Suchergebnisse

We consider the hiring of public sector workers through legislated rules and exam-based rankings, as is done in many countries and institutions around the world. In them, workers take tests and are ranked based on scores in exams and other pre-determined criteria, and those who satisfy some eligibility criteria are made available for hiring in a "pool of workers." In each of an ex-ante unknown number of rounds, vacancies are announced and workers are then hired from that pool. We show that when the scores are the only criterion for selection, the procedure satisfies desired fairness and independence properties. We show, with the aid of details of procedures used in Brazil, France and Australia, that when compositional objectives are introduced, such as affirmative action policies, both the procedures used in the field and in the literature fail to satisfy those properties. We then present a new rule, which we show to be the unique rule that satisfies those properties. Finally, we show that if multiple institutions hire workers from a single pool, even minor consistency requirements are incompatible with compositional objectives.

O presente artigo analisa o impacto dos controles de capitais sobre a trajetória temporal de uma série de variáveis macroeconômicas para economias em desenvolvimento a partir de um modelo pós-keynesiano de economia aberta e sem governo. Inicialmente, apresentamos um modelo macroeconômico que introduz o controle de capitais como variável de escolha de política econômica. A partir da análise de estabilidade do modelo deduzimos um conjunto de valores economicamente plausíveis para os parâmetros. Com base nestes parâmetros analisamos o comportamento dinâmico do grau de utilização da capacidade produtiva, do endividamento externo, das exportações líquidas e da taxa de juros sob diferentes condições iniciais. Na seqüência, analisamos a sensibilidade da economia a choques externos como, por exemplo, variações da taxa de juros internacional e do fluxo internacional de comércio. Nesse contexto, constatamos que os controles de capitais podem contribuir para a redução da volatilidade da dívida externa a choques exógenos, mas amplificam os efeitos desses choques sobre o grau de utilização da capacidade produtiva. Desta forma, a desejabilidade da adoção de controles de capitais é condicional às preferências da sociedade no que se refere à volatilidade do grau de utilização da capacidade vis-à-vis à volatilidade do endividamento externo.

We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), inspired by procedures currently being used to match millions of students to public universities in Brazil and China. Unlike most options available in the literature, IDAM is not a direct mechanism. Instead of requesting from each student a full preference over all colleges, the student is instead repeatedly asked to choose one college among those which would accept her given the current set of students choosing that college. Although the induced sequential game has no dominant strategy, when students simply choose the most preferred college in each period (denoted the straightforward strategy), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students following the straightforward strategy is an Ordinal Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Based on data from 2016, we also provide evidence that, due to shortcomings which are absent in the modified version that we propose, the currently used mechanism in Brazil fails to assist the students with reliable information about the universities that they are able to attend, and are subject to manipulation via cutoffs, a new type of strategic behavior that is introduced by this family of iterative mechanisms and observed in the field.