A populizmus kifejezést gyakran a szakirodalom egy része az illiberális, az autoritárius és egyéb jelzős, nem liberális demokráciák sajátosságának tekinti. Az ezekhez hasonló megközelítések figyelmen kívül hagyják a demokráciatípusok különbözőségét, a liberális demokráciát "a" demokráciával, a populizmust pedig az antidemokratikus, antipluralista és antiliberális gondolattal azonosítják. A populizmus fogalmának konceptualizálását követően a tanulmány bemutatja, hogy a magyarországi kormányzó jobboldal populizmusában hogyan töltődnek fel tartalommal a "mi" és az "ők" kategóriák, ezzel pedig hogyan épül fel a Fidesz populizmusa, mint politikai logika és diskurzus. Ezt követően az írás a Fidesz és a jobboldali kormány ellenségkonstruáló folyamataival, annak példáival és szemléltetésével folytatódik. Végül a tanulmány arra a következtetésre jut, hogy a Fidesz populista diskurzusában és politikai logikájában a 2010-et megelőző sajátos – magyar viszonyokra alkalmazott – inkluzív jegyekkel is bíró populizmus-variánst teljes egészében a kizáró populizmus váltotta fel.
Modernity is the sum of the fragmented cultural systems of meaning, that are mutually influentialon each other, plus of economic and political relations continually changing and transforming –a complexity that manifests itself in the structure of the (world) risk society even on the level ofthe individual. Following the late modern turn, the phenomenon of the means and opportunitiesdetermining the ability of choice is not being shared equally, but multiplied as regards globalactors, as well as choice of identity, perceptibility of risks and facing them. The study presentsthe new inequality factors and the asymmetric power relations of the late modernity along theworks by the recently died sociologists of the globalization theory (Ulrich Beck and ZygmuntBauman). In the world risk society, each community and individual bear the risks indifferently.Accordingly, the ascertainments of the study are that the globalised economy and the subjectsof the local poverty do not possess the same degree of the freedom of maneuvering. In orderto demonstrate this and also to identify each postmodern life-strategy, the study relies on theworks on identity by the discussed sociologists. According to the latter, the study concludes, thatthe reflexivity of the risk is the most profitable for those who are in the high position of the newinequality, thus, have the power to determine conflicts generated by them and inflict them onthose excluded from the struggle of definition of risk.
In post-2010 Hungary, not only have institutional reforms been implemented in the political system, but new patterns of the exercise of power have appeared as well. These changes have eventuated in majority driven democracy, based on less liberal and more authoritarian elements. Without the critical or slightly adjusted interpretation of waves of democracy and democratization theories, understanding is hindered; it is considerably difficult to interpret the characteristics of authoritarian/populist regimes, their social base, and the post-2010 rupture with the hegemonic political thinking that was present after the regime change of 1989 in Hungary. Democratization theories provide an adequate framework for certain institutional comparisons, but they are not sufficient to give full understanding of the diversity of the transitions. Fidesz's concept of politics breaks with the post-communist mainstream political thinking. This breakaway can be interpreted as an anti-liberal turn, within the framework of which the governing party rejects the normative emancipatory concept of politics, the radicalization of the separation of power, the neutralization of the concepts of state and welfare, the depolitization of leadership and the substantive and consensus-oriented perception of democracy. Our direction of research relies less on the terminologies of Western political science when describing Hungarian illiberalism; opting for the ideas of David Ost and Ivan Krastev, it interprets the post-2010 Hungarian regime change as an answer to the crisis of the "enlightened, rationalized liberalism". After the introduction of the dilemmas around democracy research and the characteristics of the new authoritarian regimes, the article continues with the presentation of the crisis of enlightened liberalism, then concludes with an exposition of the post-2010 mainstream Hungarian political thinking.
The study investigates the overheads reduction initiative, leading issue of public policy in Hungary between 2013 and 2014 in the face of the punctuated equilibrium theory. The case is examined from the perspective of how the punctuated equilibrium theory and the associated concepts (as policy image, policy monopoly and stream) can be applied to the overheads reduction initiative, a significant change in the public policy. After clarifying the terminology, the study presents that the increase of the expenditure of the domestic energy along with the rising number of those in arrears have already been issued as a real societal problem for years. Nevertheless, the intermittent character and the emergence of the policy image and monopoly can be justified with the priority of political aspects and the aspiration for bigger popularity. The series of provisions of the overheads reduction initiative perfectly match the governmental narrative. Between the discourse of the overheads reduction initiative generated by the government and the punctuated equilibrium provisions and the climax of popularity of Fidesz, a close interrelation can be detected. However, the widespread support of Fidesz cannot exclusively be attributed to the overheads reduction initiative. (author's abstract)
The objective of the paper is to provide a distinction of the often partially or completely overlapping hybrid regime terms and to discuss the notions and concepts related to the discourse on hybrid regimes. The clarification of grey zone related definitions is highly justified due to the existing rich Babelian terminology as well as the potential benefit of having a clearer view on the contradictions and limitations inherent to traditional democracy interpretations. There is a scientific consensus on the grey zone between democracy and autocracy forming its own regime type, but the different approaches apply various terms to it. Using country examples arching over eras, we demonstrate that the adjective "hybrid" actually represents a threshold indicating if a given system reaches the level above which it may be considered democratic. After identifying this level and its elements, the study also discusses how different regimes relate to elections in order to determine the institutional conditions for the stability or replacement of a regime.
