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The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is published annually to make students and other researchers aware of strategic topics that are, or should be, of particular concern to the Department of Defense and the U.S. Army. The list is a compilation of input from the faculty of the U.S. Army War College as well as input from subject matter experts across the field of strategic studies. The topics reflect current as well as longer-term strategic issues, and are revised as the changing security environment warrants. ; "2010." ; Functional Strategic Issues / POC: Dallas Owens -- Overseas contingency operations -- Homeland security/homeland defense/civil support -- Military change -- National security strategy/national military strategy -- Landpower employment -- Landpower generation and sustainment -- Leadership, personnel management, and culture -- Regional Strategic Issues / POC: Steven Metz -- Evolving regional security matters in Africa -- Evolving regional security matters in the Middle East and the Islamic world -- Evolving regional security matters in the Asia-Pacific -- Evolving regional security matters in Europe -- Evolving regional security matters in South Asia -- Evolving regional security matters in Central Asia -- Evolving regional security matters in the western hemisphere -- Other. ; The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is published annually to make students and other researchers aware of strategic topics that are, or should be, of particular concern to the Department of Defense and the U.S. Army. The list is a compilation of input from the faculty of the U.S. Army War College as well as input from subject matter experts across the field of strategic studies. The topics reflect current as well as longer-term strategic issues, and are revised as the changing security environment warrants. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Mode of access: Internet. ; Latest issue consulted: 2009. ; Description based on: 2005.

"While it is impossible to predict the values and beliefs of future generations, a modest forecast is made by tracing global trends in the use of language and media, as well as in the use of information and communication technologies. The potential implications of these culture and identity trends for the strength of the U.S. "signal" in the global info-communication sphere are analyzed. The author suggests that the information that will dominate the 21st century, particularly the beliefs and values of foreign societies, may increasingly and more directly impact our own national security, making it ever more critical for policymakers to understand issues of cultural change and identity formation from a strategic perspective"--Publisher's website. ; "August 2012." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 21-25). ; Emerging trends of the information society -- Future politics of culture and identity. No one country or region will be likely to monopolize global "influence" in the 21st century, including us -- The prospects for master narratives to unify international action may be more limited -- ICT-inundated society will drastically change the way humans interact, in particular regarding issues of privacy, trust, and transparency -- Conclusion : potential implications for security and for defense. ; "While it is impossible to predict the values and beliefs of future generations, a modest forecast is made by tracing global trends in the use of language and media, as well as in the use of information and communication technologies. The potential implications of these culture and identity trends for the strength of the U.S. "signal" in the global info-communication sphere are analyzed. The author suggests that the information that will dominate the 21st century, particularly the beliefs and values of foreign societies, may increasingly and more directly impact our own national security, making it ever more critical for policymakers to understand issues of cultural change and identity formation from a strategic perspective"--Publisher's website. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism is a declared policy of the U.S. Government. Three key strategic objectives have been identified for accomplishing this: attacking al-Qaeda's terror network, undermining radicalization and recruitment, and hardening homeland defense. The present monograph proposes a distinct "jihad-realist" approach for undermining radicalization and recruitment to al-Qaeda. First, a brief discussion of six means for ending terrorist organizations is provided. Second, the premises of a jihad-realist approach are described. Third, a jihad-realist Shari'a case against al-Qaeda's terrorism is presented. In conclusion, key assertions are summarized, and several specific policy recommendations offered for national security personnel charged with formulating and executing counterterrorist messaging strategy. ; "March 2012." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 24-64). ; How al-Qaeda ends -- A jihad-realist jurisprudential approach -- Waging jihad : al-Qaeda's violations of the Shari'a -- Conclusion and policy implications. ; Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism is a declared policy of the U.S. Government. Three key strategic objectives have been identified for accomplishing this: attacking al-Qaeda's terror network, undermining radicalization and recruitment, and hardening homeland defense. The present monograph proposes a distinct "jihad-realist" approach for undermining radicalization and recruitment to al-Qaeda. First, a brief discussion of six means for ending terrorist organizations is provided. Second, the premises of a jihad-realist approach are described. Third, a jihad-realist Shari'a case against al-Qaeda's terrorism is presented. In conclusion, key assertions are summarized, and several specific policy recommendations offered for national security personnel charged with formulating and executing counterterrorist messaging strategy. