Suchergebnisse

Dans un modèle simple de différenciation horizontale avec libre entrée (l'entrée se décidant à une étape préliminaire), on montre qu'une concurrence "forte" au sens de Bertrand peut être associée à structure industrielle plus concentrée et à un bien-être collectif moins élevé qu'une concurrence "raisonnable" au sens de Cournot.

This book provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. This measure reflects the weight put by each firm on competition for market share relative to competition for market size two dimensions of competition involving conflicting and convergent interests, respectively. It further explores several applications, such as the effect of tougher competition on innovation and of output market power on the emergence of involuntary unemployment, as well as the importance of strategic interactions for investment decisions. The Economics of Competition, Collusion and In-between provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. It aims to offer an alternative tractable model of firm competition opening the application of oligopoly theory to many fields in economics where general equilibrium features are crucial. It will be relevant to those interested in applied industrial organization, trade, macroeconomics and quantitative economics.