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Executive SummaryBrexit creates deep challenges for the UK's structure of governance; not least concerning the degree and manner in which powers are devolved within one of the most centralised countries in the world. Departing from the EU is likely to exacerbate regional inequalities and possibly social divide, while at the same time leading to further centralisation of powers, at least in the short term. Most Brexit analysis looks at the reorientation of the UK's external relationships, but the most significant impact may be on its internal constitutional affairs.While it is generally agreed that the UK needs more devolution, there is little discussion about how and why it sometimes succeeds, but also sometimes falls short of expectations. Ever since Adam Smith it has been known that economic prosperity, justice, and social cooperation are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, policy must be built around community and a sense of belonging, rather than a collection of anonymous individuals. The Core Design Principles set out by Elinor Ostrom provide a framework to transform governance structure at every level from the smallest communities all the way to parliament.Necessary institutional changes include giving local authorities much greater control over revenue-raising powers and therefore the services they wish to support. National legislatures must have the power to borrow for investment without limit, but with sole responsibility for repayment, to enhance local political accountability. A statutory body should be established, including representatives of the devolved assemblies and English regions, to address regional disparities, and there should be a much stronger regional presence in decision-making by HM Treasury and the Bank of England.

This paper examines whether EU membership enhances or diminishes the UK's financial sector stability, and therefore its prominence in global finance. The UK is host to the largest share of financial services in the EU, despite being outside of the Eurozone. An important reason is that, as a member of the EU, the UK has direct access to the Eurozone's financial infrastructure. If the UK leaves the EU (and EEA) banks and other financial services firms may continue to have access to the Single Market, but they are unlikely to have direct access to the Eurozone's infrastructure. Banks in the UK will no longer be direct members the Eurozone's payments system. The swap arrangement between the European Central Bank and Bank of England would have no legal enforcement mechanism. Resolution of cross-border banks would be more challenging with less incentive for a cooperative outcome. While some may welcome the reduced size of the financial system, not without reason, this could be achieved more effectively with domestic regulation than by leaving the EU. Given the uncertainty that would follow a vote to leave, there is a risk of capital flight.

Parental beliefs are recognised by psychologists as an important causal influence on child development. A two-period model of human capital accumulation in the framework of Becker and Tomes (1986) is presented. In the first period parents transfer their beliefs, distinct from genes, to children by signalling their 'belief in a just world' or their perceived return to effort. Children respond by choosing effort, irrespective of the real world returns, which combines with their genes to create early ability. This determines the rate of return to second-period investment and final attainment. If parents are credit constrained, both beliefs and income determine attainment. Empirical analysis using the second generation of the NCDS shows that beliefs are a strong predictor of early attainment and significantly reduce the importance of parental income. The identifying assumption is that parent beliefs are slow-moving and not conditioned on the child.

Trust allows financial transactions to take place when contracts are incomplete and the cost of negotiating too great for the parties involved. Banking covers many different types of transactions in assets with different levels of incomplete contracts. Investment banks have traditionally dealt with assets with incomplete contracts and often traded on informal and opaque markets. The creation of new global banks combined know-how, capital and collateral to generate enormous growth in these markets. While global banks developed trust with counterparties in specific markets, the opacity combined with limited liability structures also created principal-agent problems. The scandals which emerged are a reflection of these agency problems and have left trust in the banks greatly diminished. If levels of trust remain so low, this will be consistent with ongoing bank vulnerability, less lending to finance risky but profitable investment projects, and consequently lower economic activity. Regulation can support private incentives to accept codes of conduct which enhance trust.

The government set up the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) to consider structural and non-structural measures to promote stability and competition in the UK banking system. They have produced a comprehensive assessment covering some of the key issues facing the banking industry. The ICB's three core recommendations are: a ring-fence to separate retail and wholesale banking activities; banks are required to have more lossabsorbing capital; and greater competition in retail banking markets. In some respects, the recommendations are a step back towards an earlier time of compartmentalised banking. The litmus test is whether they deliver a similar period of financial stability and economic growth.

The Scotland Bill 2015–16 would make the Scottish government one of the most powerful sub-central governments in the OECD in terms of its control over spending and taxation. The UK government has also announced plans to introduce 'English Votes for English Laws' (EVEL), where the support of a majority of English MPs would be necessary to pass legislation deemed to impact on England only. The objective of this paper is to examine the potential for spillovers to arise in monetary unions of asymmetric nations where fiscal policy choices are taken locally. We extend a model of Chari and Kehoe (2008) to show the sub-optimal consequences of devolved fiscal policy in a moneteary union with a dominant member state. Because England is so much larger than the other constituent nations of the UK, its fiscal policy choices will have a commensurately stronger impact on UK monetary policy. As a result, UK monetary policy might be inappropriate for the smaller nations, calling into question the economic efficiency of EVEL. This is a general result which arises from the asymmetry of nations rather than specific UK funding arrangements or behavioural responses.