Suchergebnisse

Preliminary Material -- Introduction -- Chapter One Early Links: European Colonization to the Start of the Korean War -- Chapter Two Early Cold War: Australia's Taiwan Problem, 1950–1972 -- Chapter Three Late Cold War: Australia's Taiwan Opportunity, 1972–Early 1990s -- Chapter Four Australian Policy Feels the Post-Cold War Squeeze, 1989–2001 -- Chapter Five Australia Sidelines Taiwan, 2001–2007 -- Chapter Six Confronting China—With or Without Taiwan, 2007–2011 -- Chapter Seven Politics Meets Economics: A Focus on Bilateral Issues -- Chapter Eight South Pacific Friction -- Conclusion Australia-Taiwan Relations in Perspective -- References -- Index.

In Australia and Taiwan, Joel Atkinson examines the intriguing and important Australia-Taiwan relationship. He covers its history, the role of Taiwan in Australia s relations with China and the US, and bilateral issues such as ministerial visits and the South Pacific.

AbstractOfficial Development Assistance (ODA) is defined by a motive: the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries. This review article considers the motives of one donor, South Korea, with a close reading and comparison of three authoritative texts. It argues that Korean ODA is primarily motivated by increasing status and influence, and supporting the overseas expansion of Korean companies. There is also a contribution from secondary motivations more clearly related to the definition of ODA: humanitarianism and being a good global citizen.

Historicising Chinese foreign‐aid thinking has become indispensable given China's increasing global role. This article examines a key aspect of this context: the Great Leap Forward and the emerging Sino‐Soviet split period (1958‐1961). The Peking Review is utilised as a window into official aid‐related discourses of the time. The article is organized around an aid vs. "aid" rhetorical and conceptual symmetry within the magazine. Aid is ultimately what Mao Zedong and other leaders intend audiences to code as pro‐development and prestigious. The greater the unreciprocated cost to the donor and the higher the embodied technology, the more helpful and prestigious the donor. At the same time, the more ideologically correct the recipient or donor, the greater its relative prestige in the equation. An ideologically correct recipient such as China deserves more help but needs it less, and accrues more prestige even as it gives comparatively less aid. "Aid" is the reverse image of aid in that it is harmful rather than helpful. But instead of being the opposite of prestigious, "aid" is powerful in a predatory, paper tiger‐like way. While this discourse reflects parochial concerns of the period, the underlying concepts are likely to continue to influence contemporary Chinese aid thinking and practices.

Taiwan's foreign aid policy is largely a response to its China-imposed international isolation. Taiwan provides aid without stringent accountability conditions to countries in Africa, the Americas, and the South Pacific in order to maintain official diplomatic relations in the face of Chinese opposition. Often at odds with this is Taiwan's interest in seeking western support through being seen as a responsible aid donor. Domestic political constraints on Taiwan's aid budget accentuate the tension between these two interests. Taiwan's aid program can be seen as the product of these three competing and enduring pressures - maintaining the count of official diplomatic relationships, improving its international reputation, and containing aid spending. - Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's tacit 'diplomatic truce' with China - part of a wider warming of intergovernmental relations across the Taiwan Strait - has reduced significantly the squeeze between these three pressures on Taiwan's foreign aid policy. It has allowed the Ma administration to improve Taiwan's reputation, while maintaining or even reducing its aid expenditure, and still retain the same number of official diplomatic relationships. Nevertheless, the Ma administration has not wanted to alienate recipient governments while the prospects for the diplomatic truce with China remain uncertain. There remains considerable continuity with past practices, and the government's handling of aid as a foreign policy tool is still largely opaque and unaccountable. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

Australia's efforts between 1950 and 1972 to create an independent Taiwan are an important, largely overlooked element of Australia and Taiwan's international relations. Australia saw de jure independence for Taiwan as a means to support the US while pursuing the interrelated goals of accommodating the People's Republic of China (PRC) and minimising contradictions between US China policy and the policies of the UK and other countries important to it. Initially Australia favoured the establishment of a Taiwanese majority‐controlled state. This preference later gave way to greater support for an independent Republic of China on Taiwan under Chinese Nationalist rule. Australia nevertheless consistently justified its policy via reference to the principle of self‐determination for Taiwan's people — either immediately in the case of a Taiwanese Taiwan, or postponed into the indefinite future in the case of a Chinese Nationalist Taiwan. Championing Taiwan independence lost its utility for Australia when Sino‐ US relations improved in the late‐1960s to early‐1970s, and it became possible for Australia to make the concessions over Taiwan demanded by China without damaging its relationship with the US. This shift preceded the election of a Labor government committed to building a friendly relationship with China. Australia then dropped its policy of advocating Taiwanese independence, and established official relations with China in late 1972.

China and Taiwan have become important actors in South Pacific affairs due to their diplomatic rivalry. Securing the diplomatic recognition of the Pacific Islands countries is expensive for China and Taiwan. There are limits to what the rivals are willing to spend, and they attempt to reduce costs. This dynamic shapes how Taiwan and China engage Pacific Islands politicians. It also motivates their high level official visits to the region, and how they engage South Pacific regional organizations. Despite criticisms that China-Taiwan rivalry corrupts and destabilizes the South Pacific, the issue of whether China and Taiwan's diplomatic rivalry has been beneficial or detrimental to the region remains contentious. China and Taiwan appear to have recently called a truce in their decades-old rivalry. This tacit agreement is still tentative, and the involvement of China and Taiwan in the region has yet to change significantly. However, Taiwan has reportedly begun to reduce funding, and is likely to reform its aid delivery in order to satisfy demands from the South Pacific region's dominant power, Australia, and to improve its image as a humanitarian aid donor. China is also likely to reduce funding while the truce holds. However, China considers its ties with South Pacific governments more important than responding to Australian pressure, and is unlikely to reform its South Pacific aid programmes as a result of the diplomatic truce. (Pac Rev/GIGA)