Suchergebnisse

The establishment of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has pushed the constitutional boundaries of agencification further. After elaborating on the SRB's powers and safeguards, one can argue that its governance structure combined with its policymaking powers distinguish the SRB from all other agencies. While trying to assess its legality of establishment and empowerment, this paper seeks to identify the nature of the empowerment, whether Meroni is still fit for purpose, and whether the limits of institutional balance have been bent or indeed broken. After expressing concerns as to the SRB's compliance with the current EU institutional framework, the paper offers an alternative for exiting this constitutional deadlock by applying Weiler's theory of constitutional transformation. Such a solution would legitimize the SRB as well as facilitate the functioning of Banking Union.

Our contribution demonstrates and explains the ineffectiveness of European Union (EU) bank resolution rules, a core element of Banking Union. This inadequacy owes in large part to the limited access to and insufficient availability of EU resolution funds and inadequate national deposit guarantee schemes in most EU member states, in conjunction with the relatively high minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for many EU banks. In many cases, these requirements are unlikely ever to be met – particularly for retail banks most likely to require resolution in the euro periphery. We offer a liberal intergovernmentalist analysis to explain the inadequacy of the EU resolution regime by examining German and French government preferences on EU rules on bank capital requirements agreed earlier in 2013 and national deposit guarantee schemes agreed in 2014. These government preferences were shaped significantly by the preferences of national banks and bank associations.

AbstractOur contribution demonstrates and explains the ineffectiveness of European Union (EU) bank resolution rules, a core element of Banking Union. This inadequacy owes in large part to the limited access to and insufficient availability of EU resolution funds and inadequate national deposit guarantee schemes in most EU member states, in conjunction with the relatively high minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for many EU banks. In many cases, these requirements are unlikely ever to be met – particularly for retail banks most likely to require resolution in the euro periphery. We offer a liberal intergovernmentalist analysis to explain the inadequacy of the EU resolution regime by examining German and French government preferences on EU rules on bank capital requirements agreed earlier in 2013 and national deposit guarantee schemes agreed in 2014. These government preferences were shaped significantly by the preferences of national banks and bank associations.

As part of financial market infrastructures, central counterparties (CCPs) have long been deemed systemically important and are likely to gain in importance due to the regulatory developments mandating central clearing for an increasing number of financial products. This paper focuses on the regulation as well as the recovery and resolution of CCPs in Europe. The existing CCP regulatory framework consists of ex-ante measures, including, among others, capital and liquidity requirements, initial and variation margins, and loss sharing mechanisms. In addition, the European proposal for the recovery and resolution of CCPs (the Proposal) contains several ex-post regulatory measures mainly in the form of rules for recovery and orderly resolution. Having studied the prudential regulatory measures for CCPs contained in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation and the ex-post recovery and resolution measures of the Proposal, this paper puts a spotlight on the specific shortcomings of the existing and proposed rules, in particular in terms of misaligned incentives, externalities, collective action problems, and certain practical impediments, and concludes that it would be misguided to inordinately rely on ex-post measures. Highlighting the limitations of the recovery and resolution mechanisms, this paper proposes that given the systemic importance of CCP functions, it is critical to improve the ex-ante measures whose objective is to prevent the failure of a CCP, rather than ex-post measures, which kick in after its failure. Accordingly, recommendations for making such improvements are proposed.

AbstractThis article examines the political economy and law of bank resolution in the case of Italy – specifically, its treatment of three failing banks – the Monte dei Paschi, Veneto and Vicenza banks – which were resolved in 2016–17. These three cases stand out for the relatively large degree of discretion exercised by the national resolution and state aid authorities, ultimately with the permission of their European counterparts. This article examines the motivations of Italian authorities in lobbying the Commission for leeway in applying the bank recovery and resolution directive and analyses the intricacies of the legal framework to underline the extent of discretion exercised by policy‐makers. It concludes that the discretion visible in these three cases is not (entirely) contained within EU law, and that bending the law or turning a blind eye to infractions was key to understanding the EU approach to Italy.