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How do states violate human rights norms after legalization? Why are these violations so persistent? What are the limits of legalization for protecting human rights norms? Conventional wisdom offers a variety of answers to these questions, but most often they conflate laws and norms and focus only on state actions that violate both. While this focus is undoubtedly valuable, it does not capture cases in which states violate human rights norms without technically violating the law. Norm breakers are not necessarily lawbreakers. Focusing exclusively on norm violations that are illegal obscures the possibility that agents could violate norms in a legal manner, engaging in actions that are awful but lawful. Presenting rich case studies of the French expulsion of Roma immigrants from 2007 to 2017 and the Czech segregation of Roma children in schools for those with mild mental disabilities between 1993 and 2017, Evading International Norms argues that the violation of human rights norms often continues after legalization under the cover of technical legality. While laws and norms overlap, interact, and shape each other in many ways, they tend to reflect each other only selectively, which leads to the existence of norm-law gaps. Taking advantage of such gaps, states resist unwanted human rights obligations by transgressing international human rights norms without violating the laws designed to protect them - a process Zoltán I. Búzás names norm evasion. Based on a wealth of evidence, including more than 160 interviews, the book shows that the treatment of the Roma by France and the Czech Republic violated the norm of racial equality in a technically legal fashion. Búzás cautions that the good news about law compliance is not necessarily good news about norm compliance and draws attention to racial discrimination against the Roma, one of the largest and most marginalized European minorities.

"This book argues that the violation of human rights norms continues after legalization under the cover of technical legality. Its starting point is that human rights are embedded in and guide action through both laws and norms. Although laws and norms interact and overlap considerably, they mirror each other selectively, engendering norm-law gaps. Because of these gaps, law compliance and legality on the one hand and norm following and normative appropriateness on the other often diverge. Most relevant for our discussion, actions that are technically legal may be normatively inappropriate. The book provides a two-part theory of norm evasion. The first part focuses on norm evasion as a strategy and explains why and how states engage in it. Different domestic and international groups compete to shape state policy. In this stylized account, one side favors policies that comply with human rights laws and norms, whereas the other favors policies that violate human rights laws and norms. When the two groups are similar in strength, obeying both laws and norms or transgressing both can be very costly. Instead, the more attractive options are mixed strategies: follow norms but violate laws or comply with laws but violate norms. When officials deem law violations costlier than norm violations, the state will exploit norm-law gaps to violate norms in a technically legal fashion. This strategy, which the author labels norm evasion, allows the state to satisfy groups opposed to human rights while lowering the legal costs of doing so. The second part of the theory focuses on norm evasion as an outcome of a complex interactive process between the state and other relevant agents. After the state chooses an action, human rights supporters will contest its legality in court and its appropriateness in public and private discourse. The state and human rights opponents will defend its legality and appropriateness. The less often that courts rule against the state's action and the more discourses characterize this action as inappropriate, the more it becomes constructed as norm evasion. Another way to put this is that when the state wins the competition over the legality of its actions and loses that over appropriateness, its actions are constructed as norm evasion. He illustrates the argument in original and rich case studies of the French expulsion of Roma immigrants (2007-17) and the Czech segregation of Roma children in schools for those with mild mental disabilities (1993-2017)"--

AbstractFormal racial equality is a key aspect of the current Liberal International Order (LIO). It is subject to two main challenges: resurgent racial nationalism and substantive racial inequality. Combining work in International Relations with interdisciplinary studies on race, I submit that these challenges are the latest iteration of struggles between two transnational coalitions over the LIO's central racial provisions, which I call racial diversity regimes (RDRs). The traditional coalition has historically favored RDRs based on racial inequality and racial nationalism. The transformative coalition has favored RDRs based on racial equality and nonracial nationalism. I illustrate the argument by tracing the development of the liberal order's RDR as a function of intercoalitional struggles from one based on racial nationalism and inequality in 1919 to the current regime based on nonracial nationalism and limited equality. Today, racial nationalists belong to the traditional coalition and critics of racial inequality are part of the transformative coalition. The stakes of their struggles are high because they will determine whether we will live in a more racist or a more antiracist world. This article articulates a comprehensive framework that places race at the heart of the liberal order, offers the novel concept of "embedded racism" to capture how sovereignty shields domestic racism from foreign interference, and proposes an agenda for mainstream International Relations that takes race seriously.

