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Literaturverz. S. 33 - 34

Russia and four other CIS countries - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - are important energy producers and possess substantial reserves, particularly as far as natural gas is concerned. Russia alone accommodates about one quarter of the global gas reserves and has established itself - along with Saudi Arabia - as one of the world's two leading oil exporters. However, Russia's relations with OPEC so far have been largely a history of non-cooperation, and the prospects of future cooperation appear equally problematic. The prospects of the Russian energy sector are to be seen against the background of the newly adopted 'Energy Strategy until 2030'. The key problems tackled in the Energy Strategy are the so far generally insufficient exploration and investments in the new hydrocarbon fields. This is due to a number of factors such as the rising state involvement in the oil sector, the confiscatory tax regime, and the low domestic tariffs for gas. Deposits in the traditional energy-producing regions are largely depleted, while the fields which would enable maintaining or raising production volumes in the years to come lie predominantly in remote and technologically and climatically challenging areas. Their development would require the creation of appropriate production, transport and social infrastructure. The related total investments over the period until 2030 are estimated at some USD 1-3 trillion, implying that a substantial boost from the current investment levels is needed. In addition, the development of offshore gas deposits would require the construction of LNG plants, the expertise for which within the Russian gas industry has been very limited so far. Therefore, attracting more foreign investment and related know-how, and more private capital in general, appears to be indispensable for the government plans to materialize. Intensifying the existing 'Energy Dialogue' between Russia and the EU and deepening the mutual investment penetration would be highly instrumental in achieving these goals. The government's target is to increase, by the year 2030, oil production by 10% and gas production by some 40%, with half of the latter to be provided by the so-called 'independent' (from Gazprom) producers. The increase in the oil output would be largely channelled to domestic consumption, whereas half of the additionally produced gas should be exported gas exports are to rise by about 50%. The rise in domestic gas consumption will be constrained by the planned tariff hikes, which should facilitate the substitution of gas by coal and nuclear energy, and induce energy-saving behaviour. The announced target is to lower the energy intensity of the economy by about three times and bring it close to the levels observed in developed countries with similar climatic conditions. Domestic gas savings resulting from higher energy efficiency, but also reduced flaring and leakages, should further improve Russia's gas export prospects - along with the increased supplies from Central Asia and particularly Turkmenistan, where Russia has been recently successful in advancing its presence. The Russian government's target of exporting up to 20-25% of energy to the potentially promising Asian-Pacific region (including China) by 2030 mirrors the EU's stated objective of diversifying its energy supplies away from Russia. However, so far the results in this respect appear to have been mixed at best. While the geographical diversification of Russian oil exports has been slowly advancing, the diversification of gas exports has been constrained by the price disagreements with China and the limited progress with LNG. Given the envisaged sizeable overall increase in Russian gas exports, such diversification - even if successful - is unlikely to 'crowd out' Russian gas exports to Europe. This implies that Europe will almost certainly remain Russia's biggest energy export market in the medium and long run.

Die MOEL verzeichneten 2007 erneut ein kräftiges Wirtschaftswachstum. In den neuen EU-Ländern in Mitteleuropa, deren Expansion primär durch die Re-Industrialisierung geprägt ist, war ein Anstieg der Beschäftigung zu beobachten. In den anderen MOEL wurde die Entwicklung jedoch vor allem vom Dienstleistungssektor getragen und basierte nach wie vor teilweise auf der Ausweitung der Kreditvergabe der Banken, die allerdings in mehreren Ländern etwas gebremst wurde. Die Folgen der weltweiten Finanzmarktturbulenzen und eine Wachstumsverlangsamung in Westeuropa dürften die Konjunkturaussichten der MOEL nur unwesentlich dämpfen; der latente Arbeitskräftemangel und anhaltender Inflationsdruck aufgrund der Verteuerung von Energie und Agrarprodukten auf dem Weltmarkt könnten sich jedoch mittelfristig als Wachstumshemmnis erweisen. ; Sonderdruck aus: Monatsberichte des Österreichischen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung - WIFO, 81. Jahrgang, Heft 5, 2008 ; Economic growth in Central and East European countries (CEECs) in 2007 was driven primarily by strong domestic demand, especially for consumer goods. The latter resulted from both higher incomes (particularly in Central Europe's new EU countries) and expanding household credit (elsewhere), although the pace of credit expansion has slowed down somewhat, not