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The average citizen is often unable to distinguish and choose between political leaders according to their ideological profiles. Research using evolutionary theory shows that citizens instead turn to perceptions of procedural fairness concerning whether leaders follow basic decision-making rules such as passing policies without personal interest and displaying responsiveness to citizens' opinions. Some argue that this helps citizens "weed out" questionable leaders; others question citizens' ability to distinguish those following the rules from those who do not. To address this question, I build on psychological research showing that the mind possesses a natural ability, a cheater-detection system, enabling the detection of self-interested others who violate social rules. Introducing an experimental protocol from psychology embedded in cross-national surveys, I show that this system also operates when citizens evaluate political leaders, facilitating identification of leaders who violate basic decision-making rules. The findings advance our understanding of citizens' democratic competences and followers' cognitive abilities generally.

Politicians' desire for reelection motivates them to be responsive to voters' policy preferences. In the traditional view, voters choose between candidates based on their delivery of favorable outcomes such as ideologically appealing policies or a prospering economy. However, research in psychology shows that, in addition to outcomes, people care about procedural fairness and, particularly, impartial decision-makers who make decisions without personal motives and interests. This, I argue, confronts politicians with a delicate task: Politicians must present voters with favorable policy outcomes but without appearing as if they pursue these policies based on a personal, vote-maximizing motive for reelection. In four survey experiments, I find support for this argument. Participants were significantly less inclined to trust and vote for politicians and support their policies when political decisions were described as motivated by reelection considerations than when no such motive was present. The findings advance our understanding of how citizens view political representation and have important implications for research on public opinion, legislative behavior, and democratic theory.

Politicians' desire for reelection motivates them to be responsive to voters' policy preferences. In the traditional view, voters choose between candidates based on their delivery of favorable outcomes such as ideologically appealing policies or a prospering economy. However, research in psychology shows that, in addition to outcomes, people care about procedural fairness and, particularly, impartial decision‐makers who make decisions without personal motives and interests. This, I argue, confronts politicians with a delicate task: politicians must present voters with favorable policy outcomes but without appearing as if they pursue these policies based on a personal, vote‐maximizing motive for reelection. In four survey experiments, I find support for this argument. Participants were significantly less inclined to trust and vote for politicians and support their policies when political decisions were described as motivated by reelection considerations than when no such motive was present. The findings advance our understanding of how citizens view political representation and have important implications for research on public opinion, legislative behavior, and democratic theory.

Do voters decide on the basis of the election pledges political parties make? Although this is a key assumption in most democratic theories and, seemingly, among parties who issue dozens of pledges during campaigns, the scientific literature does not provide a clear answer to this question. This article develops a theory of pledge-based voting and a research design that allows for studying the electoral effects of pledges in real-time as the campaign unfolds. Based on a novel experimental design embedded in panel surveys administered during and after the 2019 Danish national election campaign (N = 6233), we estimate that the most salient pledges affect vote choice by between 1.1 and 2.1 percentage points averaged across the electorate. While modest, these effects can be decisive in the often highly competitive context of modern elections. The findings have implications for our understanding of political behavior, party politics, and normative theories of democracy.

This article argues that followers' preferences for dominant leadership vary according to two types of exploitation risks from other individuals within the group. Previous work demonstrates that contexts of inter-group war and peace make followers prefer dominant- and non-dominant-looking leaders, respectively. We add an intra-group perspective to this literature. Four original studies demonstrate that contexts with high risks of free-riding and criminal behavior from other group members (i.e., horizontal exploitation) increase preferences for dominant-looking leaders, whereas contexts with high risks of unresponsive, self-interested behavior from leaders themselves (i.e., vertical exploitation) decrease preferences for dominant-looking leaders. Moreover, within this framework of intra-group exploitation risks we show that followers prefer leaders from another vis-à-vis their own ethnic coalition to look less dominant, and that this difference is driven by enhanced concerns for vertical exploitation from ethnically different leaders. The findings add new insights on appearance-based voting and electoral difficulties facing minority candidates.

AbstractPolitical parties in office generally incur a cost of ruling among the electorate. This article considers the broader implications of this phenomenon for democratic governance. We argue that the electoral cost a party incurs in office entails that its individual legislators become more inclined to vote against the party line as a way to distance themselves from the deteriorating party brand. We test and support several observable implications of this argument using time series data including all members of parliament in the British parliament between 1992 and 2015 coupled with monthly opinion poll data. The well‐established electoral cost of ruling thus translates into a legislative cost of ruling by reducing incumbent party legislators' loyalty to the party line. We discuss how the legislative cost of ruling complicates effective governance but may also strengthen democratic accountability by reducing legislative capacity of governing parties that have lost their electoral mandate.