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"The United States is no longer the only global center of power as it was in the first years of post-Cold War era. Neither are there just two superpowers -- the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- that define the course of global events. The new multipolarity implies the presence of several centers of power that will provide the opportunity for small states, such as Belarus, to move from one center of power to the other and/or to engage in a sort of geopolitical gamesmanship. During the last 10 years or so, Belarus moved from Russia to the European Union and back, while at the same time engaging in relationships with Iran and China. While relationships with Russia and the European Union have not been stable, the story is different with China and Iran. Belarus has always maintained a good relationship with both countries, especially with China. This demonstrates the increasing role of Asia in the geopolitical arrangements now and certainly in the years to come."-- Publisher's website. ; "May 2012." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 66-79). ; The small player and the Cold War -- Russian direction : from "union state" to conflict -- Western direction : the first steps -- Baltic response -- Asian direction -- The Iranian equation -- China directions -- Conclusion. ; "The United States is no longer the only global center of power as it was in the first years of post-Cold War era. Neither are there just two superpowers -- the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- that define the course of global events. The new multipolarity implies the presence of several centers of power that will provide the opportunity for small states, such as Belarus, to move from one center of power to the other and/or to engage in a sort of geopolitical gamesmanship. During the last 10 years or so, Belarus moved from Russia to the European Union and back, while at the same time engaging in relationships with Iran and China. While relationships with Russia and the European Union have not been stable, the story is different with China and Iran. Belarus has always maintained a good relationship with both countries, especially with China. This demonstrates the increasing role of Asia in the geopolitical arrangements now and certainly in the years to come."-- Publisher's website. ; Mode of access: Internet.

NATO used to be the world's most formidable military alliance. But its original reason for existence, the Soviet Union, disintegrated years ago, and its dreams of being a world cop are withering in the mountains of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the European Union's (EU) Common Security & Defense Policy (CSDP) has deployed 27 successful military/civil missions from Africa to Asia in the last 10 years. Through CSDP, Europeans are increasingly taking charge of managing their own foreign and security policy. NATO is no longer the sole and preeminent Euro-Atlantic security actor. But watching NATO fade into irrelevance would be a mistake. It is a tried and true platform to harness the resources of North America and Europe. NATO's future usefulness depends on its willingness to accept its reduced role, to let the EU handle the day-to-day security needs of Europe, and to craft a relationship with CSDP that will allow North America and Europe to act militarily together, should that ever become necessary. It is time for NATO 2.0, a new version of NATO, to fit the realities of an ever more integrated Europe in the 21st century. ; "July 2011." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-44). ; Introduction -- NATO's declining trajectory -- Common Security and Defense Policy's rising trajectory -- The Euro-Atlantic security space -- NATO's new strategic concept sidesteps reality -- Structure of report -- The EU Common Security and Defense Policy, 1990-2011. Background -- Britain and France change the EU's security equation -- CSDP institutions -- The Treaty of Lisbon -- The question for U.S. policymakers -- EU's Common Security and Defense Policy in action -- The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) -- The EU military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) -- EUMM Georgia : the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia -- Conclusions and recommendations -- Policy options -- Ramification of options -- Execution of policy recommendations #2 -- Impact of policy recommendations. ; NATO used to be the world's most formidable military alliance. But its original reason for existence, the Soviet Union, disintegrated years ago, and its dreams of being a world cop are withering in the mountains of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the European Union's (EU) Common Security & Defense Policy (CSDP) has deployed 27 successful military/civil missions from Africa to Asia in the last 10 years. Through CSDP, Europeans are increasingly taking charge of managing their own foreign and security policy. NATO is no longer the sole and preeminent Euro-Atlantic security actor. But watching NATO fade into irrelevance would be a mistake. It is a tried and true platform to harness the resources of North America and Europe. NATO's future usefulness depends on its willingness to accept its reduced role, to let the EU handle the day-to-day security needs of Europe, and to craft a relationship with CSDP that will allow North America and Europe to act militarily together, should that ever become necessary. It is time for NATO 2.0, a new version of NATO, to fit the realities of an ever more integrated Europe in the 21st century. