Suchergebnisse

To minimize damage to their popularity during economic downturns, rulers in electoral autocracies can draw on their propaganda advantage to keep the economy off the political agenda or shift the blame to other actors. How successful are these strategies in swaying citizens' views? While electoral autocrats frequently resort to these strategies, there is surprisingly little evidence about their effectiveness. To address this gap, I took advantage of the recent economic crisis in Turkey and deployed a population-based survey experiment that mimicked incumbent's use of these strategies. I find that incumbent's efforts of shifting the blame fail to elicit intended effects among large parts of the electorate. In contrast, changing the political agenda away from the economy to an issue area that is more favorable for the incumbent is more effective for shoring up popular support. These findings contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms that help sustain electoral authoritarianism.

An emerging literature suggests that economic voting is driven by incumbents' relative performance, that is, how the national economy performed relative to recent past outcomes in the country (domestic comparison) and in a cross-national perspective (international comparison). While scholars have presented macro-level evidence in this direction, to date there has been scant micro-level evidence as to whether voters' evaluations of incumbent competence are shaped by relative performance. This article contributes to the literature by presenting two population-based survey experiments fielded in the United Kingdom and in Istanbul, Turkey. Both British and Turkish voters' evaluations of incumbent competence are affected by information about how well the economy performed in domestic and international comparisons, though Turkish voters seem to react to international performance comparison to a lesser degree than to a domestic one. In both countries highly educated individuals are more responsive to the incumbent's relative international performance. These results provide support for macro-level analyses that highlight the importance of incumbents' relative performance for economic voting.

Why do vote-suppression efforts sometimes fail? Why does police repression of demonstrators sometimes turn localized protests into massive, national movements? How do politicians and activists manipulate people's emotions to get them involved? The authors of Why Bother? offer a new theory of why people take part in collective action in politics, and test it in the contexts of voting and protesting. They develop the idea that just as there are costs of participation in politics, there are also costs of abstention - intrinsic and psychological but no less real. That abstention can be psychically costly helps explain real-world patterns that are anomalies for existing theories, such as that sometimes increases in costs of participation are followed by more participation, not less. The book draws on a wealth of survey data, interviews, and experimental results from a range of countries, including the United States, Britain, Brazil, Sweden, and Turkey

How do citizens respond to their government's decision to accept or reject foreign assistance in the face of a natural disaster? While the increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters necessitate international cooperation for effective response, there have been numerous instances where states have declined foreign assistance offers due to reputation concerns. In this article, we focus on the domestic audience dynamics of such behavior. Drawing on experimental survey data from Turkey and India, two middle-income countries with geopolitical ambitions and recent experience in refusing foreign assistance, we find that accepting foreign assistance during natural disasters leads to higher evaluations of government performance, though this positive effect is driven by opposition voters only. Incumbent voters, conversely, solidify their support for the government regardless of its decision toward foreign assistance. The domestic political effects of government decisions in response to aid offers are largely independent of the identity of the country offering assistance.

Populist politicians frequently employ anti-establishment appeals in their discourse by targeting an imagined or real power elite. Do such appeals have a mobilizing effect among voters? What role do the emotional responses of voters play in this process? We address these questions using a vignette experiment embedded into a nationally representative survey fielded in Turkey, a country where a populist party has long been in power. Our research design enables us to assess whether voters respond more positively to a populist framing of a call for mobilization on an issue compared to a non-populist framing, and whether their emotional responses act as mediators. We find that populist rhetoric indeed does have a mobilizing effect, though only for a low-cost form of political participation (signing a petition) and only among the constituency of the populist party. Turning to the role of emotions, we find that the populist framing of the issue led voters to report more discontent, despair, and anxiety, and these emotions mediate the positive influence of the populist message on mobilization. Thus, our study contributes to research on populism by highlighting the role of emotions in the mobilizing effect of populist discourse.

When people learn that demonstrators are being subjected to harsh treatment by the police, sometimes their reaction is to join demonstrations. What explains the potentially mobilizing power of repression? Information-oriented theories posit that repression changes people's beliefs about the likely success of the protests or the type of the government, thus encouraging them to join. Social–psychological theories posit that repression provokes a moral and emotional reaction from bystanders, and these emotional reactions are mobilizing. Our research offers a rare opportunity to test these theories, empirically, against one another. We offer experimental evidence from Turkey after the 2013 Gezi uprising. In this setting, emotional reactions appear to be the link between repression and backlash mobilization. Information-oriented theories of backlash mobilization may be less germane in democracies, in which people already have access to information about their governments, and in highly polarized polities, in which few people's political affinities are up for grabs.

This volume provides the first comprehensive overview of the state of policy analysis in Turkey for an international audience. Noting Turkey's traditionally strong, highly centralised state, the book documents the evolution of policy analysis in the country, providing an in-depth review of the context, constraints, and dominant modes of policy analysis performed by both state and non-state actors. The book examines the role of committees, experts, international actors, bureaucrats as well as public opinion in shaping policy analysis in the country through their varying ideas, interests and resources. In doing so, it presents the complex decision-making mechanisms that vary significantly among policy-making actors and institutions, documenting the key, yet unexamined, aspects of policy analysis in Turkey. It will be a valuable resource for those studying policy analysis within Turkey and as a comparison with other volumes in the International Library of Policy Analysis Series