Suchergebnisse

Although the focus of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) remains peace and security, missions may also have an environmental orientation. Such an emphasis is usually based on environmental goals and activities in operation mandates or deployed units on the ground dedicated to environmental matters. A "green" mission orientation can strengthen peacekeepers' commitment to environmental protection and help promote environmental quality in host countries. However, little is known about what leads to an environmental mission orientation in the first place. This research contributes to addressing this question as I analyze the mission orientation of African PKOs since 1991. Consistent with the general rationale that interventions tend to strategically select themselves into the more difficult cases, I report evidence that peacekeepers are more likely to have a green orientation when host countries are more exposed to climate change and environmental stress. The analysis is complemented by a short qualitative study of UN peacekeeping in Somalia.

AbstractDoes the political ideology of negotiating parties influence the design of international environmental agreements? This article distinguishes between leftist and rightist executives in democracies to develop a twofold argument. First, left-leaning democratic governments tend to be generally more environmental-friendly, which implies that they should favor designs that are more conducive to effective institutions. Second, leftist democratic executives are commonly less concerned about sovereignty costs. Both mechanisms suggest that environmental treaties likely comprise "legalized," i.e., hard-law elements when left-wing democracies negotiate their design. The empirical implication of the theory is tested with quantitative data on international environmental agreements since 1975. The findings report an association between leftist ideology in democracies and agreement legalization, although this is driven by aspects of sovereignty delegation. This article contributes to the literatures on environmental institutions, international cooperation more generally, as well as party politics.

Does the political ideology of negotiating parties influence the design of international environmental agreements? This article distinguishes between leftist and rightist executives in democracies to develop a twofold argument. First, left-leaning democratic governments tend to be generally more environmental-friendly, which implies that they should favor designs that are more conducive to effective institutions. Second, leftist democratic executives are commonly less concerned about sovereignty costs. Both mechanisms suggest that environmental treaties likely comprise "legalized," i.e., hard-law elements when left-wing democracies negotiate their design. The empirical implication of the theory is tested with quantitative data on international environmental agreements since 1975. The findings report an association between leftist ideology in democracies and agreement legalization, although this is driven by aspects of sovereignty delegation. This article contributes to the literatures on environmental institutions, international cooperation more generally, as well as party politics.

Abstract
Previous research suggests that client politics shape national migration laws in that they converge toward more liberal regulations. An examination of recently released cross-country data suggests, however, that there is little support for either convergence or generally more open policies. Trying to shed light on this empirical puzzle, I argue that democratic policymakers have incentives to listen to, and pursue policies that are favored by, the 'unorganized' electorate as well, since this maximizes their chances of staying in power. However, due to the influence of client interests that work against the public's view on migration, a positive effect should only materialize under more salient circumstances, that is, when the inflow of foreign-born individuals is high. I analyze these expectations quantitatively using data that combine information on national migration policies with all European Social Survey rounds in 2002–2016. I find robust and significant support for public opinion influencing domestic immigration laws, but this effect only emerges with rather large migrant and refugee populations in the country.

Political leaders are ultimately responsible for their country's foreign policy, but our understanding of how executive turnover affects the likelihood of international treaty ratification remains limited. For contributing to this debate, I define leader change as the replacement of the executive leader by a new one who relies on different social groups for support. Focusing then on those cases where new leaders can assume office only from predecessors who plausibly supported treaty ratification, I expect that—in light of the predecessor's support for an agreement and the change in the domestic support base—leadership turnover makes ratification less likely. The empirical implication is tested with quantitative methods using data on multilateral treaties of the post–Cold War era. The main findings and a series of additional analyses provide strong and robust evidence for the theoretical argument. This research sheds new light on the determinants of multilateral cooperation as well as the role of government leaders in international affairs and foreign-policy decision-making.

This article argues that similar conflict characteristics form links between crises, which signal the relevant actors – that is, the belligerents and the potential mediator(s) – that a comparable approach in terms of third-party mediation could be suitable across these disputes – even if the relevant parties are not the same. Specifically, demand (antagonists) and supply-side actors (mediators) are likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating the mediation behavior in similar crises. The empirical analysis, using data from the International Crisis Behavior project, shows that comparable patterns in violence, arguably the most visible and salient conflict characteristic, are associated with mediation traveling across crises; other dispute characteristics incorporated into spatial lags are not, however. Hence, particularly as domestic/unit-level (monadic) influences are controlled for, the effect of common exposure is taken into account, and different estimation strategies are used, the results emphasize that there is a genuine diffusion process via common levels of violence in the context of international mediation.

If conflicts cluster in space, does this also apply to international mediation? In light of the spatial dependency of armed conflicts, this paper develops a theoretical framework based on the mechanisms of norm diffusion for why we may also observe international mediation contagion in certain regions. Specifically, the author derives the hypothesis that mediation could diffuse across those disputes that are closely linked to each other geographically. The empirical analysis of this argument employs data from the International Crisis Behavior project, which covers international crises and mediation onsets between 1918 and 2007. The results show that mediation does indeed cluster in space, while the findings become even stronger when taking into account more recent crises only. The article concludes that knowledge about the spatial contagion of international mediation is likely to be of great interest to policy-makers and scholars alike.

Which factors make it more likely that environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) exist in autocracies? Several studies addressed this question before but might suffer from two shortcomings. First, the more general literature on social movements treats nonstate actors as a closely related characteristic of democracies. This neglects, however, that ENGOs might exist in autocracies as well. Second, the more specialized literature on comparative environmental politics examines ENGOs in autocratic regimes but rather focuses on single case studies. Despite fascinating insights, we thus lack a comprehensive theory on why ENGOs might exist in different types of dictatorships. In light of this, the following research adds to this by developing a theory that is based on the political opportunity structures (i.e., degrees of repression) in different autocratic typologies. The empirical analysis using data on 71 autocracies from 1973 to 2003 emphasizes that ENGO existence strongly differs across single-party regimes, monarchies, military regimes, and personalist dictatorships.