Can civilians control the military?
In: Orbis: FPRI's journal of world affairs, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 41-57
ISSN: 0030-4387
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In: Orbis: FPRI's journal of world affairs, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 41-57
ISSN: 0030-4387
World Affairs Online
In: Defense analysis, Band 7, Heft 2-3, S. 277-297
ISSN: 1470-3602
In: The journal of Soviet military studies, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 32-45
In: The journal of Soviet military studies, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 32-45
ISSN: 0954-254X
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 172-191
ISSN: 1743-937X
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 172-191
ISSN: 0140-2390
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of Soviet military studies, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 193-220
In: The journal of Soviet military studies, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 193-220
ISSN: 0954-254X
World Affairs Online
In: American political science review, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 1269-1290
ISSN: 1537-5943
This article provides a partial test of the rational-technical model and of the patronage model of political mobility in the Soviet Communist Party. Two major hypotheses are examined: 1) the greater the number of patron client ties acquired by regional Party secretaries, the greater the probability of their upward mobility, and 2) the better the economic performance of the regions for which secretaries are responsible, the greater the probability of their upward mobility. Multiple regression analysis indicates only very weak support for these hypotheses for the 1955–1968 period in the RSFSR. Considerably greater support for the hypotheses is found when the following variables are controlled: level of economic development, political regime, and Party cohort. Changes in the level of policy conflict within the central elite are found to account for much of the variation over time in the explanatory power of the two models.