Suchergebnisse

THE INVESTMENT THEORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE POSITS THAT POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES INVEST CAMPAIGN FUNDS IN MEMBERS WHO PROVIDE SERVICES AT A LOW COST. THE AUTHORS BUILD ON AND DIRECTLY TEST THIS THEORY, HYPOTHESIZING THAT PACS GIVE TO MEMBERS WHO ARE EFFECTIVE LEGISLATORS. USING DATA COLLECTED FROM THE 103D AND 104TH CONGRESSES AND A DIRECT MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS, THEY FIND THAT CONTRIBUTIONS FLOW TO MEMBERS WHO ARE SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR SPONSORED BILLS ENACTED INTO LAW. BEING AN EFFECTIVE LEGISLATOR IS ONE WAY A MEMBER CAN PURCHASE TIME FOR HIS OR HER WASHINGTON WORK.

MANY QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO POLITICAL SCIENTISTS MAY BE ANSWERED WITH EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS, WHICH STUDIES THE DURATION AND TIMING OF EVENTS. THE AUTHORS DISCUSS THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF EVENT HISTORY DATA-DATA GIVING THE NUMBER, TIMING, AND SEQUENCE OF CHANGES IN A VARIABLE OF INTEREST. THESE METHODS ARE ILLUSTRATED BY EXAMINING THREE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL SCIENCE PROBLEMS: OVER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS, CHALLENGER DETERRENCE, AND CONGRESSIONAL CAREER PATHS; MANY OTHER APPLICATIONS ARE POSSIBLE. THE ARTICLE IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE GROWING NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS THAT CURRENTLY EXIST IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND TO ENCOURAGE GREATER USE OF THESE MODELS BY SHOWING WHY EVENT HISTORY MODELS ARE USEFUL IN POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND EXPLAINING HOW ONE SPECIFIES AND INTERPRETS THESE MODELS.

Legislative socialisation has long been an important force for political deradicalisation in capitalist democracies worldwide. It remains barely explored, however, in large part because it is a process very difficult to track by conventional observational or survey methods. We circumvent these problems by taking advantage of an unusually propitious vote on televising the proceedings of the British House of Commons to chart the institutional deradicalisation of its Labour members. Socialisation effects are shown to be non-linear and, while the difference is not statistically significant, to be marginally stronger among Members of Parliament (MPs) with frontbench experience. The somewhat greater conservatism of frontbenchers, however, cannot be explained by anticipatory socialisation. Rather, it seems to be a function of doing well under 'rules of the parliamentary game' threatened by proposals for institutional reform. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)