This article analyses what makes political candidates run a party-focused or personalised election campaign. Prior work shows that candidates face incentives from voters and the media to personalise their campaign rhetoric and promises at the expense of party policy. This has raised concerns about the capacity of parties to govern effectively and voters' ability to hold individual politicians accountable. This article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints candidates face from their party in personalising their election campaigns. Specifically, we argue that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrains most political candidates in following electoral incentives for campaign personalisation. Using candidate survey data from the 2009 EP election campaign in 27 countries, we show how candidates from parties in which party officials exerted greater control over the nomination process and campaign finances were less likely to engage in personalised campaigning at the expense of the party programme. The findings imply that most parties, as central gatekeepers and resource suppliers, hold important control mechanisms for countering the electoral pressure for personalisation, and advance our understanding of the incentives and constraints candidates face when communicating with voters. We discuss how recent democratic reforms, paradoxically, might induce candidate personalisation with potential negative democratic consequences. ; This article analyses what makes political candidates run a party-focused or personalised election campaign. Prior work shows that candidates face incentives from voters and the media to personalise their campaign rhetoric and promises at the expense of party policy. This has raised concerns about the capacity of parties to govern effectively and voters' ability to hold individual politicians accountable. This article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints candidates face from their party in personalising their election campaigns. Specifically, we argue that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrains most political candidates in following electoral incentives for campaign personalisation. Using candidate survey data from the 2009 EP election campaign in 27 countries, we show how candidates from parties in which party officials exerted greater control over the nomination process and campaign finances were less likely to engage in personalised campaigning at the expense of the party programme. The findings imply that most parties, as central gatekeepers and resource suppliers, hold important control mechanisms for countering the electoral pressure for personalisation, and advance our understanding of the incentives and constraints candidates face when communicating with voters. We discuss how recent democratic reforms, paradoxically, might induce candidate personalisation with potential negative democratic consequences.

AbstractThis article analyses what makes political candidates run a party‐focused or personalised election campaign. Prior work shows that candidates face incentives from voters and the media to personalise their campaign rhetoric and promises at the expense of party policy. This has raised concerns about the capacity of parties to govern effectively and voters' ability to hold individual politicians accountable. This article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints candidates face from their party in personalising their election campaigns. Specifically, it is argued that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrains most political candidates in following electoral incentives for campaign personalisation. Using candidate survey data from the 2009 EP election campaign in 27 countries, the article shows how candidates from parties in which party officials exerted greater control over the nomination process and campaign finances were less likely to engage in personalised campaigning at the expense of the party programme. The findings imply that most parties, as central gatekeepers and resource suppliers, hold important control mechanisms for countering the electoral pressure for personalisation and advance our understanding of the incentives and constraints candidates face when communicating with voters. The article discusses how recent democratic reforms, paradoxically, might induce candidate personalisation with potential negative democratic consequences.

Widespread distrust in politicians is often attributed to the way elites portray politics to citizens: the media, competing candidates, and foreign governments are largely considered responsible for portraying politicians as self-interested actors pursuing personal electoral and economic interests. This article turns to the mass level and considers the active role of citizens in disseminating such information. We build on psychological research on human cooperation, holding that people exhibit an interpersonal transmission bias in favor of information on the self-interested, antisocial behavior of others to maintain group cooperation. We posit that this transmission bias extends to politics, causing citizens to disproportionally disseminate information on self-interested politicians through interpersonal communication and, in turn, contributes to distrust in politicians and policy disapproval. We support these predictions using novel experimental studies allowing us to observe transmission rates and opinion effects in actual communication chains. The findings have implications for understanding and accommodating political distrust.

Widespread distrust in politicians is often attributed to the way elites portray politics to citizens: the media, competing candidates, and foreign governments are largely considered responsible for portraying politicians as self-interested actors pursuing personal electoral and economic interests. This article turns to the mass level and considers the active role of citizens in disseminating such information. We build on psychological research on human cooperation, holding that people exhibit an interpersonal transmission bias in favor of information on the self-interested, antisocial behavior of others to maintain group cooperation. We posit that this transmission bias extends to politics, causing citizens to disproportionally disseminate information on self-interested politicians through interpersonal communication and, in turn, contributes to distrust in politicians and policy disapproval. We support these predictions using novel experimental studies, allowing us to observe transmission rates and opinion effects in actual communication chains. The findings have implications for understanding and accommodating political distrust.