AbstractThe most important international human rights norms are legalized or codified in international treaty law. Yet pernicious practices at odds with these norms endure and sometimes even increase after legalization. According to conventional wisdom, this is because agents commit to but do not comply with international law and the underlying norms. I develop a theory of evasion to explain why norm violations persist even when states technically comply with the law. Because legalization transposes social norms into international law imperfectly, it creates gaps between laws and underlying norms. Because of these norm-law gaps, legality and normative appropriateness will diverge. States caught between opposing pressures from pro-violation and pro-compliance groups exploit this gap through what I call evasion—the intentional minimization of normative obligations that technically complies with international law but violates underlying norms. I demonstrate the theory's empirical purchase in the cases of the French expulsion of Roma immigrants and the Czech school segregation of Roma children. Under the cover of technical compliance with the law, these states violated the norm of racial equality. The argument cautions that the good news about law compliance is not necessarily good news about norm compliance, broadens our understanding of norm violators' agency, and has practical implications for human rights advocacy.

Despite the widespread nature of evasion (bad-faith compliance), this interesting phenomenon is under-studied in International Relations. Even the most sophisticated typologies of compliance and rule following overlook evasion. This is problematic because evasion is essentially a false positive that looks like genuine compliance but can have the effect of violation. Drawing on purposivist legal theory, this article offers an in-depth discussion of evasion. It articulates what evasion is, why it occurs, how it relates to designed flexibility, and how it impacts accountability. Evasion entails intentional compliance with the letter of the law but violation of the purpose of the law in order to minimize inconvenient obligations in an arguably legal fashion. Three original case studies illustrate the empirical purchase and generalizability of evasion in International Relations. Evasion contributes a more nuanced understanding of compliance, cautions that legality sometimes hinders accountability, and offers policy recommendations to counter undesirable evasion. The article concludes with promising directions for a research program on evasion.

Despite the widespread nature of evasion (bad-faith compliance), this interesting phenomenon is under-studied in International Relations. Even the most sophisticated typologies of compliance and rule following overlook evasion. This is problematic because evasion is essentially a false positive that looks like genuine compliance but can have the effect of violation. Drawing on purposivist legal theory, this article offers an in-depth discussion of evasion. It articulates what evasion is, why it occurs, how it relates to designed flexibility, and how it impacts accountability. Evasion entails intentional compliance with the letter of the law but violation of the purpose of the law in order to minimize inconvenient obligations in an arguably legal fashion. Three original case studies illustrate the empirical purchase and generalizability of evasion in International Relations. Evasion contributes a more nuanced understanding of compliance, cautions that legality sometimes hinders accountability, and offers policy recommendations to counter undesirable evasion. The article concludes with promising directions for a research program on evasion.

Although human rights are widely endorsed in the abstract, significant variation exists in the degree to which different states endorse different rights. To what extent is the international human rights community divided? This research note examines fragmentation in the international human rights regime using an inductive, data-driven approach. We trace states' normative positions as they are expressed in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a UN mechanism where states "peer review" one another's human rights practices. We analyze over 56,000 recommendations from the first two cycles of the UPR using data collected from the non-profit organization UPR Info. Employing unsupervised scaling and clustering methods, we find four interstate clusters or factions emerging from this process: Civil Libertarians, Developmentalists, Institutionalists, and Egalitarians. Our results indicate that the international human rights regime reflects less a singular community than a set of communities, each constituted by a distinct configuration of normative positions. They also reveal new insights about specific norms: while women's rights and children's rights are broadly endorsed, norms related to sexuality and migration are more contentious and partisan. While our findings are descriptive, they lay the foundation for new causal questions of interest to scholars of human rights and international norms.

How do formal international institutions change and adjust to new circumstances? The conventional wisdom in international relations, outlined by rational design, is that the answer lies in designed flexibility, which allows states to adjust agreements. Drawing on rich but disparate literatures across subfields of political science—especially constructivism and historical institutionalism—we propose an alternative, which we call "emergent flexibility." Emergent flexibility is a property of international institutions that is not intentionally crafted by rule-makers when a rule is formally established, but is subsequently discovered, activated, and accessed by creative rule-users in ways unintended by designers. Rich case studies trace how rule-users have accessed emergent flexibility through the legal interpretive strategy of subsequent practice to change rigid rules of the UN Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights. A key implication of emergent flexibility is that, contrary to rational design expectations, international institutions designed to be rigid can adjust to unforeseen circumstances even in the absence of formal redesign, allowing cooperation to continue. The broadening of flexibility from designed to emergent reveals the politics of flexibility between formal design moments, provides a more nuanced notion of intentionality, and equips us to better address fundamental positive and normative questions of institutional development.