least due to government efforts to avoid excessive 'overheating'. Another distinction between these two country groups has been in the sectoral patterns of growth the main growth engine was industry in the Central European new EU countries and the services sector elsewhere. The higher world prices for food and energy and further tightening of domestic labour markets led to mounting inflationary pressures. The latter proved to be particularly strong in the poorer CEECs, but was mitigated by an ongoing currency appreciation in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The recent surge in inflation is unwelcome news for the new EU countries aiming to join the European Monetary Union soon (especially the Baltic states, but in the longer term also Bulgaria and Romania); only Slovakia has a realistic chance to join the euro zone already at the beginning of 2009 as aspired to by the country's government. At the same time, higher inflation and further budget consolidation have improved the fiscal performance of several new EU countries; the latter is no longer a formal obstacle to adopting the euro (with the exception of Hungary). In contrast, fiscal policy in Russia and Ukraine has been somewhat loosened. Russia's sovereign oil fund, which has been booming recently thanks to soaring world crude prices, is being increasingly spent on industrial policy, aimed at diversifying the country's economic structure away from energy. The current turbulence in the global financial markets and a slowdown in Western Europe should dampen the CEECs' growth prospects in 2008 only marginally. The speed of their real convergence to the EU 15 will most probably stay at around 3.5 percentage points on average. Hungary's economic growth should even pick up slightly, as consumer demand will gradually recover from the adverse effects of last year's budget consolidation. At the same time, in Latvia and Estonia, 'hard landing' following a protracted period of demand overheating appears inevitable. The prospects of EU accession for a number of Southeast European countries have recently improved and should contribute to the region's overall stability and economic development. However, Serbia might suffer from the recent 'Kosovo crisis' and the potentially destabilizing consequences of the recent fiscal loosening ahead of the parliamentary elections in May 2008, whereas Turkey remains vulnerable to fluctuations in the world financial markets.

Die Konjunkturbelebung in der EU 15 trug 2006 zu einer Beschleunigung des Wirtschaftswachstums in den MOEL bei. Während in den neuen EU-Ländern in Mitteleuropa der Außenhandel kräftig wuchs und eine weitere Aufwertung bewirkte, geht die Dynamik in den meisten anderen MOEL vor allem auf die hohe Verschuldungsbereitschaft der privaten Haushalte zurück. Die Lage auf dem Arbeitsmarkt entspannte sich in den neuen EU-Ländern weiter, der Strukturwandel ist dort weitgehend abgeschlossen. In den Westbalkanländern verschlechterte sich die Situation jedoch zum Teil sogar. Die Performance der russischen Wirtschaft hat sich von der Entwicklung der Weltmarktpreise für Energie weitgehend entkoppelt; in der Ukraine schwankt das Wachstum dagegen erheblich und nicht zuletzt durch politische Faktoren bedingt. ; Sonderdruck aus: Monatsberichte des Österreichischen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung - WIFO, 80. Jahrgang, Heft 5, 2007 ; The economic recovery in the EU 15 in 2006 resulted in an acceleration of growth in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), particularly in the new EU member states of Central Europe. Helped by the recent massive inflows of FDI, these countries have become serious competitors on the European markets, particularly those of manufactured goods. The continuous nominal currency appreciations in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia reflect their gains in international competitiveness and will not affect their economic growth. In contrast, the contribution of foreign trade to growth was decidedly negative in most other CEECs, including the Baltics and the new EU members in Southeast Europe. Their growth rates - quite high in some instances - were first of all due to a boom in private consumption, largely financed by external borrowing facilitated by the dominance of foreign-owned banks. In some cases, the credit boom is about to overheat and produce 'bubbles', especially in real estate. However, the available policy options are limited while monetary policy is constrained by fixed exchange rate regimes, fiscal policy is already quite restrictive in general. In the new EU member states, the labour market situation is continuing to improve given that their industrial restructuring is nearing completion, and not least due to the sizeable outward migration flows. In the West Balkan countries, on the other hand, unemployment rates are generally high and rising. Their recent progress towards EU integration has been generally modest, even though greater political stability and growing foreign trade both support their economic recovery. With the exception of Hungary (where large-scale efforts at fiscal consolidation have induced a noticeable economic slowdown), short- and medium-term economic prospects for the CEECs are positive, whereas growth in Serbia and Ukraine remains relatively vulnerable to political risks.

