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The Soviet Union considered the Arctic a territory of great military significance. Since the end of the East-West conflict, this has changed fundamentally. The military dimension of Russia's Arctic policy plays a clearly smaller role. Moscow cooperates with other countries across former bloc borders and participates in circumpolar regional organisations. In addition, a number of large companies play an important role in the far north today. Although danger is more likely to threaten Russia on its southern border, the Arctic is still seen as a space that is not only of great economic significance but of relevance to security policy. Nonetheless, the potential for conflict in the Arctic should not be overestimated. Adapted from the source document.

In 2008, Russian leaders stated their intention to make the Arctic Russia's 'primary resource base'. This, and the region's growing importance as an arena for marine transportation and resource extraction, has led observers to question the longterm stability of the northern part of the globe and predict a new military buildup on the Kola Peninsula. Based on a review of Russia's previous behaviour in the Arctic, recent strategies and doctrines, the pattern of civil-military relations, and trends in the development of Russia's military forces in the region, this article argues that the role of the region in contemporary Russian security policy and defence planning should not be exaggerated. This analysis concludes that the character of Russian Arctic policy will largely depend on relations with NATO and the policies adopted by other Arctic rim states. The region's growing economic significance, the existence of unresolved jurisdictional issues, and the 'action-reaction' dynamics in the military field may lead to a strengthening of the military dimension in Russia's Arctic policies, but this does not mean greater militarization of the region is inevitable or even likely. Tensions in the Barents Sea region and other parts of the Arctic are much lower today than in the days of the Cold War, and hard security concerns in the Arctic do not figure at the top of Russia's current security agenda. While Russia's Arctic policy in the past was governed by national security interests, it is now increasingly governed by national economic interests and the interests of companies closely associated with the Russian state. Adapted from the source document.

Described as one of the world's most promising new energy provinces, the European Arctic is no longer primarily seen as a military playground. Russia's approach to the region is increasingly governed by national economic interests rather than by national security interests. The development of offshore oil and gas fields, the construction of new pipelines and terminals, the increasing traffic of oil tankers to Western Europe and the United States, and the conversion of naval yards to civilian production represent both new challenges and new opportunities for the Russian Navy. Issues that were previously considered crucial to the country's national security have slowly but steadily been 'desecuritized,' and new patterns of civil-military relations have emerged. This article discusses the relationship between the Russian petroleum industry and the Northern Fleet and the interplay between Russian commercial and military interests in the post-cold war European Arctic. Adapted from the source document.

In October 1987, during a visit to the Kola Peninsula, the Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, launched a series of policy initiatives which ultimately came to mark the beginning of the end of the Cold War era in the Arctic. The move was aimed at transforming the northern part of the globe from being a sensitive military theatre to becoming an international 'zone of peace'. This objective was to be achieved through the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northern Europe, restrictions on naval activities in Arctic seas, and the development of transborder cooperation in areas such as resource development, scientific exploration, indigenous people's affairs, environmental protection and marine transportation. This article analyses the contents of the Murmansk initiative, the context in which it was launched, the extent to which it materialized, and the degree to which it contributed to a normalization of interstate relations in the Arctic. In addition to being motivated by historical interest, the article aims at exploring the Copenhagen School concept of 'desecuritization' and shedding light on the challenges and opportunities of turning security issues into non-security issues. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008 NISA.]

Drawing on the constructivist concept of 'securitisation', this article analyses Russia's perceptions of, and responses to, Norway's Svalbard policy in the 1990s and 2000s. The analysis focuses on three policy issues which have figured prominently on Russia's arctic security agenda in recent years: (1) the establishment and use of civilian radars and satellite ground stations on the archipelago, (2) the adoption of the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act, and (3) the Norwegian Coast Guard's fishery enforcement measures in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone. The article concludes that despite the changes that have taken place in the Euro-Arctic region after the Cold War, Svalbard has not ceased to be a security concern for Russia. Adapted from the source document.

In October 2005, the Russian trawler Elektron refused to be subjected to arrest when caught by the Norwegian coast guard fishing illegally in the Fisheries Protection Zone off the Svalbard archipelago. With two Norwegian coast guard inspectors still on board, the trawler took off from its pursuers, heading for Russian territorial waters. Observers in Russia were outraged by the attempted arrest and called for Russia's Northern Fleet to flex its muscles as the hot pursuit in the Barents Sea unfolded. The purpose of this article is to explore underlying factors that may explain Russia's non-escalatory behavior during the incident and why the issue was not 'securitized' by Russia's political establishment. The article is to be read as a case study exploring the phenomenon of 'failed securitization'. On a more policy-oriented level, it also aims to shed light on Russian policies and perceptions with regard to the role, relevance, and usefulness of military power in the European Arctic, as well as the interplay between intra- and interstate security dynamics. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright PRIO, www.prio.no]