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Abstract
Individuals seeking news content face a variety of options in the current media landscape, yet scholarly research provides little evidence regarding the conditions under which they might become more or less open to different partisan news outlets. Drawing on the case of Donald Trump's critiques of Fox News, I argue that elite rhetoric plays an important role in this process for members of both parties. I first conduct an original content analysis of Trump's tweets from 2017 to 2020 and find that he increasingly attacked Fox News on this platform. Notably, Trump's increasingly critical rhetoric about Fox correlates significantly with decreases in both Fox's daytime and prime-time ratings. Two survey experiments shed light on how individuals respond to this intraparty conflict, and I find that Trump's rhetoric affects both Republicans and Democrats. Republicans view Fox as less conservative and more critical of Trump when exposed to his critiques of the outlet. However, Republicans do not change their viewing habits until Trump promotes an alternative to Fox like OANN. Democrats respond to Trump's rhetoric by updating their perceptions of Fox's coverage and ideology as well as increasing their willingness to watch the channel, both in isolation and relative to an alternative like OANN. The results suggest that elite rhetoric is instrumental in shaping views of and demand for partisan outlets among members of both parties and can elevate more ideologically extreme sources among followers. Thus, elite rhetoric serves as a meaningful cue for individuals navigating an increasingly fragmented partisan media landscape.

AbstractIn recent years, sexism has played an increasingly pivotal role in American politics, and scholarship examining the importance of gender attitudes for political behavior has surged. Researchers have largely relied on the hostile sexism scale to measure prejudice against women, and this scale seems particularly relevant to political science research. However, this scale measures attitudes with an agree-disagree response format, which has long been recognized as a source of substantial measurement error. In this paper, we introduce a revised version of the hostile sexism scale that instead relies on an item-specific question format. Across three studies, we show that the item-specific scale is strongly related to the agree-disagree scale, but that the item-specific version reduces problems with truncation and tends to improve discriminant and predictive validity. Given these advantages, we conclude by recommending that researchers adopt the item-specific hostile sexism scale.

How do partisans react when their candidate wins or loses a gubernatorial election? Previous work shows that when parties win presidential elections, demand for their affiliated local newspapers decreases relative to the losing party's newspapers. However, it is unclear if this negative link extends beyond presidential races into state-level elections. To test this relationship, we analyze demand for partisan and non-partisan newspapers in Virginia and New Jersey—two states that hold off-cycle gubernatorial elections with no competition from federal elections—from 1933 to 2005. We find demand for local newspapers associated with the winning party declines after gubernatorial elections compared to demand for other newspapers. The results also shed light on whether (and which) winning partisans are disengaging completely or shifting their consumption to independent newspapers. Taken together, our study suggests that state-level elections significantly influence local newspaper consumption and adds valuable local context to our understanding of the political dynamics of news demand.

Since the 2016 US presidential campaign and the rise of the #MeToo movement, issues of sexual assault and harassment have risen to prominence. At the same time, these issues have also been understood and evaluated through the lens of partisanship. The US Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Brett Kavanaugh exemplified these dynamics by providing clear partisan and emotion-laden cues to citizens. Given these events' temporal proximity to the midterms, we argue that the confirmation hearings not only amplified an ongoing conversation, but also heightened the effect of sexist predispositions on turnout. Using a unique online survey with validated voter turnout in the 2018 midterms, we find that higher levels of modern sexism increased turnout among Republicans while lower levels of modern sexism increased turnout among Democrats. In 2018, sexist predispositions triggered turnout in opposing ways across the aisle.

Issues of sexual assault, sexual harassment, and gendered power imbalances have risen to prominence in the wake of the 2016 US presidential election and the rise of the #MeToo movement. This paper uses original panel and cross-sectional data to assess the degree to which levels of sexism have changed in response to current events, and finds very little change in levels of sexism from 2004 to 2018. The results also suggest that modern sexism significantly correlates with views undercutting the pervasiveness of sexual misconduct, purporting that #MeToo has gone too far, and opposing mandatory workplace harassment training, among other beliefs. Overall, the evidence suggests that modern sexism is firmly entrenched in the public mind and readily connected to public opinion in the wake of #MeToo.

What position do far-right news outlets occupy in contemporary U.S. politics, and how did Trump use the power of the presidency to contribute to their rise among Republican legislators and mainstream American media? We posit that Trump's position as president, in conjunction with his populist communication style that favored far-right outlets, contributed to the legitimation of such outlets. We first analyze Trump's tweets during his presidency (January 2017–January 2021) mentioning three far-right outlets (One America News Network, Newsmax, and Breitbart), conceptualizing these messages as authority signals that symbolically lend legitimacy to the media sources. We then provide rich descriptive information regarding subsequent mentions of the far-right outlets in four national mainstream newspapers as well as appearances by GOP (Republican) members of Congress in the far-right outlets. We find significant and positive correlations between Trump's tweets and mainstream media coverage of One America News Network (OANN) and Newsmax, and significant and positive correlations between Trump's tweets and GOP Congressional interviews on OANN and Newsmax. Together, these results represent an example of presidential authority signals that bolster far-right outlets and aid in their legitimization among legislators and the mainstream press. The findings shed light on the role of political leaders in the recent mainstreaming of the far-right across many democratic countries.