Trotz der Konjunkturflaute in den Ländern der EU-15 und der Aufwertungen in einigen Ländern verzeichneten die mittel- und osteuropäischen Länder (MOEL) 2005 wieder ein robustes Wachstum. In den neuen EU-Ländern wurde es primär durch die Exportexpansion, in den anderen MOEL vor allem durch den boomenden Konsum getragen. Die Wirtschaftserfolge der neuen EU-Länder, aber auch der Beitrittsländer Bulgarien und Rumänien basieren im Wesentlichen auf der erfolgreichen Umstrukturierung dank massiver Zuflüsse von ausländischen Direktinvestitionen. In den westlichen Balkanländern verbessern sich die politische Stabilität und die Aussichten für die EU Integration zusehends, während Russland und die Ukraine nach wie vor von der Konjunktur auf dem Weltmarkt für Energie und Metalle abhängig sind. Nachdem die Umstrukturierung der Industrie weitgehend abgeschlossen ist, trat erstmals eine leichte Entspannung auf dem Arbeitsmarkt der neuen EU-Länder ein. Gleichzeitig ist die Arbeitslosigkeit in Südosteuropa jedoch weiterhin sehr hoch und dürfte durch die bevorstehenden Umstrukturierungsmaßnahmen sogar noch steigen. Obwohl die Exporte einiger neuer EU-Staaten dank der Verbesserung der Produktqualität kräftig expandieren, bleibt ihre Außenposition wegen der Gewinne aus den Direktinvestitionen stark defizitär. In Südosteuropa hat der Konsumboom eine rasante Zunahme der privaten Auslandsverschuldung zur Folge. Mit der erwarteten leichten Belebung der Konjunktur in der EU-15 und der Verbesserung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der neuen EU-Länder wird sich das robuste Wirtschaftswachstum in den kommenden Jahren fortsetzen und nach wie vor um 2 bis 3 Prozentpunkte über der Rate in Westeuropa liegen. Die jüngsten Erfolge in der Konsolidierung der öffentlichen Haushalte drückten das Budgetdefizit der meisten Länder unter die Maastricht-Marke von 3% für den Eintritt in die Währungsunion. Die verhältnismäßig hohe Inflation könnte sich aber in mehreren Fällen als problematisch erweisen. Slowenien wird somit voraussichtlich als einziges neues EU-Land die gemeinsame Währung bereits Anfang 2007 übernehmen. In den EU-Beitrittsländern Bulgarien und Rumänien ist mit einer Fortsetzung der derzeitigen Trends zu rechnen. Die Aussichten für die anderen Länder Südosteuropas hängen entscheidend von der Bewältigung mehrerer politischer und institutioneller Probleme ab. Zunehmend werden hier die Zuflüsse an ausländischen Direktinvestitionen die ausländische Finanzhilfe für Sicherheitsversorgung, Wiederaufbau und Einkommensunterstützung ersetzen. Die Erwartung eines weiterhin hohen Rohölpreises und die Festigung der politischen Stabilität lassen für Russland auch in den kommenden Jahren ein Wirtschaftswachstum von 6% erwarten. Dagegen sind selbst die kurzfristigen Aussichten für die Ukraine mit einer Reihe von großen Unsicherheiten etwa bezüglich der politischen Stabilität und der Energiepreisentwicklung behaftet. ; Sonderdruck aus: Monatsberichte des Österreichischen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung - WIFO, 79. Jahrgang, Heft 5, 2006 ; Despite an economic slack in the EU-15 and, in many cases, the revaluated currencies, the Central and East European (CEE) countries achieved a sturdy growth again in 2005. This was primarily due to increased exports in the new EU member states and, throughout the remainder of CEE, as a result of booming consumption. The economic accomplishments of the new EU member states and also those of the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania are largely based on successful restructuring, thanks to a massive influx of foreign direct investment (FDI). The western Balkan countries are increasingly benefiting from greater political stability and improved chances of an EU integration, whereas Russia and Ukraine continue to be dependent on the world market economic situation as regards energy and metals. For the first time, the largely completed restructuring of industries in the new EU member states resulted in a slight easing of tension within the labour market. Simultaneously, however, unemployment remains very high in many Southern European countries and, in view of forthcoming restructuring, may rise further. Despite an impressive growth of exports in many new EU member states, sustained increasingly by improved quality standards, the external position of these countries remains high in deficit, in view of FDI-related profit. In Southeast Europe, the boom in consumption has resulted in a breakneck increase in private foreign indebtedness. The anticipated slight stimulation of economic activity within the EU-15, as well as the increasing competitive capacity of the new EU member states, will also enable a continuity of the latter's sturdy economic growth in the years to