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'Imposing Values' provides an even-handed characterization of the differences between modern liberalism and classical liberalism about the proper scope of government. It also systematically and comprehensively discusses arguments for and against various regulatory regimes favored by modern liberals and opposed by classical liberals

This treatise offers a comparative evaluation of market socialism and free enterprise systems. It argues that a market socialist system would be responsible for widespread and systematic exploitation that is precluded or minimized in a free enterprise system

This treatise offers a comparative evaluation of market socialism and free enterprise systems. It argues that a market socialist system would be responsible for widespread and systematic exploitation that is precluded or minimized in a free enterprise system

AbstractThis paper answers the title question, "Yes," on both counts. The first part of the paper argues that modern liberals are socialists, and the second part argues that they are also social democrats. The main idea behind the first argument is that the state has effectively taken control of the incidents of ownership through its taxation, spending, and regulatory policies. The main idea behind the second argument is that the institutions of social democracy are replicated by the institutions favored by modern American liberalism. Specifically, the takeover of the American healthcare system, Social Security, employers' mandatory contributions to unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation insurance replicate the institutions of social democracy.

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) can impose significant limitations on what landowners may do with their property, especially as it pertains to development. These restrictions imposed by the ESA are part of a larger controversy about the reach of the "Takings Clause" of the Fifth Amendment, which says that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The question this paper addresses is whether these restrictions require compensation. The paper develops a position on the general question of compensation for regulatory takings and applies it to the ESA. The main argument concludes that compensation should be paid. It is based on the proposition that the goods provided by regulatory takings are typically public goods, and on a principle of fairness, which holds that compensation should be paid when those who benefit from a regulatory taking pay virtually nothing and those who pay receive hardly any benefit. It is argued that this principle is implicit in many of the Court's rulings on regulatory takings.