Suchergebnisse

When the pandemic began, many opponents of North Korea argued that the country's leadership would not cope with a possible outbreak of a highly contagious infection, the consequences of which could lead to a collapse of the existing system of power in the DPRK. However, the North Koreans managed to hold out for more than two years preventing the first more lethal strains of coronavirus from spreading massively in the country. The first outbreak of COVID-19 in the DPRK was officially acknowledged in May 2022, and on August 10, a nationwide victory was already proclaimed. Foreign forecasts about the "imminent collapse of the regime" did not come true once again.
The first part of the article discusses the strategy of the DPRK to prevent the entry of the virus from abroad since 2020. Having assessed the strengths and weaknesses of their country, the leadership made a rational choice in favor of maximum isolation of the population from external contacts, observing strict anti-epidemic measures, studying the specifics of a new infection and the experience of other countries in combating it, as well as waiting for the pandemic to subside.

The second part examines the measures taken by the authorities to combat the first COVID-19 outbreak in the country in 2022. The country's leadership adequately assessed the scale of the threat and formed a strategy based on the specifics of the administrative and healthcare systems rationally distributing limited forces and resources. Open informing the population about the dynamics of the fight against the disease, as well as the personal participation of the top leader in anti-epidemic activities, demonstrated to the masses that the state did not abandon them. At the same time, the victory was not accompanied by a "collapse of the economy" or an excessive burden on the healthcare system. All this confirms the stability of the existing management system in the DPRK and its ability to provide effective responses to new challenges.

The presidential race of 2022 was fought on the background of the uneasy legacy of President Moon Jae-in between the candidate of the ruling Democratic Party Lee Jae-myong and the representative of the conservatives, former Attorney General Yoon Seok-yeol. Each of the camps was represented by a person who was not a typical representative of his camp and has a difficult relationship with the "core of the party". Lee is a representative of the inner-party opposition, and not Moon's successor. Yoon has found himself in the conservative camp after the conflict with the Blue House due to the logic of factional struggle and the absence of a third force in the politics of the Republic of Korea. Lee was called the Korean Bernie Sanders because of the promise of unconditional basic income and other social programs, and in foreign policy he promised to continue inter-Korean rapprochement. Yun had to reflect conservative discourse and advocated a tougher policy towards the DPRK, an alliance with the United States and the restoration of relations with Japan.

The elections turned out to be a record in terms of populist promises and black PR against candidates and their families. This led to a specific situation when, on the eve of the elections, both candidates had a high anti-rating and the final gap between them was less than one percent. In such a situation, the victorious Yoon Seok-yeol will have to face the split of society, the Democrats controlling the parliament, and the need to strengthen the unity of the party in the difficult international situation and internal problems.

Since the 1990s, there have been many publications predicting an imminent "collapse of the North Korean regime" or a shift of the country's political vector. However, this has not happened so far, and the DPRK's political regime continues to exist. What leads to such chronically unrealistic forecasts for North Korea, and what are alternative options for the future of this country in the short and medium term?
Revising a number of unfulfilled predictions, the authors try to explain the reason for these failures. They are usually closely related to an ideological framework, lack of information and dependence on certain sources, which leads to an underestimation of the DPRK's capabilities and misinterpretation of data, when any event is seen as a sign of the regime's imminent collapse. Using the theoretical approaches of G. Tallok and V.I. Lenin, the article identifies the main types of threats to the current political regime (external invasion, a coup within the elite, economic collapse, mass protests), as well as the likelihood of their implementation under the current policies of the DPRK leadership.
The authors describe several development scenarios based on an analysis of factors that can affect the situation in North Korea in the short and medium term. Maintaining the status quo stands out in the first place in terms of probability. Less likely scenarios include "sinofication" due to Beijing's growing influence on Pyongyang, military escalation leading to an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, political and economic crisis.