come. This growth will continue to be 2 to 3 percentage points above the level of Western Europe. The most recent consolidation achievements in the field of public finances in the majority of these countries enabled a lowering of their budget deficits below the 3 percent mark, as required by the Maastricht criterion for joining the European Monetary Union. However, relatively high inflation could prove to be problematic in several cases. Thus, Slovenia will presumably be the only new EU country to already adopt the euro at the beginning of 2007. A continuation of current trends is to be expected in the EU acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania. The prospects of the remainder of the countries in Southeast Europe largely depends on the surmounting of multiple political and institutional problems. However, FDI influx will increasingly replace foreign financial aid, with a view to providing security, reconstruction and revenue support. Favourable forecasts regarding crude oil prices and the strengthening of political stability in Russia will allow for the current growth rate of approximately 6 per cent to be sustained in the years to come. In contrast, even short-term prospects concerning Ukraine are encumbered with great uncertainties which, among other things, relate to questions of political stability and the level of energy prices.

Ukraine's recent political developments have been rather turbulent and their effects on the economy controversial. The economy was rapidly growing between 2000 and 2004, albeit starting from a very low base. Among the growth factors were the devaluation of the hryvnia in 1999, the rising demand in Russia, other CIS markets and Asia, high world market prices of steel and a dramatic upswing in domestic demand for capital goods. Yet in 2005 economic growth slowed down dramatically, as the investment climate suffered from a re-privatization campaign, the world steel prices plunged, while imports were fostered by increased social spending and the currency revaluation undertaken. Newly available data show that the economic slowdown has reversed recently. Private consumption gained momentum once again, backed by an impressive growth of money incomes of households and expanding bank lending. The new Yanukovych government appears to be returning to the more liberal course pursued prior to the Orange Revolution cutting the corporate profit tax, re-instating the Special Economic Zones and shifting the social insurance burden from employers to employees. The consolidated deficit envisaged by the 2007 budget draft (2.6% of GDP) is to be covered largely by privatization receipts. Foreign trade developments during the past one and a half decades have been generally characterized by a re-orientation of trade flows away from Russia and the CIS. However, Ukraine's trade and integration relations with the EU have not advanced very much. The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement envisages the formation of a free trade area with the EU only after the Ukraine has joined the WTO; the latter seems now likely to be delayed and synchronized with that of Russia. The project of a Common Economic Space (CES) between Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan - agreed upon in September 2003 - remains largely on paper as well. Ukraine has scarce reserves of fossil fuels but an extremely energy-intensive economy. In order to reduce the energy dependence on Russia, the 'Energy Strategy of Ukraine until 2030' aims at using more nuclear power and domestically produced coal. An even better recipe in solving the country's energy problems would be a large-scale implementation of energy-saving technologies, including those brought by foreign investors. However, until now the FDI flows into Ukraine have been rather disappointing. The EU-15 share in Ukraine's FDI stock stood at 58% by the end of 2005. The relative political stability following the formation of the new government in the summer of 2006 is likely to bring benefits in the form of increasing investments and higher economic growth. The relations with Russia will almost certainly improve. Further price hikes for imported natural gas are likely to be gradual so that their impact on Ukraine's economy will probably be smoothed. The expected economic growth is 6.5% in 2006 and 7% next year, with annual consumer price inflation hovering around 10%. The recent upturn in exports implies that the trade and the current account deficits will be relatively small. In the longer run, a diversification of the economic structure away from metals and chemicals, and towards goods with a higher value-added, accompanied by an implementation of energy-saving measures, will be essential for ensuring the sustainability of economic growth.

