Suchergebnisse

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Workshop "Revising European Treaties", organised by the RSCAS/EUI on 11 November 2013. ; This working paper explores the challenges and opportunities of a possible euro area flexibility clause. Such a clause, if introduced through a limited revision of the current EU Treaties, could be used to partially respond to one of the institutional challenges exposed by the Eurozone crisis, namely that member states (permanently) outside the euro area can block change desired by the member states within the euro area. It would provide an alternative to a comprehensive treaty revision and to going outside the treaties by concluding additional intergovernmental treaties.

The financial and sovereign debt crisis has had a great impact on the relationship between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Member States of the Eurozone, a relationship traditionally studied from the perspective of central bank independence. This article takes a different perspective on that relationship, namely that of central bank intervention in Member State economic policy making. It focuses on the pressure and influence exercised by the ECB on the Member States of the eurozone. The two perspectives combined reveal the nature of the ever more frequent and intense interaction between the ECB and the Member States of the eurozone. In the crisis, several different forms can be identified of ECB pressure on eurozone Member States to adopt reforms in the areas of fiscal policy and structural reforms, marking a shift from interaction to central bank intervention. This ECB intervention is parallel to an equally unprecedented intervention by the collective of eurozone Member States in the economic policy of several Member States through the economic policy conditionality linked to financial assistance. The article analyses several instances of ECB intervention, offers an explanation and a theoretical framework for normatively assessing it. The main risk identified for the ECB in this article is that of being perceived as a political or politicized actor, although it is acknowledged that the ECB is confronted with a difficult balancing act. The ECB should be more cautious in its approach, the further an issue is from its core mandate of securing price stability.

This paper examines and critically discusses several new forms of differentiated integration developed in reaction to the Eurozone crisis, including the so-called Two-Pack of economic governance, the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact. A number of elements from these instruments will be discussed that best illustrate the challenges of the most recent forms of further integration in the light of legitimacy. A theoretical framework for the concept of legitimacy is used that builds on the assumptions that legitimacy is provided through legality and that parliaments contribute to the legitimacy of political projects as an important element of so-called 'input legitimacy'. The paper illustrates some of the opportunities, challenges and risks of the recent forms of differentiated integration. It is argued that in the absence of an increased legitimacy of democratic politics at the level of the European Union, the most important legitimacy source remains at the level of national democracy and parliaments. Therefore, the importance of national legitimacy moments should not be underestimated. Moreover, they should not be avoided.

Significant long-term developments in EMU are conditioned not only by the current EU legal framework but also by national constitutions. Conditions are posed by constitutional courts interpreting the constitution, by putting limits to transfers of sovereignty and by putting limits on the basis of rights protection. Good examples of this are the German and Portuguese constitution. Conditions are posed also by referenda prescribed or allowed for the ratification of new treaties. Member states are free to determine the national constitutional requirements for the ratification of EU treaties (in line with the national constitution), including the use of referenda. The United Kingdom illustrates that development of the EU can also be conditioned by referenda on membership. Conditions are posed to euro area development by non-euro area member states. The most prominent example of this is again provided by the United Kingdom (Fiscal Compact and in-or-out referendum). ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.