Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper revisits the classic question of legal origins: whether laws originating from common or civil law traditions are more effective in promoting governance rules with stronger shareholder and investor protection. But corporate governance cannot be easily disentangled from other sources that can influence firm outcomes. This paper disentangles these effects by assembling a new dataset of corporations in Egypt between 1887 and 1914. Egypt had an unusual system of incorporation. The main legal system was a close French transplant but entrepreneurs – Europeans and Egyptians alike – had the option of incorporating under any European law. This practice allowed extraordinary legal flexibility in choice of law, governance provisions, and board composition. The new findings show that companies incorporated under British law provided weaker shareholder protection than companies incorporated under French laws, especially in giving weaker voting rights to minority shareholders, preventing oversight over directors' borrowing powers, and limiting director rotation. These rules mattered for firm performance. Corporations with weaker investor protection had higher failure risk, were less profitable, and had lower firm value.

This paper estimates the causal impact of short-term aggregate fluctuations in Egypt, 1911–48, using global cotton price shocks. Firm entry was procyclical, and exit was acyclical. There were persistent differences between cohorts over the cycle; expansionary cohorts were of lower quality. The evidence supports models of firm entry with ex-ante heterogeneity. The findings highlight the extensive margin of entry as the primary adjustment mechanism. As a result, recessions had a strong "isolation" effect. This nature of firm entry amplified and propagated temporary price shocks.

AbstractThis article examines the composition of firm ownership and entrepreneurship in Egypt between 1910 and 1949 by assembling a novel dataset on multi‐owned firms. The evidence supports two main results. First, Muslim participation remained disproportionately low in partnerships but was distinctly high in corporations relative to non‐Muslims. Second, Muslim‐owned firms were frailer and more likely to experience early exits. The findings are consistent with the view that the region's institutional legacy, such as disparities in physical or human capital, created obstacles for Muslims. When these implications are tested, the findings show that only small‐scale Muslim firms had restricted access to capital. The skewness in Muslim firms' entry and start‐up size is probably the result of legal distortions introduced by the government, which entrenched a small class of political elites in large‐scale firms.

In the eighteenth century, European embassies in the Ottoman Empire started selling exemption licenses calledberats, which granted non-Muslim Ottomans tax exemptions and the option to use European law. I construct a novel price panel for British and French licenses based on primary sources. The evidence reveals that prices were significantly high and varied across countries. Agents acquired multipleberatsto enhance their legal options, which they exploited through strategic court switching. By the early 1800s,beratholders had driven other groups from European-Ottoman trade.

AbstractThe transplantation of European legal systems in the periphery often occurred via semi‐colonial institutions, where Europeans were subject to their own jurisdictions that placed them outside the reach of local courts. In nineteenth‐century Egypt, the option of extraterritoriality was extended to local non‐Muslims. Drawing on Egypt's population censuses in 1848 and 1868, we show that locals did not seek extraterritoriality to place themselves under more efficient jurisdictions. Rather, legal protection mitigated uncertainty about which law would apply to any contractual relationship in an environment where multiple legal systems co‐existed and overlapped.

Turkey imposed a controversial tax on wealth to finance the army in 1942. This tax was arbitrarily assessed and fell disproportionately on non-Muslim minorities. We study the heterogeneous impact of this tax on firms by assembling a new dataset of all enterprises in Istanbul between 1926 and 1950. We find that the tax led to the liquidation of non-Muslim-owned firms, which were older and more productive, reduced the formation of new businesses with non-Muslim owners, and replaced them with frailer Muslim-owned startups. The tax helped "nationalize" the Turkish economy, but had negative implications for productivity and growth.

This study examines the transplantation and evolution of business law in the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish republic, drawing broader implications for the economic and political determinants of legal transplantation for late industrializers. We show that the underlying political economy context was influential in shaping the way commercial law was transplanted and evolved in Turkey. Extraterritorial rights in the nineteenth century eroded the incentives to demand legal change by providing alternative legal rules to the non-Muslim commercial elite; the nation-building efforts of the twentieth century cultivated a new Muslim business class that was reliant on the state's goodwill for success and could not effectively push for more open access to novel forms of business organization.