Since the start of transition, the currencies of most East European countries have experienced an abrupt real depreciation, followed by a trend real appreciation over the subsequent years. Within the framework of a panel-data study for eight Central European transition countries - Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia - over a period of up to 12 years, we attempt to explain their real exchange rate movements against the ECU/euro. Theory suggests that in the medium and long run, real exchange rate movements can only be explained by real shocks, such as the shifts in tastes and technology. We construct a model decomposing real exchange rate movements into two components the changing relative price of tradables (the shifts in terms of trade, reflecting the quality upgrading of the countries' exports) and the changing relative price of non-tradables, relating the latter variable to cross-sectoral productivity differentials (capturing presumably the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect). Our findings suggest that not only the tradable sector productivity and the share of government in GDP, but also the terms of trade are significant determinants of the real exchange rate. However, controlling for sectoral productivities, we found no positive correlation between real exchange rate and per capita GDP, suggesting the relative unimportance of demand effects associated with rising income. The latter finding implies that the trend real appreciation in the countries involved (i.e. higher domestic inflation under a fixed exchange rate arrangement within the framework of monetary integration with the EU) may prove more pronounced than usually assumed due to the possible demand-driven component, as living standards and consumption patterns in transition economies are expected to converge to those currently observed in West European countries.

Die merkliche Wachstumsbeschleunigung, die 2004 in fast allen MOEL zu beobachten war, ging auf unterschiedliche Faktoren zurück. Die meisten Länder verzeichneten ein robustes Wachstum der Binnennachfrage. Die neuen EU-Länder profitierten auch von der relativ guten Konjunktur in der EU 15, die EU Beitrittskandidatenländer Bulgarien und Rumänien von der Steigerung der Zuflüsse an ausländischen Investitionen, die Westbalkanländer von größerer politischer Stabilität und verbesserten Aussichten für die EU-Integration. Russland und die Ukraine schließlich waren vor allem durch die hohen Weltmarktpreise von Energie und Metallen begünstigt. ; Sonderdruck aus: Monatsberichte des Österreichischen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung - WIFO, 78. Jahrgang, Heft 5, 2005 ; In 2004, nearly all countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) recorded an acceleration of economic growth and once again outperformed in this respect the EU 15. However, the reasons for this have been different across individual countries. In the new EU member states domestic demand has picked up, Romania and Bulgaria have improved their competitiveness due to the surge in foreign direct investment, the Western Balkans have benefited from greater political stability, whereas Russia and Ukraine have taken advantage of the high world prices for their major export commodities energy and metals. The accession of eight CEE countries to the EU on 1 May 2004 was well prepared and has provided an additional growth stimulus to the new EU member states, particularly for agriculture. The migration of labour force from those countries to the EU 15 has been moderate, despite the sizeable income gap and the stubbornly high unemployment, especially in Poland and Slovakia. The Baltic countries and Slovenia have already joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II and are planning to introduce the euro in 2007-08. However, in the remaining new EU member states persistently large public deficits are the main formal obstacle to adopting the euro in the medium term. The EU accession prospects for the countries of Southeast Europe have improved. Bulgaria and Romania have signed accession treaties with the EU and are expected to join in 2007. Croatia has been given the status of EU accession candidate, and Macedonia has applied for EU membership. Under an optimistic scenario the whole region might become part of the EU as soon as 2015. However, many of these countries face the task of solving the problem of huge foreign debt, which in several cases appears unsustainable. Russia and Ukraine are recording signs of 'overheating' due to the booming commodity exports and the resulting surge in current account surplus. The general macroeconomic picture is favourable, but serious structural distortions remain untackled, not least due to the rough climate for foreign direct investments.

