Suchergebnisse

THE STUDY OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF GOVERNMENTS IN DEMOCRATIC, WESTERN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES HAS YIELDED MANY INSIGHTS IN THE THREE DECADES SINCE ANTHONY DOWNS' AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY WAS PUBLISHED IN 1957. SIMILARLY, THE STUDY OF THE OVERT POLITICAL COMPONENT OF THE ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN AUTHORITARIAN, EASTERN CENTRALLY-PLANNED ECONOMIES HAS ATTAINED A GREAT DEGREE OF REFINEMENT IN THE POST-STALIN ERA. FOR MOST COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD, HOWEVER, NEITHER MODEL APPLIES VERY WELL. RATHER THERE IS A THIRD TYPE - MORE OR LESS AUTHORITARIAN CUM MORE OR LESS CAPITALIST - WHICH REASONABLY DESCRIBES A LARGE NUMBER OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE BEHAVIOR OF THESE COUNTRIES' GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT BE WELL EXPLAINED BY MODELS WHICH FIT THE OTHER TWO TYPES. THIS PAPER PROPOSES A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE ECONOMIC DECISIONS OF AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS CAN BE ANALYZED WITHOUT ASSUMING THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS THE ONLY ECONOMIC AGENT, THUS IN BASICALLY CAPITALIST COUNTRIES WHERE ELECTIONS ARE NOT THE MEANS BY WHICH POWER IS VALIDATED AND TRANSFERRED.