Suchergebnisse

pt. 1. Introduction to the study of the public policy process: history and method -- pt. 2. Conceptualizing public policy-making -- pt. 3. Modelling the policy process : frameworks for analysis -- pt. 4. Understanding the agenda-setting process -- pt. 5. Understanding the formulation process -- pt. 6. Understanding the decision-making process -- pt. 7. Understanding the implementation process -- pt. 8. Understanding the evaluation process -- pt. 9. Policy dynamics : patterns of stability and change

This Handbook provides a comprehensive global survey of the policy process. Written by an outstanding line up of distinguished scholars and practitioners, the Handbook covers all aspects of the policy process including:Theory - from rational choice to the new institutionalismFrameworks - network theory, advocacy coalition and development modelsKey stages in the process - Formulation, implementation and evaluationAgenda setting and decision makingThe roles of key actors and institutions.

The first-generation literature on policy design has made considerable contributions over the last 30 years to our understanding of the process, politics and implications of policy design and instrument choice. This literature, however, has generally treated institutions as a black box and has not developed a coherent set of frameworks, theories and models of how institutions matter to policy design. In this paper, I unpack the black box of institutions using transaction cost and mechanism design to show how regulations can be better designed in developing countries when institutions are weak, unaccountable, corrupted or not credible. Under these conditions, I show that efficient regulatory design has to minimize transaction costs, particularly agency problems, by having incentive compatible (self-enforcing) mechanisms. I conclude with a second-generation research agenda on regulatory design with implications for environmental, food and drug safety, healthcare and financial regulation in developing countries. Adapted from the source document.

During much of the 1990s, water utilities worldwide experienced a wave of privatization. The rationale for this is largely based on two hypotheses: the fiscal hypothesis and the efficiency hypothesis. This article examines the evidence and concludes that water utilities privatization has been a failure.

Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically known how it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic case study to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice: bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan's Dilemma and the Patron's Dilemma. Adapted from the source document.