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This monograph is meant to provide an unbiased examination of: the scarcity of natural gas in the contemporary security environment; the salience of natural gas in Russia's national security strategies; and, the natural gas pipeline politics in Eastern and Central Europe. While the tendency of most energy security scholars has been to collectively analyze Europe's dependency on oil and gas, this author analyzes the two energy markets separately, and demonstrates that natural gas is a more potent instrument of coercion in the contemporary security environment than oil was in the traditional security environment. Sufficient evidence is also provided that Russia continues to perceive NATO as a hostile alliance, and that future natural gas disruption by Russia -- which holds a monopoly on the supply of natural gas via pipeline to Eastern and Central Europe -- will prove deadly to the economies of many NATO member states. The salience of natural gas as an instrument of state power is emphasized in Russia's negotiations with Ukraine; this monograph credits the 2006 and 2009 gas wars between the two nations as the main causes for the failure of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Ultimately. today, Russia uses the same tools it used in Ukraine -- in the context of natural gas negotiations -- to bribe Western European nations; to divide the NATO Alliance; and to rule over its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe. Finally, the author emphasizes that with the Russian construction of Nord Stream and South Stream natural gas pipelines, and unless alternatives to Russian natural gas are found, it is only a matter of time until Russia will use natural gas as an instrument of coercion against NATO member states. ; "October 2011." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 133-148). ; Summary -- Redefining the scarcity of natural gas in the contemporary security environment -- The salience of natural gas in the emerging geopolitical model of Russia as an energy superstate -- Carrots and sticks : a look at Russia-Ukraine gas pipeline politics -- Divide ut regnes : reflexive control and gas pipeline politics in Eurasia -- Conclusion. ; This monograph is meant to provide an unbiased examination of: the scarcity of natural gas in the contemporary security environment; the salience of natural gas in Russia's national security strategies; and, the natural gas pipeline politics in Eastern and Central Europe. While the tendency of most energy security scholars has been to collectively analyze Europe's dependency on oil and gas, this author analyzes the two energy markets separately, and demonstrates that natural gas is a more potent instrument of coercion in the contemporary security environment than oil was in the traditional security environment. Sufficient evidence is also provided that Russia continues to perceive NATO as a hostile alliance, and that future natural gas disruption by Russia -- which holds a monopoly on the supply of natural gas via pipeline to Eastern and Central Europe -- will prove deadly to the economies of many NATO member states. The salience of natural gas as an instrument of state power is emphasized in Russia's negotiations with Ukraine; this monograph credits the 2006 and 2009 gas wars between the two nations as the main causes for the failure of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Ultimately. today, Russia uses the same tools it used in Ukraine -- in the context of natural gas negotiations -- to bribe Western European nations; to divide the NATO Alliance; and to rule over its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe. Finally, the author emphasizes that with the Russian construction of Nord Stream and South Stream natural gas pipelines, and unless alternatives to Russian natural gas are found, it is only a matter of time until Russia will use natural gas as an instrument of coercion against NATO member states. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force. ; "September 2011." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-26). ; Introduction -- Myth #1 : the British military is an effective learning institution -- Myth #2 : British civil-military COIN planning is strategically perceptive -- Myth #3 : the British military has flexibly adapted to the demands of COIN -- Myth #4 : the British military has an ingrained educational approach to COIN -- Myth #5 : Iraq represented the zenith of 60 years worth of modern COIN learning -- Myth #6 : the British can do COIN alone -- Myth #7 : the British "don't talk to terrorists" -- Myth #8 : "hearts and minds" and "minimum force" are sacrosanct elements of the British way of COIN -- Myth #9 : the Malayan emergency is the archetypal COIN campaign -- Myth #10 : the British military are the ultimate COIN practitioners -- The value of the British experience. ; This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force. ; Mode of access: Internet.