The last decade of the past century has been dominated by growing decentralization in Russia, both in economic and political terms. The major factors driving decentralization were the weakness of the federal government and of President Yeltsin, as well as the poor performance of the federal budget. As a consequence of decentralization, economic policy in Russia was increasingly determined at the regional level, resulting in economic fragmentation and in numerous barriers to the movement of goods and production factors. Although the economic upturn and the relative political stability which returned to the country with the election of President Putin have halted the separatist regional trends, interregional economic barriers are still substantial. The enormous disparities across Russian regions observed nowadays are partly linked to the inherited economic structure and the varying ability of different branches to respond to the shocks of transition, but also to the policies pursued by the regional administrations. On the one hand, raw materials extraction and exporting continue to bring most revenues, benefiting the few richly endowed regions. On the other hand, whereas in many areas of central Russia a still unreformed and uncompetitive manufacturing sector (including defence production) is a major factor behind depressed incomes, some regions have been relatively successful in their restructuring efforts, often via creating an attractive investment environment. The 'core' area in terms of attractiveness for investors includes the axis Moscow - St. Petersburg, as well as the axis stretching from Moscow eastwards. Over the period following the 1998 crisis, the Russian banking sector has recovered substantially, with assets, market capitalization, and the volumes of both deposits and loans all rising in real terms. However, banking assets still correspond to just 39% of GDP - much below the levels observed in most Central European transition countries. The banks' capitalization of 6% of GDP, the volume of credit to the real economy of 15% of GDP, and the volume of household deposits of 10% of GDP are all signs of the sector's under-development. The bulk of loans is extended to raw materials' exporters, whereas smaller enterprises' access to credit is often restricted. In addition, the role of bank loans in financing fixed capital investment is negligible. All this points to the inability of the banking sector to provide efficient financial intermediation in Russia. On the one hand, this is due to the narrow deposit base - a legacy of the 1998 crisis and the long-standing capital flight, which may have resulted in a cumulated outflow of some USD 250-300 billion. Most households still prefer to keep their savings in foreign cash, although the developments of recent months could be interpreted as a sign of a possibly coming turnaround. Also, it is hoped that the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme starting from 2005 will be helpful in attracting private deposits. On the other hand, lending is constrained by the numerous legislative and regulatory deficiencies, such as the impossibility to enforce a collateral, the cumbersome regulations accompanying lending to small businesses, the absence of credit bureaus, etc. Although the Central Bank seems to be committed to enacting the necessary changes and has elaborated a comprehensive programme of reforms accompanied by a strengthening of the banking supervision, this is not going to be a smooth process. In particular, the planned transition to IAS will entail a number of problems. Besides, although the state will probably succeed in selling off its numerous stakes, the sector will remain uncompetitive as long as Sberbank, which now accounts for 67% of private deposits and is the only bank present in all Russian regions, dominates. In Russian circumstances, a way to encourage competition is to promote the consolidation of the more than 1300 banks, most of which are tiny and essentially represent treasuries of affiliated industrial enterprises. The interest of foreign banks to enter the Russian market seems to be limited so far, notwithstanding several liberalization measures undertaken recently. Disagreement over the degree of openness of the banking sector remains, along with the level of prices of energy, a major stumbling block in Russia's WTO negotiations.

The Visegrád economies have been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, especially its second wave. In response, macroeconomic policies have been markedly relaxed, with fiscal stimulus packages reaching up to 14% of GDP in Poland and Czechia. The projected recovery of the Visegrád economies from 2021 onwards should be significantly helped by the massive inflow of EU transfers, particularly from the newly established Next Generation EU recovery fund. Such transfers will boost their economies by between 2.1% per year in Slovakia and 1% in Czechia, at a minimum; the effect should be stronger once EU transfers to other member states are taken into account. The cumulative boost to the Austrian economy in 2021-2022 from EU transfers to the Visegrád countries is estimated at least at 0.12%, thus partly offsetting the net contributions paid by Austria to the EU budget (which stood at 0.31% of Austria's GNI in 2019). Given strong cross-border spillovers of fiscal policy measures and historically low interest rates, the governments of the Visegrád countries and Austria (and Germany) should be interested in a more expansionary fiscal policy at EU level for the benefit of the less-developed EU member states. In addition, greater co-ordination of national policies among the above-mentioned countries would be advisable in the planning and implementation of COVID-19 restrictions, as well as in the resolution of mass insolvencies that are likely to follow the withdrawal of large-scale fiscal stimulus measures. It might also be advisable to establish joint Central European working groups to analyse possible scenarios of the economic situation in the post-COVID world.

