media access and residence were the most significant factors leading to socioeconomic inequality of opportunity across the districts of Punjab. Based on the findings, it is suggested that the government should prioritize equitable resource allocation, particularly in southern Punjab.

Diversity and socioeconomic deprivation have been widely discussed as determinants of social cohesion. These two factors are considered to be a threat to social cohesion. The existing literature identifies the problem, however, the literature suggesting the solution is very limited. The most important determinant which can cure the problems of social cohesion is the better quality of institutions, however, there is hardly any literature on this aspect. The current study has investigated the impact of political institutional quality on social cohesion by employing the fixed‐effect model for estimation. The analysis is conducted for 135 countries, using five‐year average panel data. The results suggest that political institutional quality augments social cohesion, gender equality, and per capita income also augment social cohesion. Ethnic diversity, income inequality, and globalization are a threat to social cohesion. Moreover, the threat to social cohesion is greater when there are low political institutional quality and high ethnic diversity, and income inequality as compared to a situation where there are high political institutional quality and low ethnic diversity, and income inequality. The results further suggest that the harmful effects of ethnic diversity, inequality, and globalization can be, not only overcome by institutional quality but can also be put to use to enhance social cohesion.

This paper gives insight of the role of political stability in
investigating the two competing hypotheses in Developing Eight Muslim
countries, and also investigates whether conditional liaison between
corruption and political stability matters or not. The empirical
findings indicate that investment, population and political stability
play positive role in promoting economic growth. Corruption not only
impact growth but also influenced by the institutional quality that a
nation experiences. Corruption acts as sands in the wheels in the
nations having higher degree of political stability, and greases the
wheels in less politically stable countries such as Nigeria and
Pakistan. Thus, political stability is conducive to growth, as it
reduces the social unrests, political turmoil, and encourages
investment, and there by economic growth. JEL Classification: C30, D73,
O43, P48 Keywords: Corruption, Economic Growth, Political Stability,
Conditional Cooperation

The embodied technical change should reduce the cost of
production of the commodity. However, price structure, wages and
interest rates also will change over time. Thus if a commodity is
following a fixed price regime, the adjustment of a historical
input-output table to current price wage level will leaves less and less
profit per unit of output. The extent of this reduction will indicate
the extent of technological change. There are different approaches to
the prediction of changes in input-output coefficients. The first
approach, attributable to Leontief (1941) and Stone (1962), assumes that
input-output matrices change over time in a "biproportional" way. The
other approach is to estimate trends in individual coefficients using
statistical data. Former approach is used by a number of experts,
including Fontela, et al. (1970), Almon, et al. (1974) and Carter
(1970). Arrow and Hoffenberg (1959), Henry (1974), Savaldson (1970,
1976), Ozaki (1976), Aujac (1972) and Buzunov (1970). These are examples
of the application of the quantitative approach for forecasting
input-output coefficients. Still another approach which could not get
much attention for forecasting input-output coefficients, is
constructing the marginal input-output coefficients [Tilanus (1967);
Middelhoek (1970)]. Marginal coefficients for forecasting constructed by
Tilanus and Middelhoek are based on average input-output tables, which
shows that still new approach (marginal) is based on the old (average)
one