Suchergebnisse

1. Introduction -- 2. Game Theoretical Analysis -- 3. Material Accountancy -- 4. Data Verification -- 5. Verification of Materials Accounting Data -- 6. International Nuclear Material Safeguards -- 7. Further Applications -- Annex -- Elements of Statistics -- A.1. Sample Spaces and Probabilities -- A.2. Random Variables, Distribution Functions, and Moments -- A.3. Special Discrete Distributions -- A.4. Gaussian or Normally Distributed Random Variables -- A.5. Alternative Tests -- List of Symbols -- Logical Symbols -- Mathematical Symbols -- Stochastic Symbols.

Unannounced Interim Inspections (UIIs) in nuclear facilities of the European Union have recently attracted major attention by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and by European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)in the context of the IAEA/EURATOM Partnership Approach. Therefore, a research project had been organized by the Joint Research Centre in Ispra in collaboration with the Universität der Bundeswehr München in the framework of which the assumptions have been classified which are necessary for a quantitative analysis and a few variants have been studied in detail. In that project only so-called Attribute Sampling Procedures were considered which means that only errors of the second kind (no detection of the illegal activity), but not those of the first kind (false alarms), where taken into account. It was the purpose of the work presented here to investigate the impact of errors of the first kind on UIIs which may occur if so-called Variable Sampling Procedures are used. Two kinds of planning UIIs are considered: in the sequential one both players, the inspector and the operator of the facility, decide step by step to inspect resp. to start the illegal activity – if there is one. In the hybrid-sequential one the inspector decides at the beginning of the reference time interval where to place his UIIs, whereas the operator acts again sequentially. For two UIIs during the reference time interval equilibria are determined, which generalize the results of the above mentioned research project. It turns out that in both cases, the sequential and hybrid-sequential one, the equilibrium strategies of the inspector and the equilibrium payoffs to both players are the same, but not the equilibrium strategies of the operator. We try to present a plausible explanation for this surprising result.

Unannounced Interim Inspections (UIIs) in nuclear facilities of the European Union have recently attracted major attention by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and by European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)in the context of the IAEA/EURATOM Partnership Approach. Therefore, a research project had been organized by the Joint Research Centre in Ispra in collaboration with the Universität der Bundeswehr München in the framework of which the assumptions have been classified which are necessary for a quantitative analysis and a few variants have been studied in detail. In that project only so-called Attribute Sampling Procedures were considered which means that only errors of the second kind (no detection of the illegal activity), but not those of the first kind (false alarms), where taken into account. It was the purpose of the work presented here to investigate the impact of errors of the first kind on UIIs which may occur if so-called Variable Sampling Procedures are used. Two kinds of planning UIIs are considered: in the sequential one both players, the inspector and the operator of the facility, decide step by step to inspect resp. to start the illegal activity – if there is one. In the hybrid-sequential one the inspector decides at the beginning of the reference time interval where to place his UIIs, whereas the operator acts again sequentially. For two UIIs during the reference time interval equilibria are determined, which generalize the results of the above mentioned research project. It turns out that in both cases, the sequential and hybrid-sequential one, the equilibrium strategies of the inspector and the equilibrium payoffs to both players are the same, but not the equilibrium strategies of the operator. We try to present a plausible explanation for this surprising result.

International agreements, such as those governing arms control or the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification of information, in order that compliance can be established. To ensure that the verification process can be regarded as efficient, effective and impartial, it is important to have a mathematical model of it. One can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of non-cooperative games, developed in part by John Nash, who received a Nobel prize in 1994 for his work. The methods permit the development of rational verification strategies, as well as such fundamental concepts as guaranteed probability of detection, timeliness of inspections and the deterrence of illegal activity. In this 1996 book, the required theory is introduced gradually in the context of specific real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics, so the book should be accessible to a broad range of scientists and non-scientists, in industrial, academic or governmental environments