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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- 1 Regime and Opposition -- 2 Suharto's New Order: origins and opening -- 3 Regime Friction and Elite Dissidence -- 4 Proto-opposition: NGOs and the legal aid institute -- 5 Student Activism: from moral force to popular mobilization -- 6 Megawati Soekarnoputri and the PDI -- 7 Prelude to the Fall: the 1996 crisis and its aftermath -- 8 The Fall of Suharto -- 9 Indonesia's Opposition and Democratic Transition in Comparative Perspective -- 10 Legacies of Suharto and His Opposition -- Notes -- Glossary -- Bibliography -- Index

Nation, Islam, war, and peace -- Aceh, Islam, and Indonesia -- Birth of nationalism -- Rural and global networks -- The nationalist moment -- Violence, money, insurgency -- Islam to nationalism -- From war to peace -- Conclusion

AbstractA new nationalist mood is visible in Indonesia, expressed in increasingly bellicose rejection of alleged foreign interference in Indonesia's affairs and in demands for greater international recognition of Indonesia's power and status. This new mood has been visible for several years, but became particularly marked during the 2014 presidential election and under the new Joko Widodo administration. This article analyses Indonesia's new nationalism, especially as manifested in economic, cultural and territorial spheres, noting both continuities with past episodes, and novel features. A chief novelty is contemporary nationalism's markedly non‐ideological and non‐intellectual form; continuity is visible in its discursive style, with many contemporary nationalists anachronistically reproducing tropes rooted in earlier periods. The article concludes by identifying forces driving the contemporary resurgence of nationalism, notably the effects of democratisation as well as deeper feelings of insecurity about Indonesia's achievements.

Analyses of Indonesian democracy often emphasize elite capture of democratic institutions, continuity in oligarchic power relations, and exclusion of popular interests. Defying such analyses, over the last decade, Indonesia has experienced a proliferation of social welfare programmes, some with a redistributive element. This article analyses the expansion of social welfare protection by focusing on health care. At the national level, Indonesia has introduced programmes providing free health care to the poor and approved a plan for universal social insurance. At the subnational level, in the context of far-reaching decentralization reforms, politicians have competed with each other to introduce generous local health care schemes. Taking its cue from analyses of social welfare expansion in other East Asian states, the article finds the origins of policy shift in the incentives that democracy creates for elites to design policies that appeal to broad social constituencies, and in the widening scope for engagement in policymaking that democracy allows. The article ends with a cautionary note, pointing to ways in which oligarchic power relations and the corruption they spawn still undermine health care quality, despite expansion of coverage.

This article reviews the part played by lower class groups in Indonesia's democratic transition and consolidation. While mainstream analyses emphasize dominance of Indonesian politics by oligarchs and other elites, this article also finds many new avenues for lower class political agency. It focuses on two: fragmented activism, through which lower class groups organize and mobilize to advance their own interests, and electoral populism, by which candidates for elective office respond to the preferences of poor voters by offering them policy concessions. The article illustrates these propositions by focusing on the labor movement and healthcare programs.

In 2009, national affairs in Indonesia were dominated by elections that were held in two rounds: legislative elections on 9 April and presidential elections on 8 July. A second round of presidential elections was scheduled for September, but proved unnecessary because the incumbent, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, won a landslide victory in the first round, with just over sixty per cent of the vote. With his political party also coming first in the parliamentary elections, 2009 was President Yudhoyono's year: he becomes the first post-Suharto president to serve more than one term, and the first Indonesian president to be democratically re-elected. Moreover, in 2009 his government could also claim other significant achievements, including continuing positive economic performance which largely spared Indonesia from the worst effects of the global financial crisis, and, after two bombings in Jakarta in July, the killing by police of key Islamist terrorists. His government also demonstrated an increasingly confident posture and high profile on the world stage. With the third successful elections since Indonesia's transition from authoritarian rule began in 1998, the year also marked a milestone in democratic consolidation. Yet amid the triumph, both for President Yudhoyono and for Indonesian democracy, there were also stumbles, some of which point toward future dangers. The administration of the elections was bungled � so badly that had the margin of Yudhoyono's victory been narrower, the very legitimacy of his victory may have been in doubt. In the final months of 2009, the President's efforts to form a new government and set out an agenda for a second term were overshadowed by a series of interconnected corruption scandals, exposing serious misdeeds and a culture of mendacity in the bureaucracy that not only cast a pall over the President's much-vaunted achievements on the anti-corruption front but also pointed to underlying systemic problems in Indonesian democracy

Indonesia is alternately lauded as a democratization success story and derided as an exemplar of low-quality democracy. This article explains both Indonesian democracy's surprising survival and its defects by focusing on how it fended off three potential spoilers: the military, Islamism and ethnic and regional unrest. In each case, democratic spoilers were granted concessions and incorporated into the democratic system, rather than being excluded from it, pointing to an absorptive capacity in Indonesian democracy inherited from the predecessor authoritarian Suharto regime. Indonesian democracy's resilience and its defects are not in fundamental conflict, but are two sides of the one coin.

