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A tractable incomplete-market model with unemployment, sticky prices, and a fiscal side is used to quantify the macroeconomic effects of lockdown policies and the miti-gating effects of raising government spending and implementing UI benefit extensions. We find that the effects of lockdown policies, although we are relatively conservative about the size of the lockdown, are huge: unemployment doubles on impact and al-most triples even for relatively short lockdown durations. Output falls dramatically and debt-output ratios increase by several tens of percentage points. In addition, the surge in unemployment risk triggers a rise in precautionary savings that make such shocks Keynesian supply shocks: aggregate demand falls by more than aggregate supply, and lockdown policies are deflationary. Unfortunately, we find that raising public spending and extending UI benefits stimulate aggregate demand or improve risk-sharing but has little effects on output and unemployment, although they do alleviate the welfare losses of lockdown policies for the households.

A tractable incomplete-market model with unemployment, sticky prices, and a fiscal side is used to quantify the macroeconomic effects of lockdown policies and the miti-gating effects of raising government spending and implementing UI benefit extensions. We find that the effects of lockdown policies, although we are relatively conservative about the size of the lockdown, are huge: unemployment doubles on impact and al-most triples even for relatively short lockdown durations. Output falls dramatically and debt-output ratios increase by several tens of percentage points. In addition, the surge in unemployment risk triggers a rise in precautionary savings that make such shocks Keynesian supply shocks: aggregate demand falls by more than aggregate supply, and lockdown policies are deflationary. Unfortunately, we find that raising public spending and extending UI benefits stimulate aggregate demand or improve risk-sharing but has little effects on output and unemployment, although they do alleviate the welfare losses of lockdown policies for the households.

A tractable incomplete-market model with unemployment, sticky prices, and a fiscal side is used to quantify the macroeconomic effects of lockdown policies and the miti-gating effects of raising government spending and implementing UI benefit extensions. We find that the effects of lockdown policies, although we are relatively conservative about the size of the lockdown, are huge: unemployment doubles on impact and al-most triples even for relatively short lockdown durations. Output falls dramatically and debt-output ratios increase by several tens of percentage points. In addition, the surge in unemployment risk triggers a rise in precautionary savings that make such shocks Keynesian supply shocks: aggregate demand falls by more than aggregate supply, and lockdown policies are deflationary. Unfortunately, we find that raising public spending and extending UI benefits stimulate aggregate demand or improve risk-sharing but has little effects on output and unemployment, although they do alleviate the welfare losses of lockdown policies for the households.

A tractable incomplete-market model with unemployment, sticky prices, and a fiscal side is used to quantify the macroeconomic effects of lockdown policies and the miti-gating effects of raising government spending and implementing UI benefit extensions. We find that the effects of lockdown policies, although we are relatively conservative about the size of the lockdown, are huge: unemployment doubles on impact and al-most triples even for relatively short lockdown durations. Output falls dramatically and debt-output ratios increase by several tens of percentage points. In addition, the surge in unemployment risk triggers a rise in precautionary savings that make such shocks Keynesian supply shocks: aggregate demand falls by more than aggregate supply, and lockdown policies are deflationary. Unfortunately, we find that raising public spending and extending UI benefits stimulate aggregate demand or improve risk-sharing but has little effects on output and unemployment, although they do alleviate the welfare losses of lockdown policies for the households.

A tractable incomplete-market model with unemployment, sticky prices, and a fiscal side is used to quantify the macroeconomic effects of lockdown policies and the miti-gating effects of raising government spending and implementing UI benefit extensions. We find that the effects of lockdown policies, although we are relatively conservative about the size of the lockdown, are huge: unemployment doubles on impact and al-most triples even for relatively short lockdown durations. Output falls dramatically and debt-output ratios increase by several tens of percentage points. In addition, the surge in unemployment risk triggers a rise in precautionary savings that make such shocks Keynesian supply shocks: aggregate demand falls by more than aggregate supply, and lockdown policies are deflationary. Unfortunately, we find that raising public spending and extending UI benefits stimulate aggregate demand or improve risk-sharing but has little effects on output and unemployment, although they do alleviate the welfare losses of lockdown policies for the households.