A vigorous debate is occurring among American elites with respect to whether and when the United States should relinquish its nuclear weapons. Bolstering hopes for tangible results is that a U.S. President is again publicly and forcefully supporting disarmament. While this debate, which addresses both technical and political factors related to abolition, may be the most serious one of its kind since the dawn of the nuclear age, the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy remains uncertain. The general approach advanced today in U.S. policy circles largely hews, after all, to the logic of the past 65 years: arms control and nonproliferation now, disarmament at an undetermined time in the future. Moreover, several conceptual and strategic barriers continue to block serious progress toward U.S. disarmament. By situating the current pro-disarmament rhetoric in this larger historical and strategic context, this monograph argues that there is reason to doubt whether the current push for disarmament will produce meaningful and lasting results. ; "November 2011." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 41-57). ; American abolitionism : new trick or old pony? (1945-91). Limited dissent for a wartime project -- Shaping the post-war world -- Three important shifts move the United States away from disarmament -- From Kennedy to Carter : the rise of arms control -- A Reagan-era rebirth for disarmament -- Shaping a new world order, or shaped by it? : from Reykjavik to rogue states. New risks and uncertain priorities in the post-Cold War world (1991-2001) -- Disarmament continues its retreat (2001-09) -- A new center or a return to normalcy? : the four horsemen ride to town -- Forecasting the U.S. nuclear future : yes we can (eventually?). The Obama administration : pledges and actions -- Continuity, not revolution -- Guarding your optimism : conceptual roadblocks to disarmament -- Guarding your optimism : structural roadblocks to disarmament -- Conclusion. ; A vigorous debate is occurring among American elites with respect to whether and when the United States should relinquish its nuclear weapons. Bolstering hopes for tangible results is that a U.S. President is again publicly and forcefully supporting disarmament. While this debate, which addresses both technical and political factors related to abolition, may be the most serious one of its kind since the dawn of the nuclear age, the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy remains uncertain. The general approach advanced today in U.S. policy circles largely hews, after all, to the logic of the past 65 years: arms control and nonproliferation now, disarmament at an undetermined time in the future. Moreover, several conceptual and strategic barriers continue to block serious progress toward U.S. disarmament. By situating the current pro-disarmament rhetoric in this larger historical and strategic context, this monograph argues that there is reason to doubt whether the current push for disarmament will produce meaningful and lasting results. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Our national security system turns our overall capabilities into active assets, protects us against the threats of an anarchic international system and makes it possible to exploit its opportunities. Today, however, the system is arguably in dire need of reform. Much remains in the dark about how the organizations that safeguard our national security are reformed because international circumstances change. The author examines a crucial historical case of military reform: the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)--the direct predecessor of Central Command. He discusses how the U.S. military adapted to the emerging security challenges in the Persian Gulf in the late 1970s by recasting military command arrangements. The RDJTF was one of the components of President Carter's Persian Gulf Security Framework, which marked a critical strategic reorientation towards the region as a vital battleground in the global competition with the Soviet Union. The author also suggests how national security reforms can be understood more generally. In this way, he lays out some of today's challenges that we must face in effectively restructuring our security and defense establishment. Especially in these times of fiscal restraint, a better grasp of institutional reform is very much needed. Based upon original interviews with key civilians and military officers as well as extensive archival research, including the analysis of material only recently declassified, this monograph is the most complete account of the establishment of the RDJTF thus far ; "March 2011." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 64-85). ; Long-term strategic thinking meets organizational politics -- The stony road towards the RDJTF -- The legacy : U.S. strategy in the Persian Gulf before 1977 -- From Carter's inauguration to the fall of the shah -- From the fall of the shah to the invasion of Afghanistan -- From the invasion of Afghanistan to Reagan's inauguration -- Epilogue : the Reagan administration and Central Command -- Conclusion and perspectives -- The Carter years and military command arrangements for the Persian Gulf -- A historic case, enduring challenges -- Where we are today : the state of the U.S. national security system. ; Our national security system turns our overall capabilities into active assets, protects us against the threats of an anarchic international system and makes it possible to exploit its opportunities. Today, however, the system is arguably in dire need of reform. Much remains in the dark about how the organizations that safeguard our national security are reformed because international circumstances change. The author examines a crucial historical case of military reform: the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)--the direct predecessor of Central Command. He discusses how the U.S. military adapted to the emerging security challenges in the Persian Gulf in the late 1970s by recasting military command arrangements. The RDJTF was one of the components of President Carter's Persian Gulf Security Framework, which marked a critical strategic reorientation towards the region as a vital battleground in the global competition with the Soviet Union. The author also suggests how national security reforms can be understood more generally. In this way, he lays out some of today's challenges that we must face in effectively restructuring our security and defense establishment. Especially in these times of fiscal restraint, a better grasp of institutional reform is very much needed. Based upon original interviews with key civilians and military officers as well as extensive archival research, including the analysis of material only recently declassified, this monograph is the most complete account of the establishment of the RDJTF thus far ; Mode of access: Internet.