The paper's aim is to understand how the populist right in Hungary answered the challenge of the climate movement, which became a significant issue in the year 2019. The paper answers the research question whether the Hungarian populist right's narrative reactions differed from non-incumbent populist parties and movements, and to what extent the populist discourse defined these reactions. The paper analyses the content of the conservative, nationally circulated daily newspaper Magyar Nemzet and the government's press releases between the 2018 general election and November 2020, the onset of the second wave of the Covid-19 in Hungary. The analyses of the identified frames (N = 171) demonstrate that the climate movement was interpreted as the new left, and political interests were suspected of supporting the movement in the background. The accusation of serving hidden political and economic interests and being a new form of the political left served the effort to discredit the climate movement. The results also indicate that the narrative reaction of the Hungarian populist right followed the general communication and policy agenda of the Hungarian government, rather than the inherent discursive patterns of populism. It could be rightly assumed that this interrelation is the consequence of the incumbency and strong centralization of the populist right in Hungary.
A koronavírus-járvány és az azzal járó egészségügyi és gazdasági válság negatív következményeinek enyhítése érdekében az egyik elsődleges eszköz a kormányok számára a lakosság minél magasabb arányú átoltottságának elérése. A vonatkozó diskurzusok azonban rendkívül átpolitizálódtak, különösen azokban az országokban, ahol a pártos polarizáció szintje a vélemények és médiadiskurzusok kapcsán olyan magas, mint az általunk vizsgált Magyarországon. Továbbá, ahogy arra korábbi, főként egyesült államokbeli vizsgálatok rámutatnak, a tudomány iránti általános bizalmat az egyének politikai ideológiai irányultsága is jelentősen meghatározhatja – a konzervatív ideológiát vallók vagy magukat annak tekintők nagyobb eséllyel kérdőjelezik meg a tudományos eredményeket. Tanulmányunkban két kérdést vizsgálunk: egyrészt, hogy a magyar állampolgárok ideológiai irányultsága és pártos kötődése befolyásolja-e a tudomány iránti bizalmukat általánosságban, valamint hogy ugyanezen tényezők milyen szerepet játszanak abban, képesnek tartják-e a tudomány képviselőit a Covid–19 elleni vakcinák hatékony kifejlesztésére. Az online reprezentatív kérdőíves vizsgálat eredményei szerint minél konzervatívabbnak vallja magát valaki, annál nagyobb eséllyel szkeptikus mindkét kérdést illetően, a kormányt és ellenzéket támogatók között viszont nincs különbség a tudomány hatékony vakcinafejlesztési képességének megítélésében. Utóbbi jelenség, hogy a kormánypárti szavazók ebben az értelemben nem térnek el az ellenzékiektől, vélhetően a kormány oltásra buzdító intenzív kampányával magyarázható, illetve hogy a kormány az átoltottság kérdését erőteljes legitimációs eszköznek tekintette a kormányzati válságkezelésről való kommunikáció során.
Abstract As for the mitigation of the negative consequences of the coronavirus pandemic and the related crisis, governments should inter alia facilitate the willingness to vaccinate. However, related discussions became politicised, especially in countries with an extremely high level of partisan polarisation in opinions and media discourses, like in Hungary, which is the selected case of our study. As previous research about the United States shows, general trust in science is also influenced by the ideological alignment of individuals – people with conservative identification are more likely to question scientific results and recommendations, considering global warming, or the characteristics of the pandemic and the effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines. In our study we examine two main questions: first, whether the ideological orientation and partisan alignment of Hungarian citizens influence their general trust in science, and second, whether the same factors influence their opinion on scientists' ability to develop effective vaccines against the coronavirus. Furthermore, we also investigate whether media consumption habits might influence these interrelations. According to the results of the representative online survey, the more conservative someone in Hungary identifies, the more likely they will be sceptical in terms of both questions. However, support of government or opposition parties does not determine whether they believe in the ability of scientists to develop effective vaccines, and it is influenced by their media consumption habits. We showed that (1) opposition supporters are much more different along their preferred media source than government supporters, (2) television watchers are of the same opinion independent of their party preference and (3) social media consumers are generally more likely to reject scientific results. The phenomenon that supporters of the conservative government and of the alliance of opposition parties are different in terms of their media consumption is a surprising finding in the polarised Hungarian context. We provide two main explanations for this. First, it is most probably the consequence of the government's intensive campaign that encouraged vaccination. Second, the government used the issue of vaccination as a source of legitimacy regarding the effectiveness of their crisis management.
