Suchergebnisse

My interest in biopolitics took a circuitous route. My guiding interest in studying politics is the study of democratic representation. Democracy is a special institution. It holds out the hope that we can resolve our differences in a peaceful way by letting the governed govern themselves. As a graduate student, I was immediately taken by Anthony Down's (1957) theory of democracy. It just made so much sense. People hold preferences that are ordered and coherent. They derive utility from outcomes. Government policy should, therefore, reflect the distribution of policy preferences that maximizes the utility of the most people. Easy peasy, right?

AbstractSubstantial research concludes that favoritism toward members of people's ingroup, or ingroup bias, motivates people to oppose public programs that assist needy outgroup individuals. I argue that a gap in the empathic capacity for ingroup and outgroup members motivates and maintains ingroup bias in helping behavior and is sensitive to contextual cues that trigger anxiety. Using a novel experimental design, Study 1 demonstrates that anxiety exacerbates the outgroup empathy gap. Study 2 replicates these findings with an explicit measure of outgroup empathy. Study 3 shows that the outgroup empathy gap causes individuals to become less supportive of helping needy outgroup members. These studies suggest that opposition to welfare programs may go beyond simple prejudice.

Competition in political debate is not always sufficient to neutralize the effects of political rhetoric on public opinion. Yet little is known about the factors that shape the persuasiveness of political arguments. In this article, I consider whether cognitive biases influence the perceived strength of political arguments, making some arguments more persuasive than others. Lessons from neurobiology and recent political psychology research on emotion lead to the expectation that individuals are more likely to be persuaded by political arguments that evoke loss aversion via a fearful response—even in the face of a counterargument. Evidence from two experiments corroborates this expectation. I consider the normative implications of these empirical findings and potential avenues for future research.