A tractable incomplete-market model with unemployment, sticky prices, and a fiscal side is used to quantify the macroeconomic effects of lockdown policies and the miti-gating effects of raising government spending and implementing UI benefit extensions. We find that the effects of lockdown policies, although we are relatively conservative about the size of the lockdown, are huge: unemployment doubles on impact and al-most triples even for relatively short lockdown durations. Output falls dramatically and debt-output ratios increase by several tens of percentage points. In addition, the surge in unemployment risk triggers a rise in precautionary savings that make such shocks Keynesian supply shocks: aggregate demand falls by more than aggregate supply, and lockdown policies are deflationary. Unfortunately, we find that raising public spending and extending UI benefits stimulate aggregate demand or improve risk-sharing but has little effects on output and unemployment, although they do alleviate the welfare losses of lockdown policies for the households.

A tractable incomplete-market model with unemployment, sticky prices, and a fiscal side is used to quantify the macroeconomic effects of lockdown policies and the miti-gating effects of raising government spending and implementing UI benefit extensions. We find that the effects of lockdown policies, although we are relatively conservative about the size of the lockdown, are huge: unemployment doubles on impact and al-most triples even for relatively short lockdown durations. Output falls dramatically and debt-output ratios increase by several tens of percentage points. In addition, the surge in unemployment risk triggers a rise in precautionary savings that make such shocks Keynesian supply shocks: aggregate demand falls by more than aggregate supply, and lockdown policies are deflationary. Unfortunately, we find that raising public spending and extending UI benefits stimulate aggregate demand or improve risk-sharing but has little effects on output and unemployment, although they do alleviate the welfare losses of lockdown policies for the households.

We analyze the effects of world wars on the macroeconomic dynamics of the U.S., France, Germany, and the UK, by means of an estimated open-economy model. The model allows wars to affect the economy through capital depreciation, sovereign default, a military draft, household preferences, and spillovers on other exogenous processes (productivity, investment, trade, policy variables). If the bulk of fluctuations during war episodes can be explained by the rise in government spending in the U.S., other factors are crucial in other countries. We also discuss the size and state-dependence of public spending multipliers, and a counterfactual welfare exercise.

We analyze the effects of world wars on the macroeconomic dynamics of the U.S., France, Germany, and the UK, by means of an estimated open-economy model. The model allows wars to affect the economy through capital depreciation, sovereign default, a military draft, household preferences, and spillovers on other exogenous processes (productivity, investment, trade, policy variables). If the bulk of fluctuations during war episodes can be explained by the rise in government spending in the U.S., other factors are crucial in other countries. We also discuss the size and state-dependence of public spending multipliers, and a counterfactual welfare exercise.

We analyze the effects of world wars on the macroeconomic dynamics of the U.S., France, Germany, and the UK, by means of an estimated open-economy model. The model allows wars to affect the economy through capital depreciation, sovereign default, a military draft, household preferences, and spillovers on other exogenous processes (productivity, investment, trade, policy variables). If the bulk of fluctuations during war episodes can be explained by the rise in government spending in the U.S., other factors are crucial in other countries. We also discuss the size and state-dependence of public spending multipliers, and a counterfactual welfare exercise.

We analyze the effects of world wars on the macroeconomic dynamics of the U.S., France, Germany, and the UK, by means of an estimated open-economy model. The model allows wars to affect the economy through capital depreciation, sovereign default, a military draft, household preferences, and spillovers on other exogenous processes (productivity, investment, trade, policy variables). If the bulk of fluctuations during war episodes can be explained by the rise in government spending in the U.S., other factors are crucial in other countries. We also discuss the size and state-dependence of public spending multipliers, and a counterfactual welfare exercise.

We analyze the effects of world wars on the macroeconomic dynamics of the U.S., France, Germany, and the UK, by means of an estimated open-economy model. The model allows wars to affect the economy through capital depreciation, sovereign default, a military draft, household preferences, and spillovers on other exogenous processes (productivity, investment, trade, policy variables). If the bulk of fluctuations during war episodes can be explained by the rise in government spending in the U.S., other factors are crucial in other countries. We also discuss the size and state-dependence of public spending multipliers, and a counterfactual welfare exercise.

We analyze the effects of world wars on the macroeconomic dynamics of the U.S., France, Germany, and the UK, by means of an estimated open-economy model. The model allows wars to affect the economy through capital depreciation, sovereign default, a military draft, household preferences, and spillovers on other exogenous processes (productivity, investment, trade, policy variables). If the bulk of fluctuations during war episodes can be explained by the rise in government spending in the U.S., other factors are crucial in other countries. We also discuss the size and state-dependence of public spending multipliers, and a counterfactual welfare exercise.