In 'The Frontlines of Peace', Sv́erine Autesserre, award-winning researcher and peacebuilder, examines the well-intentioned but systematically flawed peace industry. He sheds light on how typical aid interveners have been getting it wrong, and, more importantly, how a few of them have been getting it right.
"The Trouble with the Congo suggests a new explanation for international peacebuilding failures in civil wars. Drawing from more than 330 interviews and a year and a half of field research, it develops a case study of the international intervention during the Democratic Republic of the Congo's unsuccessful transition from war to peace and democracy (2003-2006). Grassroots rivalries over land, resources, and political power motivated widespread violence. However, a dominant peacebuilding culture shaped the intervention strategy in a way that precluded action on local conflicts, ultimately dooming the international efforts to end the deadliest conflict since World War II. Most international actors interpreted continued fighting as the consequence of national and regional tensions alone. UN staff and diplomats viewed intervention at the macro levels as their only legitimate responsibility. The dominant culture constructed local peacebuilding as such an unimportant, unfamiliar, and unmanageable task that neither shocking events nor resistance from select individuals could convince international actors to reevaluate their understanding of violence and intervention"--
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¿Por qué los constructores internacionales de la paz no toman en consideración las causas locales de los procesos de paz que fallan? A través del presente artículo demuestro cómo las agendas locales jugaron entonces un rol decisivo en fomentar la violencia a nivel local, regional y nacional. Sin embargo, la existencia de un marco de construcción de la paz posbélica configuraba la visión internacional de la violencia y de la intervención de tal manera que la resolución del conflicto local era considerada como irrelevante e ilegitima. Este marco incluyó enseguida cuatro elementos fundamentales: los actores internacionales etiquetaron la situación en Congo de "postconflicto"; estos mismos actores creyeron que la violencia constituía un componente innato en la sociedad congolesa y, por lo tanto, aceptable incluso en tiempos de paz; conceptualizaron la intervención internacional como un asunto exclusivo de la esferas nacional e internacional; y consideraron la celebración de elecciones, en lugar de la resolución del conflicto local, como una herramienta viable, apropiada y efectiva para la construcción del estado y de la paz. Este marco, al autorizar y justificar prácticas y políticas específicas mientras impedía otras, en particular la resolución de conflictos locales, acabó condenando en última instancia los esfuerzos para la construcción de la paz. Para concluir, sostengo que el análisis de los marcos discursivos es un enfoque fructífero para intentar resolver los puzles de los fracasos internacionales en la construcción de la paz que se dan, también, más allá de las fronteras del Congo.
AbstractWhy do international peacebuilders fail to address the local causes of peace process failures? The existing explanations of peacebuilding failures, which focus on constraints and vested interests, do not explain the international neglect of local conflict. In this article, I show how discursive frames shape international intervention and preclude international action on local violence. Drawing on more than 330 interviews, multi-sited ethnography, and document analysis, I develop a case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo's transition from war to peace and democracy (2003–2006). I demonstrate that local agendas played a decisive role in sustaining local, national, and regional violence. However, a postconflict peacebuilding frame shaped the international understanding of violence and intervention in such a way that local conflict resolution appeared irrelevant and illegitimate. This frame included four key elements: international actors labeled the Congo a "postconflict" situation; they believed that violence there was innate and therefore acceptable even in peacetime; they conceptualized international intervention as exclusively concerned with the national and international realms; and they saw holding elections, as opposed to local conflict resolution, as a workable, appropriate, and effective tool for state- and peacebuilding. This frame authorized and justified specific practices and policies while precluding others, notably local conflict resolution, ultimately dooming the peacebuilding efforts. In conclusion, I contend that analyzing discursive frames is a fruitful approach to the puzzle of international peacebuilding failures beyond the Congo.