Suchergebnisse

The first goal of this study is to examine the capacity of prominent survey-based effort proxies to predict real effort provision in children. Do children who "talk the talk" of hard work also "walk the walk" and make costly effort investments? The second goal is to assess how objective and subjective effort measures are related under two conditions: intrinsic (nonincentivized) motivation and extrinsic (incentivized) motivation. We measure objective "real" effort using three tasks and subjective self-reported effort using four psychological characteristics (conscientiousness, need for cognition, locus of control and delay of gratification) to understand to what extent material incentives affect the cognitive effort of children with different self-reported personalities. Data stem from real-effort experiments carried out with 420 fifth grade students from primary schools in Madrid, Spain. We find that some of the subjective and objective effort measures are positively correlated. Yet the power of personality to predict real effort is only moderate, but greater and more so in the extrinsic than the intrinsic motivation condition. In particular, need for cognition and conscientiousness are the most relevant correlates of objective effort. Overall, we find there is a big difference between saying and doing when it comes to exerting effort, and this difference is even larger when there are no direct material incentives in place to reward effort provision.

Abstract
The upswing in finance in recent decades has led to rising inequality, but do downswings in finance lead to a symmetric decline in inequality? We analyze the asymmetry of the effect of ups and downs in finance, and the effect of increased capital requirements and the bonus cap on national earnings inequality. We use administrative employer–employee-linked data from 1990 to 2019 for 12 countries and data from bank reports, from 2009 to 2017 in 13 European countries. We find a strong asymmetry in the effect of upswings and downswings in finance on earnings inequality, a weak, if any, mitigating effect of capital requirements on finance's contribution to inequality, and a restructuring but no absolute effect of the bonus cap on financiers' earnings. We suggest that while rising financiers' wages increase inequality in upswings, they are resilient in downswings and thus downswings do not contribute to a symmetric decline in inequality.