Die Konjunktur in den mittel-, ost- und südosteuropäischen Ländern (MOSOEL) kühlt sich zwar ab, aber viel weniger als noch im Frühjahr erwartet Die Prognosen für heuer wurden für die Mehrheit der Länder nach oben revidiert. Vor allem in der EU-MOE-Region hat sich das Wachstum vom Abschwung im Euro-Raum recht deutlich abgekoppelt. In einigen Ländern mehren sich sogar die Anzeichen einer Überhitzung, die allerdings nur in Rumänien Anlass zur Sorge gibt. Die Westbalkanländer profitieren von steigenden FDI-Zuflüssen, mehrere GUS-Länder von der expansiven Fiskalpolitik. In Russland dagegen hat der restriktive fiskalpolitische Kurs die Wirtschaft an den Rand einer Rezession gebracht. Die Wirtschaftskrise in der Türkei erwies sich zwar tiefer als früher erwartet, dürfte aber spätestens 2020 überwunden sein. Insbesondere die Visegrád-Staaten gehören zu Österreichs wichtigsten Wirtschaftspartnern. Ihnen waren im Jahr 2018 mehr als 10% des österreichischen Güterhandels, 20% der Einkommen aus Direktinvestitionen sowie 40% der Auslandsforderungen österreichischer Banken zuzurechnen. Gleichzeitig sind sie auch EU-Mitglieder mit brisanten politischen und wirtschaftlichen Herausforderungen, von welchen auch Österreich nicht unberührt bleiben wird. ; The economy in the Central, East and Southeast European countries (CESEE) is cooling down, but much less than expected in the spring the forecasts for this year have been revised upwards for the majority of countries. Particularly in the EU-CEE region, growth has decoupled quite clearly from the downturn in the euro area. In several countries there are even signs of overheating, although only in Romania this is a cause for concern. The Western Balkans are benefiting from rising FDI inflows, while several CIS countries from expansionary fiscal policy. In Russia, on the other hand, the restrictive fiscal policy has brought the economy to the brink of recession. Although the economic crisis in Turkey proved to be deeper than previously expected, it should be overcome by 2020 at the latest. The Visegrád countries, in particular, prove very important for the Austrian economy. In 2018, they accounted for more than 10% of Austrian goods trade, 20% of income generated by Austrian investment abroad, as well as 40% of foreign claims of Austrian banks. At the same time, they are among the EU Member States facing increasing political and economic challenges, by which Austria will not be unaffected.

MOSOE Konjunkturzenit überschritten Die jüngsten Statistiken deuten auf ein weiterhin robustes BIP-Wachstum in den meisten Ländern Mittel‑, Ost- und Südosteuropas (MOSOEL) hin. Der konjunkturelle Höhepunkt scheint allerdings bereits überschritten zu sein. Einerseits lässt die Dynamik der privaten Konsumnachfrage leicht nach, andererseits dämpft die Konjunkturabkühlung im Euro-Raum die Exportentwicklung vieler MOSOEL. Die Investitionen steigen weiterhin kräftig an, getrieben in erster Linie von EU-Transfers in der EU-MOE-Region und von ausländischen Direktinvestitionen im Westbalkan. Ein deutlicher Wachstumseinbruch ist heuer nur in Rumänien und der Türkei zu erwarten – Ländern, deren Wirtschaft sich bislang in einem Zustand der "Überhitzung" befand. Vor dem Hintergrund der österreichischen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft und divergierender Handelspolitiken der weltgrößten Volkswirtschaften werden auch die immer engeren wirtschaftlichen Verflechtungen Österreichs mit den MOSOEL analysiert. Insbesondere die Visegrád-Staaten gewinnen für den österreichischen Güterhandel, Tourismus und auch als Investitionsstandorte an Gewicht. Österreich präsentiert sich als Top-10-Exportdestination für sieben der MOSOEL, für acht zählt es zu den zehn wichtigsten Ländern für Importe, und für siebzehn Länder rangiert Österreich unter den Top-10-Investoren. Ausgewählte Indikatoren zu den österreichischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit den MOSOEL können kostenlos über interaktive Visualisierungen erkundet werden. ; The latest statistics point to ongoing robust GDP growth in most countries of Central, East and Southeast Europe (CESEE). However, the growth peak seems to have already been passed. On the one hand, private consumer demand is weakening slightly; on the other hand, the economic slowdown in the eurozone is dampening the export performance of many CESEE countries. Investment continues to grow strongly, driven primarily by EU transfers in the EU-CEE and by foreign direct investment in the Western Balkans. A significant slump in growth this year can only be expected in Romania and Turkey, countries whose economies have been 'overheating'. In the context of the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union and diverging trade policies of the two largest economies in the world, we analyse the deepening economic relations between Austria and the CESEE countries. The Visegrád states in particular are gaining weight for Austrian trade in goods, tourism and as FDI destinations. From the perspective of CESEE, Austria represents a top 10 export destination for seven countries, a top 10 source country for imports for eight countries and a top 10 investor for even seventeen countries in the region. Explore a selection of indicators on Austria's economic ties with CESEE free of charge with our interactive data visualisations.