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While British coal miners are often cast in the collective memory as traditionalists, the article reveals a more complex conception of identity. During the 1970s and 1980s, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) combined ideas of heroic masculinity with support for the workplace rights of women and ethnic minorities. 'Muscular masculinity' was used as a resource to further the opportunities of disadvantaged groups and to defend the miners' own interests, as is demonstrated with reference to the ›Grunwick‹ dispute of 1976-78 and the great miners' strike of 1984/85. The miners' prioritising of muscular masculinity did not go uncontested at the time. Yet it was not until the events of 1984/85 that the NUM's cult of masculinity came to be seen as a cause of the miners' defeat and a problem for the British Left in general. Following a famous dictum by E.P. Thompson, the article argues that historical conceptions of masculinity should be measured by the standards of the time rather than the expectations of our present.

AbstractThe article proceeds from the observation that in the contemporary British cultural imagination, the figure of the coal miner tends to be presented as the embodiment of anti-urban and organicist qualities that in continental Europe are more commonly associated with the peasantry. Drawing on the theoretical insights of Raymond Williams, the article traces the genealogy of this 'structure of feeling' back to the time of the miners' strike of 1984/85 and further back in the 1970s. It argues that the 'ruralized' miner was one imaginary in a complex power struggle over the 'real' identity of miners that was waged between the industry and the state, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the National Coal Board (NCB), and, crucially, inside the NUM itself. 'Ruralization' was most vigorously promoted by union militants who sought to displace an alternative vision, championed jointly by the Coal Board and union moderates, which had situated miners firmly at the heart of industrial modernity. It was only in the wake of the defeat of the miners in the 1984/85 strike, and during the subsequent cultural reworking of this strike, that this structure finally gained dominance.

This article employs the concept of risk as a lens through which to explore discursive constructions of the nature of coal mining and coal miners in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s. Drawing on a diverse primary source base, ranging from songs and poetry to parliamentary debates and government files, it contextualises and refines labour historian Dick Geary's observation about the "death of sympathy" for the miners in the coal strike of 1984/85. It argues that over the course of the period, coal miners turned from an object of risk into its subject; they were transformed, in political discourse, from heroes and victims into enemies of the state and society. Although the notion that coal miners were a "special case" on account of the hazardous working conditions in which they laboured, continued to resonate in popular culture throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the political bargaining power of the "blood on the coal" argument became progressively eroded after its successful application in the strikes of 1972 and 1974. By the time of the strike of 1984/85, Conservative opponents of the miners' cause had turned the argument on its head: The very hazardous working conditions were taken as proof of an obstinate refusal of the industry to go with the times. The real danger, they argued, were not health hazards, but the miners themselves.

© GESIS. This article employs the concept of risk as a lens through which to explore discursive constructions of the nature of coal mining and coal miners in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s. Drawing on a diverse primary source base, ranging from songs and poetry to parliamentary debates and government files, it contextualises and refines labour historian Dick Geary's observation about the "death of sympathy" for the miners in the coal strike of 1984/85. It argues that over the course of the period, coal miners turned from an object of risk into its subject; they were transformed, in political discourse, from heroes and victims into enemies of the state and society. Although the notion that coal miners were a "special case" on account of the hazardous working conditions in which they laboured, continued to resonate in popular culture throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the political bargaining power of the "blood on the coal" argument became progressively eroded after its successful application in the strikes of 1972 and 1974. By the time of the strike of 1984/85, Conservative opponents of the miners' cause had turned the argument on its head: The very hazardous working conditions were taken as proof of an obstinate refusal of the industry to go with the times. The real danger, they argued, were not health hazards, but the miners themselves.

This article employs the concept of risk as a lens through which to explore discursive constructions of the nature of coal mining and coal miners in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s. Drawing on a diverse primary source base, ranging from songs and poetry to parliamentary debates and government files, it contextualises and refines labour historian Dick Geary's observation about the "death of sympathy" for the miners in the coal strike of 1984/85. It argues that over the course of the period, coal miners turned from an object of risk into its subject; they were transformed, in political discourse, from heroes and victims into enemies of the state and society. Although the notion that coal miners were a "special case" on account of the hazardous working conditions in which they laboured, continued to resonate in popular culture throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the political bargaining power of the "blood on the coal" argument became progressively eroded after its successful application in the strikes of 1972 and 1974. By the time of the strike of 1984/85, Conservative opponents of the miners' cause had turned the argument on its head: The very hazardous working conditions were taken as proof of an obstinate refusal of the industry to go with the times. The real danger, they argued, were not health hazards, but the miners themselves.