This volume examines 'domestic colonialism' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and analyzes domestic colonies empirically - across several countries using primary, archival, and secondary sources - and theoretically, through the writings of leading thinkers of the period
This key text explores the relationship between cultural justice and sexual justice in multicultural societies. It focuses on three theoretical themes from a feminist perspective: the meaning and role of culture and identity in politics; the problem of autonomy in relation to culture and identity; and the crucial role of democracy in addressing the theoretical and practical problems raised by this set of issues. They illustrate these with concrete experiences of women and minorities who are caught in the dilemmas of gender and cultural justice, using case studies on Britain, South Africa, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, Mexico, and the United States--from pub. desc.
Contemporary scholars routinely argue colonialism and imperialism are indistinguishable. In this essay, I challenge this argument. While it is true the "colonial" and "imperial" overlap and intersect historically, I argue there is a central thread of modern colonialism as an ideology that can be traced from the seventeenth century to mid-twentieth century that was not only distinct from—but often championed in explicit opposition to—imperialism. I advance my argument in four parts. First, I identify key ways in which the colonial can be distinguished from the imperial, including most importantly the specific kind of productive power inherent in colonialism. Second, I examine how colonialism and imperialism evolve in meaning and are redefined by both champions and critics, in relation to each other in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries. Third, I examine the historical moment when colonialism and imperialism fully conflate after WWII through the UN process of decolonization as the "salt water thesis" delimits colonialism to mean foreign racialized domination, and it thus becomes synonymous with imperialism. I conclude with an analysis of why the distinction still matters in both theory and practice.
Using two recently published folios by Jeremy Bentham, I draw out a fundamental but little-analyzed connection between pauperism and both domestic and settler colonialism in opposition to imperialism in his thought. The core theoretical contribution of this article is to draw a distinction between a colonial, internal, and productive form of power that claims to improve people and land from within, which Bentham defends, and an imperial, external, and repressive form of power that dominates or rules over people from above and afar, that he rejects. Inherent in colonialism and the power unleashed by it are specific and profoundly negative implications in practice for the poor and disabled of Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries subject to domestic colonialism and indigenous peoples subject to settler colonialism from first contact until today. I conclude Bentham is best understood as a pro-colonialist and anti-imperialist thinker.
AbstractIn this address, I examine the lexical, geographic, temporal and philosophical origins of two key concepts in modern political thought: colonies and statistics. Beginning with the Latin word colonia, I argue that the modern ideology of settler colonialism is anchored in the claim of "improvement" of both people and land via agrarian labour in John Locke's labour theory of property in seventeenth-century America, through which he sought to provide an ideological justification for both the assimilation and dispossession of Indigenous peoples. This same ideology of colonialism was turned inward a century later by Sir John Sinclair to justify domestic colonies on "waste" land in Scotland—specifically Caithness (the county within which my own grandparents were tenant farmers). Domestic colonialism understood as "improvement" of people (the "idle" poor and mentally ill and disabled) through engagement in agrarian labour on waste land inside explicitly named colonies within the borders of one's own country was first championed not only by Sinclair but also his famous correspondent, Jeremy Bentham, in England. Sinclair simultaneously coined the word statistics and was the first to use it in the English language. He defined it as the scientific gathering of mass survey data to shape state policies. Bentham embraced statistics as well. In both cases, statistics were developed and deployed to support their domestic colony schemes by creating a benchmark and roadmap for the improvement of people and land as well as a tool to measure the colony's capacity to achieve both over time. I conclude that settler colonialism along with the intertwined origins of domestic colonies and statistics have important implications for the study of political science in Canada, the history of colonialism as distinct from imperialism in modern political thought and the role played by intersecting colonialisms in the Canadian polity.
AbstractWhat is a colony? In this article, I reconsider the meaning of colony in light of the existence of domestic colonies in Canada around the turn of the twentieth century. The two case studies examined are farm colonies for the mentally disabled and ill in Ontario and British Columbia and utopian colonies for Doukhobors in Saskatchewan. I show how both kinds of colonies are characterized by the same three principles found in Lockean settler colonialism: segregation, agrarian labour on uncultivated soil and improvement/cultivation of people and land. Defining "colony" in this way is theoretically interesting as it is different from the definition found in most dictionaries and post-colonial scholarship. There is also an inherent contradiction within domestic colonies as they both support state power over indigenous peoples, Doukhobors and the mentally ill and disabled but also challenge the principles of domination, individualism, private property and sovereignty upon which the Canadian settler state was founded.
