Suchergebnisse

During the last two decades the CIS countries have received very significant amounts of technical assistance from international development organizations and bilateral donors. While this has played a positive and important role in the transformation of these societies, practically all stakeholders currently share the opinion that many problems have accumulated in the area of technical cooperation with CIS countries. This paper intends to outline these problems, analyze their underlying reasons - including the changing environment for technical cooperation in the CIS - and the interaction of the interests of beneficiaries, donors and providers in the process of implementing technical cooperation projects. The analysis suggests that a good understanding, recognition and coordination of the interests of all TC stakeholders and a reduction in the information gap between the various participants in the technical cooperation process are necessary for improving the effectiveness of technical cooperation.

As the Arab Spring unfolded and political unrest spread across the Arab world, Jordan faced an adverse economy as well. Fundamental to the economic challenge was high and rising energy prices, already heavily subsidized for consumers. With the government intent on staving off emerging political unrest through a series of measures, buffering consumers from increased energy prices being a key action, fiscal costs mounted. By 2012, subsidies on petroleum products alone were about 2.8 percent of GDP and 8.8 percent of government expenditures. At the same time, political unrest disrupted the supply of natural gas from Egypt and Jordan abruptly had to switch to using imported oil products (heavy fuel oil and diesel) to produce electricity. Consequently, the cost of producing electricity increased several folds. As the increased cost was not passed on to the consumers, National Electric Power company (NEPCO), bore all the increases in fuel prices and accumulate debt as a result. At approximately 17 percent of government expenditures and 5.5 percent of GDP in 2011, this was twice the amount of the petroleum subsidies. The chapter is organized as follows. Section two traces the evolution of subsidies in Jordan in recent times. The distributional impacts of reform would depend on how important the subsidized items are to consumers in terms of their expenditures on those items. Section three discusses this question from the perspective of richer and poorer households. The distributional impacts of reform would of course not only depend on how much consumers spend on the subsidized items but also on the extent of price changes. Sections four and five simulate direct and indirect impacts of potential reform scenarios across the income distribution. From this discussion, in section six the chapter moves onto considering how reforms are weighed down by vexing political economy constraints. In MENA countries, universal subsidies have been in place as part of the government's role in ensuring stability in the lives of the people and doing away with them is not straightforward.

Facing a fiscal crisis, Jordan initiated substantial petroleum subsidy reforms in 2012. The government has also long contemplated how to cut electricity subsidies, which surpass the fiscal burdens imposed by the petroleum subsidies. This paper estimates the impacts of the 2012 petroleum subsidies reform on household welfare and government revenues. It also simulates the distributional and fiscal impacts from ending subsidies in the electricity sector, where the pricing structure is more complex than petroleum prices. The paper looks at the direct and indirect impacts of reform. Moreover, the paper discusses the political economy considerations of reform. While the full removal of petroleum subsidies would have increased poverty, the compensatory cash transfer program the government instituted is estimated to have fully offset the negative impact for the poorer population. The impact of reforms in the electricity sector will depend significantly on the implementation method chosen. A flat increase of tariffs toward cost recovery will put a huge burden on the poorest households. However, a progressive increase in tariffs will generate substantial savings for the government, even with compensatory mechanisms to mitigate the strong negative impact on the vulnerable population. The immediate compensation of the losers from reform appears to be a crucial factor in the successful implementation of reforms in Jordan.

Facing a fiscal crisis, the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to increase gasoline prices at the end of 2019. This paper estimates the impact of the price increase on household welfare and government revenue, using the most recent Household Expenditure and Income Survey conducted by the Statistical Center of Iran in March 2018-March 2019. The paper looks at the direct and indirect impacts of the reform and quantifies the compensatory cash transfer program the government instituted. Despite very regressive gasoline subsidies benefitting the rich the most, the increase in gasoline prices is found to affect the poor to a greater extent due to larger negative indirect impacts as well as their relatively low incomes. In total, poverty is estimated to increase by about 2.9 percentage points, with the direct impact accounting for a third of this increase. The proposed government scheme, if targeted perfectly to the poorest 18 million households, would fully compensate the poorest bottom 50 percent of the population and reduce poverty to below pre-reform levels. The annual cost of the program will be around 338 trillion rials, which accounts for 77 percent of the estimated total savings from the subsidies reform (439 trillion rials).