Suchergebnisse

Scholars argue the dominant discourse of meritocracy legitimises intergenerational inequality and the winner–loser divide. However, is our society really meritocratic? If yes, the relative power of educational qualifications per se should be smaller than that of skills/abilities in the labour market. Using the standardised data in the United States, structural equation modelling shows (1) the contribution of family background to educational attainment is as large as that to skills acquisition; but (2) the economic return to education is substantially larger than that to skills; and consequently (3) the role of education outweighs that of skills in forming social stratification. This suggests that contemporary USA is a typical credential society, where credentialism prevails over skills-based meritocracy. Nonetheless, people may misbelieve the society is meritocratic – imagined meritocracy – by conflating the levels/influences of education and skills. It is essential to distinguish these two traits and understand the credential/meritocratic nature of our society.

The association between education and subjective well-being has long been investigated by social scientists. However, prior studies have paid inadequate attention to the influence of societal-level educational expansion and skills diffusion. In this article, multilevel regression analyses, using internationally comparable data for over 48,000 individuals in 24 countries, detect the overall positive linkage between educational attainment and life satisfaction. Nevertheless, this relationship is undermined due to the larger degree of skills diffusion at the societal level, and no longer confirmed once labor market outcomes are accounted for. Meanwhile, the extent of skills diffusion per se is positively and substantially associated with people's subjective well-being even after adjusting for key individual-level and country-level predictors, whereas other societal conditions including GDP, Gini coefficients, safety, civic engagement, and educational expansion do not indicate significant links with life satisfaction in the current analysis. Given that recent research suggests skills diffusion promotes the formation of meritocratic social systems, one may argue it is the process of fairer rewards allocation underpinned by skills diffusion, rather than the status quo of macroeconomy, economic inequality, social stability, and educational opportunities as such, that matters more to people's subjective well-being.

AbstractScholars have long investigated the positive link between income and well-being, including its gender difference. However, little is known about (1) how low income is linked to ill-being among women and men; and (2) how their association varies depending on societal-level gender (in)equality. Filling this knowledge gap is crucial not only for scholarship but for social policy to tackle income-based disparities of ill-being. In this study, using the European Social Survey and the joint European Values Study-World Values Survey data, we conduct country-specific regressions and cross-national multilevel analyses to examine the relationship between low income, subjective ill-being (SIB), and macro-level gender parity. We first confirm that low-income individuals, regardless of gender, are more likely than their affluent counterparts to suffer from SIB in many countries. This indicates the applicability of implications derived from conventional approaches focused on the positive association between higher income and better well-being to the studies on low income and SIB. Nevertheless, the SIB risk significantly differs depending on the degree of gender inequality in that (1) both women and men face a higher likelihood of SIB in gender-inegalitarian societies; and importantly, (2) the psychological penalty for the poor is intensified under such gendered circumstances, especially among men. These results suggest that gender inequality not merely induces women's ill-being but punishes low-income men possibly by exacerbating pressure as a breadwinner and imposing stigmas when they cannot meet gendered social expectations.

Abstract
The association between flexible work arrangements (FWA) and worker well-being has been extensively investigated. However, the Covid-19 pandemic has generated a new phenomenon where workers return to inflexible workstyles after experiencing FWA. This article examines the consequence of this 'flexibility loss' with attention to telework and job satisfaction (JS). Using panel data collected by the Japanese government in 2020–2021, regressions and generalized structural equation modeling reveal (a) workers who frequently telework exhibit higher JS in both years; (b) on average, losing telework does not affect JS; and (c) workers who experienced telework-related challenges in 2020 and continue to work remotely next year report lower JS, whereas those who lost telework opportunities possess higher JS. These results suggest that a new type of labor stratification emerges based on the compound of workers' FWA experience (upsides or downsides) and their FWA usage (continuation or withdrawal), which affects well-being either functionally or adversely.

Sociologists have long used credential inflation theory to explain the devaluation of tertiary education degrees as the consequence of the excessive supply of educated personnel. However, the literature has inadequately examined two fundamental conditions: the combination of degrees/skills that individuals possess and the level of degrees. In this article, cross-country multilevel regressions reveal lower-level degrees (i.e. short-cycle tertiary) are devalued due to the larger extent of lower-level tertiary expansion in a society, regardless of degree holders' skills level. This is consistent with the concept of credential inflation. In contrast, alongside the proliferation of higher-level tertiary education (i.e. bachelor and above), individuals with such degrees are penalized only when they lack high skills. Put differently, higher-level degree holders retain their rewards despite their diminishing scarcity as long as they possess high skills. Meanwhile, high skills unaccompanied by tertiary degrees lose their premium merely in connection with lower-level tertiary expansion. These results suggest credentialism is intensified and credential inflation operates in societies where the extent of lower-level tertiary expansion is relatively large, whereas 'decredentialization' emerges along with the larger extent of higher-level tertiary expansion in a way that devalues credentials as such whilst relatively enhancing the role of skills in reward allocation.