Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Map -- Ch 1 Introduction -- What Went Wrong and How It Was Fixed -- Maastricht Criteria and Euro Adoption -- Parallels to the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 -- Structure of the Book -- Ch 2 Causes and Eruption of the Financial Crisis -- Causes of the Crisis -- Eruption of the Crisis -- Ch 3 Political Economy of Crisis Resolution -- Hungary: Straightforward Crisis Resolution -- Latvia: The Most Complex Stabilization -- Romania: All About Politics -- Lithuania, Estonia, and Bulgaria: Robust Anticrisis Policy without the IMF -- Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia: No Serious Overheating or Crisis -- Fast Financial Adjustment -- Ch 4 The Exchange Rate Dilemma -- The Baltic Exchange Rate Conundrum -- Why Latvia Did Not Have to Devalue Like Argentina -- Multiple Exchange Rate Options Remain -- Ch 5 The Banking Crisis that Never Materialized -- West European Banks Expand in the East -- The Vienna Initiative -- Ch 6 International Cooperation in Crisis -- International Monetary Fund: Financial Savior -- European Union: The Rookie -- European Central Bank: Voldemort -- The United States: Keeping a Low Profile -- World Bank: The Third Fiddle -- A New Pattern of International Financial Crisis Resolution -- Ch 7 Why Eastern Europe Acted So Responsibly -- Strong Center-Right Tendency in Elections -- Causes of Popular Fiscal Restraint -- Ch 8 Eastern Europe and the Fiscal Crisis in the Eurozone -- The Greek Tragedy -- The Greek Rescue Package of May 2, 2010 -- The South European Rescue Package, May 9-10, 2010 -- East European Lessons Dawn on the Eurozone -- Ch 9 Toward European Convergence -- Outcome of the Crisis in Eastern Europe -- EU Convergence or Divergence? -- The Last Shall Be the First.

This book offers a most comprehensive empirical analysis of the economic transformation of the countries comprising the former Soviet bloc during the first decade after communism. It debunks many myths, seeing transition as a struggle between radical reformers and those thriving on rent seeking.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the attempted transformation of Russia into a democracy and a market economy constitute one of the most significant events of our time. A transformation could hardly be greater, yet judgments vary from failure to substantial achievement. This book clarifies that Russia has actually become a market economy. Anders Aslund provides the most detailed and insightful assessment to date of the Russian transformation from a socialist economy to a market economy. His account covers the period from the formation of the Russian reform government in November 1991 through the autumn of 1994. He discusses the preconditions of economic reform, the formation of a reform program, relations with other former Soviet republics, liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, and privatization. The final chapter evaluates the transformation. As a longtime specialist on the Soviet economy and an economic adviser to the Russian government during most of this period, Aslund analyzes the original intentions of the government, what they were able to accomplish, and why they fell short. The book's general conclusion is that the greater the speed, consistency, and determination, the more impressive the results. The main threat to the reform process was the resistance from the state enterprise managers, who wanted to enrich themselves at the expense of the state. The reformers could only win if they acted swiftly and firmly. According to Aslund, the Russian transformation has not been too quick, as many maintain, but rather too slow.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was multiple, but the demise of the very economic system was one important component that in itself rendered its implosion inevitable, and with the Soviet collapse the Cold War came to a definite end. The purpose of this article is twofold, to depict this amazingly fast demise of a petrified economic system and to show how it was connected with the end of the Cold War. Today, the case for socialism is no longer persuasive, but it was not always so. Once, many intelligent people considered socialism not only morally but also economically superior to capitalism and democracy. They thought a benign state would pursue higher ideals than a petty democracy and execute them more effectively. In order to understand the demise of the socialist economic system, we need to comprehend its advantages as well as its drawbacks. Adapted from the source document.

Both Boris Yeltsin and the US failed to take full advantage of the window of opportunity between the August 1991 putsch and the collapse of the Soviet Union four months later. Bolder political action, greater economic reform, and more generous Western assistance might have precluded Russian resentment. This article discusses aspects of the immediate post-Soviet reforms. Adapted from the source document.

Discusses the pros and cons for Russia to join the WTO.

The global economic crisis hit Ukraine hard in the middle of a boom. The country was cut off from global financial markets; the banking system came to a standstill; the stock market plummeted. Kiev had no other choice than to ask for assistance from the International Monetary Fund, which then put $16 billion at the country's disposal. Soon industrial production also collapsed, foreign trade was curtailed drastically, the country plunged into recession. In the meantime, all of the signs are pointing point to recovery. Now the fundamental forms that have been put off for years must be tackled. Adapted from the source document.