This book, first published in 1993, is an analytical review that discusses the changes in the international security policies of the USA and USSR at the end of the Cold War, as well as the main events that occurred in the area of arms control. A distinctive feature of this work is the detailed analysis of competing Russian views concerning arms control agreements and Russian military reforms.
In the foreign policy section of the President V. Putin's Address to the Federal Assembly on February 21, 2023, the most conspicuous was the new subject – the suspension of Russia's participation in the New START Treaty. Among the reasons provided as justification of this decision was the absence of limitations on the nuclear forces of the two U.S. NATO allies – the Great Britain and France. Most probably, the main reason for the decision of the Russian leadership on the New START was political in nature – countering the policy of the U.S. and its allies, aimed at the defeat of Russia in the military conflict in Ukraine. At the same time, the suspension of the New START is prone with the break of the treaty-based strategic relationship of the two nuclear superpowers and the collapse of the whole regime of nuclear arms control. Still, provided improvement of the international politics: peaceful settlement of the military conflict in Ukraine, moving of the West and Russia away from the overwhelming confrontation – the resumption of the strategic limitation dialogue between the U.S. and Russia is possible. However, the subject of involving the Great Britain and France in arms control will stay on the agenda. Thirty years ago, the sum of their forces was about 4% of the strategic forces of each of the two superpowers, whereas now it is close to 35% due to the reductions of the U.S. and Russian strategic arms since 1991. Resolving this problem would require innovative application of legal norms and the use of the experience and precedents elaborated during half a century of strategic negotiations.
During the last three years, the prospects of engaging China in the process of nuclear disarmament has moved to the forefront of the arms control agenda. In 2019–2020, it was made the top issue by the Donald Trump's administration when it withdrew from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) and refused to prolong the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START). As for Beijing, it flatly rejected US demands to join arms control and this position was endorsed by Moscow. Thanks to the Joseph Biden's administration coming to power in January 2021, the New START was extended by five years in February of the same year. In June, the summit of the presidents of Russia and the United States was held in Geneva, and in July, the official dialogue on strategic stability was launched. However, during the same summer, an unexpected event happened. Independent U. S. experts published information from commercial satellites, which revealed an ongoing construction of three large military bases in central areas of China with hundreds of new silo launchers for intercontinental missiles. Afterwards, the Pentagon confirmed this information and predicted that Chinese missiles buildup may reach the level of about 1000 or more nuclear warheads by the year 2030. This news was neither confirmed nor denied by the official Beijing. However, together with continuing Chinese deployment of strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines, forthcoming introduction of heavy bombers, expanding early warning satellites and tests of antisatellite systems – these developments imply the fundamental shift in the global and regional strategic balances with profound political consequences. American response to China's strategic buildup and Russian reaction to the U.S. military innovations may entail a next massive cycle of arms race and would cause a new stagnation at the negotiations of the two nuclear superpowers – all highly detrimental to international security. Nonetheless, there is still a chance of reinvigorated diplomatic effort at the U.S. – Russian and U.S. – Chinese tracks, which might lay the foundation of the future multilateral framework of strategic stability.
Received 28.02.2021. In the end of January 2021, the New START Treaty was extended by five years by the United States and Russia. Thus, the two nuclear superpowers have time to work on the follow-on treaty not in a strategic vacuum, but relying on the valid treaty and its system of transparency and predictability. The promoters of abolishing negotiations on arms limitation and their substitution by amorphous multilateral discussions of "a general philosophy of strategic stability", who have been highly active during recent years, have temporarily shied away, but probably not for long. The predictable difficulties of the forthcoming negotiations would be interpreted as the evidence of their impending doom, and this may turn into a self-fulfilling prophesy and once again deadlock the dialogue. During the previous decades, the development of the military technologies and new strategic concepts have changed strategic relationship of the parties. This was happening against the background of deteriorating political relations, a long pause of arms control negotiations and abrogation of a number of crucial disarmament treaties. Now the two sides have to catch up. Already it is possible to foresee the main differences of their positions. Washington is emphasizing deep reduction of the nuclear arms of the two superpowers – both strategic and tactical. Moscow has advanced a concept of "security equation", which implies limitation of offensive and defensive arms – both nuclear and nonnuclear. There will be a great demand for strong political will and wisdom of the leaders of the two nations and of hard work and professionalism of civilian and military experts – in order to restore arms control, which has historically proved its effectiveness as a barrier in preventing nuclear war and as a stabilizer of turbulent world politics.
