Suchergebnisse

The allocation of powers between the European Union and its member states is a classic theme in European studies. The question of to how to limit the expansion of Union's competences whilst safeguarding the dynamics of the process of European integration is now being raised. This book is a theoretical and practical inquiry into this question.

In a recent Article published in this Journal, Gareth Davies draws a parallel between European citizens as fashioned by EU law and pre-war Europe's Jews (G. Davies, How Citizenship Divides: The New Legal Class of Transnational Europeans, in European Papers, Vol. 4, 2019, No 3, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 675 et seq.). This parallel raises two serious issues. One is the complete lack of contextualisation of such a dubious comparison. The other is the lack of careful methodological engagement with the ways in which EU law operates in actual practice. This note cautions against the use of such parallels and calls for the development of renewed categories to analyse and critically assess the European Union and its law.

In a recent Article published in this Journal, Gareth Davies draws a parallel between European citizens as fashioned by EU law and pre-war Europe's Jews (G. Davies, How Citizenship Divides: The New Legal Class of Transnational Europeans, in European Papers, Vol. 4, 2019, No 3, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 675 et seq.). This parallel raises two serious issues. One is the complete lack of contextualisation of such a dubious comparison. The other is the lack of careful methodological engagement with the ways in which EU law operates in actual practice. This note cautions against the use of such parallels and calls for the development of renewed categories to analyse and critically assess the European Union and its law.

Over the last decade, the European Court of Justice has breathed new life into the old notion of autonomy of the EC/EU legal order. This was the case in Kadi, in Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, and this was recently reconfirmed in Achmea. These decisions convey the message that, in face of adversity, EU law is capable of relying on its own system of principles and values. In contrast, in a line of cases starting with Dano and Alimanovic, the Court has reacted to a sensitive political and economic environment by making EU law responsive to what was considered to be a pressing societal demand.2 It is as though, in this particular context, respect was owed to collective feelings prevailing in Member States' societies and also to shifting moods. This raises the question of the extent to which this curious oscillation between common values and collective feelings is capable of becoming one of the defining features of our current Union and its law. (First paragraph)

Over the last decade, the European Court of Justice has breathed new life into the old notion of autonomy of the EC/EU legal order. This was the case in Kadi, in Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, and this was recently reconfirmed in Achmea. These decisions convey the message that, in face of adversity, EU law is capable of relying on its own system of principles and values. In contrast, in a line of cases starting with Dano and Alimanovic, the Court has reacted to a sensitive political and economic environment by making EU law responsive to what was considered to be a pressing societal demand.2 It is as though, in this particular context, respect was owed to collective feelings prevailing in Member States' societies and also to shifting moods. This raises the question of the extent to which this curious oscillation between common values and collective feelings is capable of becoming one of the defining features of our current Union and its law. (First paragraph)

L'essentiel du travail des juristes européens sur la question de l'immigration se présente comme une réflexion sur les mécanismes mis en place par l'Union européenne et ses États membres pour réguler l'afflux de migrants(1). Il leur est aisé de constater que ces mécanismes fonctionnent mal. Ils se donnent dès lors pour tâche de trouver des remèdes. Recherche qui se résout généralement par l'établissement d'une formule associant responsabilité et solidarité. La responsabilité consiste, pour les États membres, à respecter à la lettre les règles relatives aux contrôles des personnes franchissant les frontières extérieures de l'Union et d'assumer les charges que leur impose le régime d'asile européen commun. La solidarité, c'est de pouvoir compter sur un partage entre États membres des coûts liés à la prise en charge des nouveaux arrivants et sur la mise en place d'une répartition équilibrée des nouveaux arrivants sur le territoire européen. La formule idéale veut que des comportements plus responsables entraîneront une solidarité plus forte. Force est toutefois de constater que tous les gouvernements européens n'adhèrent pas à cette formule : certains refusent la responsabilité, d'autres rejettent la solidarité. Au demeurant, dans l'autre grand domaine de crise mettant en cause l'Union européenne - l'euro -, où la même formule est proposée, de fortes résistances se font également entendre(2). Dans ce cas, responsabilité veut dire respect des règles portant sur la discipline budgétaire, tandis que la solidarité porte, pour l'essentiel, sur des mécanismes de transferts financiers entre États membres de l'Union. (Premier paragraphe de l'article)

L'essentiel du travail des juristes européens sur la question de l'immigration se présente comme une réflexion sur les mécanismes mis en place par l'Union européenne et ses États membres pour réguler l'afflux de migrants(1). Il leur est aisé de constater que ces mécanismes fonctionnent mal. Ils se donnent dès lors pour tâche de trouver des remèdes. Recherche qui se résout généralement par l'établissement d'une formule associant responsabilité et solidarité. La responsabilité consiste, pour les États membres, à respecter à la lettre les règles relatives aux contrôles des personnes franchissant les frontières extérieures de l'Union et d'assumer les charges que leur impose le régime d'asile européen commun. La solidarité, c'est de pouvoir compter sur un partage entre États membres des coûts liés à la prise en charge des nouveaux arrivants et sur la mise en place d'une répartition équilibrée des nouveaux arrivants sur le territoire européen. La formule idéale veut que des comportements plus responsables entraîneront une solidarité plus forte. Force est toutefois de constater que tous les gouvernements européens n'adhèrent pas à cette formule : certains refusent la responsabilité, d'autres rejettent la solidarité. Au demeurant, dans l'autre grand domaine de crise mettant en cause l'Union européenne - l'euro -, où la même formule est proposée, de fortes résistances se font également entendre(2). Dans ce cas, responsabilité veut dire respect des règles portant sur la discipline budgétaire, tandis que la solidarité porte, pour l'essentiel, sur des mécanismes de transferts financiers entre États membres de l'Union. (Premier paragraphe de l'article)