ABSTRACT: Research in many countries shows that where voters and campaign workers are motivated by material rewards, the brokerage networks delivering those rewards can be highly unstable. Brokers often exercise considerable autonomy, shifting between candidates, disobeying their directives, or stealing the cash or goods they are supposed to pass on to voters. What determines whether brokers betray their ca ndidates in such ways? This article answers this question by focusing on elections in Indonesia, where candidates construct ad-hoc "success teams" to organize brokers and mobilize voters. In proposing a model to explain broker behavior, the author proposes the division of team members into three categories: activist brokers, who support a candidate based on a political, ethnic, religious, or other commitment; clientelist brokers, who desire long-term relations with the candidate or with more senior brokers, with the goal of receiving future rewards; and opportunist brokers, who seek short-term material gains during the course of a campaign. Two problems of broker loyalty are then discussed, specifically: predation, where brokers misappropriate resources intended for voters or lower-level team members, and defection, where they desert one candidate in favor of another. Explaining the incidence of these phenomena, the author examines two key factors: the material endowments of candidates and broker evaluations of their prospects of electoral victory. Well-resourced candidates with poor prospects are most likely to experience predation, whereas less materially endowed candidates will experience defection. The article concludes by addressing the implications for studies of clientelism and brokerage.

In 2014, Indonesia faced its most severe threat of authoritarian regression since the transition to democratic rule began in 1998. Prabowo Subianto, a general with a fiercely reactionary record under the Suharto regime, and with a party platform that implied rolling back key democratic reforms, came within 6.3 percentage points of winning the Jul 9 presidential election. Here, Aspinall examines Subianto's background and the nature of his political appeal, explores how be came so close to winning the presidency, and analyzes the implications of his campaign for Indonesian democracy.

Democratic countries in Southeast Asia are deeply affected by a set of interrelated phenomena that is sometimes colloquially known as 'money politics'. Rather than being based on competition between different programmes, in such a system, politics can become highly personalised. Citizens might end up hoping for personal favours from their politicians while having few expectations that the system as a whole will function in their interests. As a result, such practices are a source of considerable disillusionment with democratic politics.

After the downfall of President Suharto in 1998, communal violence occurred in several Indonesian provinces, producing an image of the country as one characterized by strong ethnic politics. In this article, I propose that this image is mistaken. The political salience of ethnicity has subsided greatly as a new democratic system has settled into place. Overall, Indonesia is a weakly ethnicized polity. Ethnicity still counts in arenas such as local elections, but what prevails is a soft form of ethnic politics, with few of the deep disputes about ethnohistory or cultural policy that occur in more ethnicized polities. Moreover, rather than producing ethnic polarization, democratization has created powerful new norms of compromise. I present this overarching argument by advancing nine general theses on Indonesian ethnic politics and by pointing to explanations concerning institutional crafting, historical legacies, and the deep architecture of politics, notably the prevalence of patronage. Rather than positing definitive answers, I propose new questions and frameworks for investigating the weakness of ethnic politics in contemporary Indonesia. KEYWORDS: democratization, ethnicity, Indonesia, ethnic conflict, nationalism, elections, democratic institutions.

Scholars of Indonesia are still searching for ways to characterize the ordering principles of the new post-Suharto politics. In the 1950s and 1960s, Clifford Geertz's notion of aliran (stream) politics captured central features of Indonesian political life. In the 1970s and 1980s, the state took center stage, with scholars seeing the New Order state as standing above society, depoliticizing and reordering it. Since reform began in 1998, these analyses are clearly no longer adequate, but scholars have yet to find persuasive alternatives. This article offers one attempt to diagnose the fundamentals of political organization in contemporary Indonesia. It starts by emphasizing the organizational fragmentation that characterizes much contemporary political life. It seeks the origins of this fragmentation in two sources: the ubiquity of patronage distribution as a means of cementing political affiliations and the broader neoliberal model of economic, social, and cultural life in which patronage distribution is increasingly embedded. These two forces are often portrayed as being incompatible, but in practice they are frequently intertwined. This argument is first substantiated by reference to the project (Indonesian: proyek), a mechanism for distributing economic resources that is pervasive in Indonesia. The proyek formally adheres to the expectations of transparency and competition associated with neoliberalism, but is also a major source of patronage. Proyek-hunting drives much of the fragmentation in contemporary Indonesian political and social organization. The argument is then illustrated with examples drawn from four spheres: state structures, political parties, non-governmental organizations and Islamic politics.