After growing for decades, the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts both experienced a dramatic drop in membership during the 1970s. Since then their membership patterns have diverged as the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) continues to decline and the Girl Scouts of the USA (GSUSA) has reached near record numbers. These patterns raise two questions: Why the decline? And why the divergence? On the cause of decline, I argue that a younger civil rights generation, informed by a new set of post-materialist values, did not join traditional organizations like the BSA and GSUSA because their values were deemed to be outdated. The challenge for traditional organizations therefore was how to respond. Using path dependency theory, I argue that BSA and GSUSA—shaped by their own unique origins and identities—responded very differently to the critical juncture of the civil rights generation, which in turn explains the subsequent divergence in membership patterns from the 1980s onward. While the BSA rejects such changes in order to defend traditional values, the GSUSA, which established a commitment to challenging gender norms from its birth, embraces the new values and adapts virtually every aspect of its organizational identity to this new generation. As young people see themselves reflected back in the values endorsed by the GSUSA, its membership resurges, while the BSA continues to decline. I conclude by drawing out larger theoretical lessons on the meaning of change in American civil society in light of an increasingly diverse population.
Abstract.In the last 20 years, the idea that the social realm is under threat of decline or collapse has been a central theme in academic literature and political analysis. In this short paper I explore the meaning of social decline and its relationship to multiculturalism and diversity. Using the twin notions of participation and trust as two key measures of social decline, I argue that participation has not so much declined over the last 40 years (as Robert Putnam, for example, has argued) as it has changed because of what I call the politics of the us's—groups historically oppressed (including women, ethnic and racialized minorities and gay, lesbian and disabled citizens) who have created new kinds of advocacy organizations in order to change the norms of civil society itself. I also argue that such changes (while often perceived as negative in relation to a transcendent "us") are positive to the extent that they have made society more inclusive, respectful of diversity and just. Trust, on the other hand,hasdeclined but, I argue, this is also due to the politics of diversity as the us's fought for change and other groups responded by defending traditional norms and values, often in the name of a transcendental us, creating a vicious circle of distrust as each side feels betrayed by the other's victories. Thus, I conclude, to understand social decline, in terms of participation and trust, we must pay attention not only to the us but also to the us's in civil society. The tendency, therefore, to champion a transcendent us in order to reverse social decline, as many scholars and politicians seem prone to do in recent years, not only ignores the us's but may foreclose on their hope for a future free from discrimination and hate.Résumé.Au cours des vingt dernières années, l'idée que le champ social est menacé de déclin ou d'effondrement a été un thème central dans la littérature académique et l'analyse politique. Dans ce court article, j'explore la signification du déclin social et sa relation avec le multiculturalisme et la diversité. En utilisant les notions liées de participation et de confiance en tant que deux mesures principales du déclin social, j'avance que la participation n'a pas tellement diminué au cours des quarante dernières années (comme le soutient Robert Putnam, par exemple), mais qu'elle a plutôt changé en raison de ce que j'appelle la politique des nous – soit des groupes longtemps opprimés (comprenant les femmes, les minorités ethniques et racialisées, ainsi que les gais, les lesbiennes et les personnes handicapées) qui ont créé de nouveaux types d'organismes représentatifs afin de changer les normes de la société civile. Je soutiens également que de tels changements (souvent perçus négativement par rapport à un «nous» transcendant) sont positifs dans la mesure où ils ont permis à la société de devenir plus inclusive, plus respectueuse de la diversité et plus juste. D'autre part, la confiance a effectivement diminué, mais je soutiens que c'est également en raison de la politique de la diversité, car les nous ont lutté pour faire changer les choses et d'autres groupes ont réagi en défendant les normes et les valeurs traditionnelles, souvent au nom d'un «nous» transcendant – créant ainsi un cercle vicieux de méfiance où chaque côté se sent trahi par les victoires de l'autre. Je conclus donc que pour comprendre le déclin social, en termes de participation et de confiance, nous devons porter attention non seulement au «nous», mais également aux nous dans la société civile. Par conséquent, la tendance à prôner un «nous» transcendant afin de renverser le déclin social, comme le font plusieurs chercheurs et politiciens ces dernières années, en plus d'ignorer les nous, peut aussi éteindre leur espoir d'un avenir libre de discrimination et de haine.