Over the last decade, the European Court of Justice has breathed new life into the old notion of autonomy of the EC/EU legal order. This was the case in Kadi, in Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, and this was recently reconfirmed in Achmea. These decisions convey the message that, in face of adversity, EU law is capable of relying on its own system of principles and values. In contrast, in a line of cases starting with Dano and Alimanovic, the Court has reacted to a sensitive political and economic environment by making EU law responsive to what was considered to be a pressing societal demand.2 It is as though, in this particular context, respect was owed to collective feelings prevailing in Member States' societies and also to shifting moods. This raises the question of the extent to which this curious oscillation between common values and collective feelings is capable of becoming one of the defining features of our current Union and its law. (First paragraph)

Over the last decade, the European Court of Justice has breathed new life into the old notion of autonomy of the EC/EU legal order. This was the case in Kadi, in Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, and this was recently reconfirmed in Achmea. These decisions convey the message that, in face of adversity, EU law is capable of relying on its own system of principles and values. In contrast, in a line of cases starting with Dano and Alimanovic, the Court has reacted to a sensitive political and economic environment by making EU law responsive to what was considered to be a pressing societal demand.2 It is as though, in this particular context, respect was owed to collective feelings prevailing in Member States' societies and also to shifting moods. This raises the question of the extent to which this curious oscillation between common values and collective feelings is capable of becoming one of the defining features of our current Union and its law. (First paragraph)

Les études juridiques européennes vivent un moment critique. Elles ont traditionnellement assumé un rôle de soutien et de consolidation du processus d'intégration. Il leur revenait de formuler, de porter et de protéger le programme d'intégration. Les juristes ont fait de l'Europe institutionnelle et de son droit « un tout structuré, organisé, finalisé ». Cette conception n'est plus soutenable et le rôle vertueux du droit est désormais contesté. L'Union n'a pas perdu son droit mais elle semble avoir perdu le droit comme facteur structurant, vecteur de dynamisme et de cohésion. Un tournant critique s'amorce dans les études juridiques européennes. Ce tournant devrait les plonger dans une interrogation fondamentale sur la forme à donner à l'expérience collective qu'est l'intégration.

[Abstract editor: European Union law has developed a concept of Union citizenship based on a right of exit from one's country and a consequential right of entry in another Member State of the Union. 'Empowering' European citizens and enabling them to integrate into other Member States' territories is its main purpose. If we seek to analyse further the concept of Union citizenship, it is almost inevitable that we inquire into the social background of this construction, the individual skills and resources it entails, the state structures and collective goods it affects. This is the puzzle with which the most acute commentators engage. Looked at this way, Union citizenship is about integration of Union citizens into national communities, financial solidarity with other Member States' nationals and recognition of their personal identities. Ultimately it is about transnational integration and new forms of social justice within the Member States. There is, however, another way to engage with the concept. The focus on social integration is replaced by a somewhat more ambitious project: to empower the Union citizens to connect with Europe as a whole. This approach assumes that a proper regime of Union citizenship constitutes not only a right to free movement but a right to enjoy a common way of living. It would allow Union citizens to live, at least partially, in social and moral conditions which denote a far-reaching European society. If we take this project seriously, the problem, then, is as follows: how are we going to shape this project within a conceptual framework based on transnational integration? What does it mean practically to create ties between individuals who have been allowed to disaffiliate from their country of origin? To which 'whole' shall we refer that is not a structured state and yet does not boil down to a mere sphere of individual interests and particular social interactions? The essays presented here suggest two ways to approach this problem. The first explores the concept of 'the territory of ...

[Abstract editor: European Union law has developed a concept of Union citizenship based on a right of exit from one's country and a consequential right of entry in another Member State of the Union. 'Empowering' European citizens and enabling them to integrate into other Member States' territories is its main purpose. If we seek to analyse further the concept of Union citizenship, it is almost inevitable that we inquire into the social background of this construction, the individual skills and resources it entails, the state structures and collective goods it affects. This is the puzzle with which the most acute commentators engage. Looked at this way, Union citizenship is about integration of Union citizens into national communities, financial solidarity with other Member States' nationals and recognition of their personal identities. Ultimately it is about transnational integration and new forms of social justice within the Member States. There is, however, another way to engage with the concept. The focus on social integration is replaced by a somewhat more ambitious project: to empower the Union citizens to connect with Europe as a whole. This approach assumes that a proper regime of Union citizenship constitutes not only a right to free movement but a right to enjoy a common way of living. It would allow Union citizens to live, at least partially, in social and moral conditions which denote a far-reaching European society. If we take this project seriously, the problem, then, is as follows: how are we going to shape this project within a conceptual framework based on transnational integration? What does it mean practically to create ties between individuals who have been allowed to disaffiliate from their country of origin? To which 'whole' shall we refer that is not a structured state and yet does not boil down to a mere sphere of individual interests and particular social interactions? The essays presented here suggest two ways to approach this problem. The first explores the concept of 'the territory of the Union' enshrined in the EU legal discourse as a possible venue for this shift in understanding the project of European citizenship. The second approach tells the story of an individual who feels strongly about being a 'European' with the right to be recognized everywhere in Europe without being part of any definite community. The first paper is an academic article which was commissioned by Dimitry Kochenov for a forthcoming edited volume on EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP, 2015). The second is more of a narrative or a tale and is written in French. The first essay builds upon the second. The reason for bringing them together is to show that the literary form may contribute to an understanding of complex legal issues simply by showing a state of legal affairs in its most stylised form.]