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A Passion for Cooperation is the exciting autobiography of Robert Axelrod, one of the most acclaimed and wide-ranging scientists of the last fifty years. After being recognized by President Kennedy for being a promising young scientist while in high school, Axelrod built a career dedicated to collaborating with business school professors, international relations scholars, political scientists, computer scientists, and even evolutionary biologists and cancer researchers. Fifty years later, he was honored by President Obama with the National Medal of Science for scientific achievement and leadership and his work has been referred to as the gold standard of interdisciplinary research.

Yet Axelrod's autobiography is not just an account of his wide-ranging passion for cooperation. It reveals his struggles to overcome failures and experience the joys of gaining new insights into how to achieve cooperation. A Passion for Cooperation recounts Robert Axelrod's adventures talking with the leader of the organization Hamas, the Prime Minister of Israel, and the Foreign Minister of Syria. Axelrod also shares stories of being hosted in Kazakhstan by senior Soviet retired generals and visiting China with well-connected policy advisors on issues of military aspects of cyber conflict. Through stories of the difficulties and rewards of interdisciplinary collaborations, readers will discover how Axelrod's academic and practical work have enriched each other and demonstrated that opportunities for cooperation are much greater than generally thought.

This book outlines a new approach to the analysis of decision making based on "cognitive maps." A cognitive map is a graphic representation intended to capture the structure of a decision maker's stated beliefs about a particular problem. Following introductory chapters that develop the theory and techniques of cognitive mapping, a set of five empirical studies applies these new techniques to five policy areas.Originally published in 1976.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905

Its a wonderful coincidence that almost thirty years ago the first translation of my book on the Evolution of Cooperation was the Swedish edition. But today, I don't plan to talk about international politics. Instead, I'd like to talk about the discipline of Political Science itself. I'll do so in terms of some things Political Science has gained from other disciplines and especially what it has to offer to other disciplines. Adapted from the source document.

In this Top Twenty Commentaries section of the Centennial Issues of the journal, Robert Axelrod reviews his highly cited article An Evolutionary Approach to Norms(1986). The author states his interest in the question of how cooperation can emerge in a world of egoists without central authority as the foundation of his exploration of the emergence & maintenance of cooperation in the context of the two-person iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). His search for mechanisms that work in societies explored issues of the power of social norms, punishment of norm violators on simulations of agent-based models, & the informal discussion of social norms in relation to other mechanisms for sustaining cooperation in group. The influence of the work is concluded to be difficult to evaluate, but formal modeling of social norms did increase, the article must have a wide range of interest since it was cited in journals outside the political science arena, & to have benefited from the widespread desire to provide a "hardheaded" rationale for cooperation. References. J. Harwell

Abstract
The symposium included in this issue of Analyse & Kritik extends the basis of Cooperation Theory as set forth in Axelrod's Evolution of Cooperation (1984). This essay begins with an overview of Cooperation Theory in terms of the questions it asks, its relationship to game theory and rationality, and the principal methodologies used, namely deduction and simulation. This essay then addresses the issues raised in the symposium, including the consequences of extending the original paradigm of the two person iterated Prisoner's Dilemma to take into account such factors as nonsimultaneous play, the ability to offer hostages for performance, social networks of interaction, information sharing that can support reputations, learning behavior, envy, misunderstanding, and an option to exit. The essay places the contributions of this symposium in the context of previous research on these and related issues.

Despite tendencies toward convergence, differences between individuals and groups continue to exist in beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. An agent-based adaptive model reveals the effects of a mechanism of convergent social influence. The actors are placed at fixed sites. The basic premise is that the more similar an actor is to a neighbor, the more likely that that actor will adopt one of the neighbor's traits. Unlike previous models of social influence or cultural change that treat features one at a time, the proposed model takes into account the interaction between different features. The model illustrates how local convergence can generate global polarization. Simulations show that the number of stable homogeneous regions decreases with the number of features, increases with the number of alternative traits per feature, decreases with the range of interaction, and (most surprisingly) decreases when the geographic territory grows beyond a certain size.