The Problem of Measurement and Evaluation of Individual Scientific Productivity
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 392-401
ISSN: 2336-8225
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In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 392-401
ISSN: 2336-8225
N/A
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 71, Heft 6, S. 642-667
ISSN: 2336-8225
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 70, Heft 3, S. 288-311
ISSN: 2336-8225
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 68, Heft 6, S. 679-694
ISSN: 2336-8225
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 66, Heft 3, S. 344-365
ISSN: 2336-8225
N/A
In: Acta oeconomica Pragensia: vědecký časopis Vysoke Školy Ekonomické v Praze, Band 21, Heft 6, S. 3-20
ISSN: 1804-2112
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 113-132
ISSN: 2336-8225
N/A
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 113-132
ISSN: 0032-3233
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 57, Heft 4, S. 495-508
ISSN: 2336-8225
N/A
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 57, Heft 4, S. 495-508
ISSN: 0032-3233
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 53, Heft 6, S. 747-764
ISSN: 2336-8225
N/A
In: Policy & internet
ISSN: 1944-2866
AbstractThe digitalization of the economy and state administration are important economic research topics. This paper focuses on value‐added tax and its collection from the e‐government perspective, more precisely, the digitalization of tax administration. Research has examined the digitalization of tax collection and its effect on tax evasion only to a limited extent. Our paper examines the impact of the level of e‐government expressed by the e‐government Development Index on value‐added tax (VAT) evasion as measured by the VAT gap. A dynamic panel regression model on the European Union (EU) Member States data between 2003 and 2020 showed that more developed e‐government reduces the VAT gap, that is, improves VAT collection. In addition to the e‐government level, the VAT share in tax revenues also reduces tax evasion. On the other hand, the factors that increase the VAT gap are the final consumption of households and the standard rate. Apart from these results, VAT evasion in original and new EU Member States was found to be affected by different factors. This fact should be considered when deciding the tax policy.
In: Ekonomický časopis: časopis pre ekonomickú teóriu, hospodársku politiku, spoločensko-ekonomické prognózovanie = Journal of economics, Band 71, Heft 10, S. 596-617
ISSN: 0013-3035
In: Post-communist economies, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 127-146
ISSN: 1465-3958
In: CESifo economic studies: a joint initiative of the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute, Band 68, Heft 3, S. 297-318
ISSN: 1612-7501
Abstract
VAT represents one of the most important taxes in the EU; however, this tax is highly affected by tax evasion. To combat these frauds, almost all the member states have implemented anti-fraud measures. This article focuses on the regular reports required from VAT payers in some EU member states. This tool is called differently in various countries; this article adopts the name VAT listing. The main aim of this article is to find out whether these measures contribute to a better collection of VAT. The level of VAT collection is within the analysis expressed by the VAT gap. In the panel regression model, the effect of the introduction of VAT listings on the size of the VAT gap was determined using control variables potentially affecting the VAT gap. The results were then verified using an alternative difference-in-differences design with multiple time periods. The results showed that VAT listings reduce the value of the VAT gap, as does using of credit cards for payments and low corruption in the country. On the other hand, the implicit rate of consumption taxes, the final consumption, imports from EU countries, and the number of items in the reverse charge increase the VAT gap. (JEL codes: C33, H26)