The article deals with the Agreement concluded in July of 2015 by the group of states "5+1" (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China and Germany, and special envoy of the European Union) with Iran on its nuclear energy program (called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA). It is argued, that despite some controversial points the Agreement as a whole is tangibly limiting, reducing and restructuring Iranian nuclear-technical assets, its development program, stockpile and quality of nuclear materials, and is prohibiting potentially military activities. Of special value is the broad and deep regime of transparency, safeguards and control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which goes much further than the existing safeguards associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is underlined that objectively (regardless of Iranian intentions) manufacturing of nuclear weapon or some secret military activity of significant scale is practically out of question in Iran during the term of various provisions of the Agreement (10–25 years). As proved by the article, a crucial factor in reaching the JCPOA were the U.S. and European Union economic and financial sanctions, adopted against Iran in 2012. They led to the profound economic crisis, which brought the change of government at presidential elections of 2013, and eventually facilitated Iranian concessions (foremost, on the scale of uranium enrichment, deep underground enrichment complex, plutonium-producing reactor, and the scale of transparency). On the other hand, in contrast to American and Russian official statements, the unprecedented tensions between Russia and the West around the Ukrainian crisis since the early 2014 seriously weakened the unity and diplomatic dominance of the "5+1" group of states. Hence, it turned impossible to achieve still more far-reaching agreements on some principle issues (in particular, on the necessity for Iran to receive the approval of the "5+1" and IAEA for the parameters of its nuclear energy program justifiable by peaceful needs – as suggested by the Interim Agreement of November 2013). This has created a precedent for other states to claim the right for developing nuclear energy programs with dual purpose or suspicious elements without obligatory and plausible peaceful justification. It is also underlined, that the future impact of the Agreement on the global system and regimes of nuclear non-proliferation is unclear. The positive side is the JCPOA role in preventing the new war in the Gulf. The dubious aspect is that universalization of the limitations and transparency norms of the Agreement for the purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty enhancement is rejected by a number of states, foremost by Russia. It keeps to a tough position that the Agreement is exceptionally Iranian case, which is not applicable to other states, and in fact this point is legally fixed in JCPOA and IAEA documents. This Russian position is in line with its general stance against more restrictive interpretation of the NPT norms and against more intrusive IAEA safeguards. No doubt, in the foreseeable future, these issues will be a matter of serious controversies among states regarding the enhancement of the NPT and overall non-proliferation system and regimes.
The article is addressed to an unprecedented crisis of the system and process of nuclear arms control – including nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation. During a half century history of the practical nuclear disarmament (counting from the 1963 partial nuclear tests ban treaty – PTB) this process has had many ups and downs, but never has it been so deeply deadlocked. Although the two main nuclear treaties are still implemented: the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 2010 and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987, their future is increasingly uncertain and their validity is eroding, just as that of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and other agreements in this crucial sphere. For the first time in the last fifty years the world is facing a real threat of totally loosing control over the most destructive weapons created in the history of mankind. What is the most amazing – this is happening half a century after the end of the Cold War, when the hopes emerged that nuclear disarmament would finally become a realistic proposition. Dramatic events in and around Ukraine are badly exacerbating the crisis of nuclear arms control, but they are not its original cause. The article is analyzing the principal reasons of the present crisis: the transforming post-post Cold War world order; Russia's position and role in the new international environment; the military-strategic, economic and technological developments, which are leading to disintegration of former conceptual premises and mechanisms of nuclear arms control and which are not adapted to the changing objective realities. In conclusion some general proposals are provided with the aim of saving, adopting and enhancing nuclear arms limitation and non-proliferation.
The article is dedicated to the state and prospects of the US-Russian dialogue on strategic arms control. Military-strategic and political reasons of the deadlock of negotiations existing since 2011 are discussed. Special attention is addressed to the situation in the area of strategic nuclear offensive arms, anti-ballistic missile systems, and advanced offensive conventional long-range weapons. The ways of achieving a breakthrough out of the present dead end and progress towards a next START treaty are proposed. Foremost this implies shifting the accent from the resolution of the BMD problem to the limitation of conventional strategic offensive systems. Also political obstacles and conditions for the progress of negotiations are analyzed.
The article treats political, military and strategic aspects of disarmament process, in particular the involvement of nations other than USA and Russia. The author briefly analyses the positions of the European nations (United Kingdom and France), China, India and Pakistan on the issue. Also, the article covers the approaches of the informal and non-recognized nuclear states (North Korea and Israel).
Signing and ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the U.S. and Russia in 2010–2011 inspired the adherents of interaction between two nations on arms reduction in both states, as well as in Western Europe and the rest of the world. Due to the new Treaty, in 2010 the summit of the leading states on nuclear materials and technologies security took place; a regular conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) scrutiny went successfully. Many a one thought that after 10 years of stagnation it set the wheels in motion, and the world free from nuclear arms that the Presidents of both countries called for became a closer reality. But by the end of 2011, the optimism gradually gave place to a growing pessimism. During the ratification of the Treaty of Prague in Winter 2010–2011, both Parliaments raised reservation clauses as requirements for execution of the Treaty – almost diametrically opposed, and incompatible with the prolongation of negotiations on arms reduction. In the present article, the attempt is made to sort out the reasons of such drastic strategic "volte-face", and to suggest both ways out of deadlocks and ways to restore progressive advance in the matter of arms control, which is a binding condition for non-proliferation regimes enhancement.
The article is devoted to the problem of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear weapons reduction negotiations. Evaluation is made, to what extent nuclear states have performed their obligations under the first part of the Art.VI, the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The author analyzes the influence of the Great Powers' policy aimed at nuclear arsenals curtailing and reduction of the nuclear weapons' role in national and international safety assurance, as well as at carrying of nuclear war concepts and plans far off stage in international military and political relations, at enhancement of the worldwide "taboo" against any use of nuclear weapons directly or as a threat, at lowering the popularity of nuclear weapons in inside politics of many countries.
