Suchergebnisse

Many post-Soviet central governments have assigned numerous policy responsibilities to local governments, but have simultaneously constrained local autonomy in an effort to ensure that local governments pursue central objectives. In this paper, I examine the interplay between local autonomy and central control in one post-Soviet central government—Ukraine—by examining the case of small-enterprise privatization. Shortly after Ukraine's independence, the central government transferred ownership of state-run small enterprises to local governments, but required that local governments meet annual privatization targets set by a central agency. Some local governments have met the annual targets, while others have lagged behind. The results of an empirical analysis of local privatization levels indicate that central control mechanisms currently have limited influence over local decisionmaking. The results demonstrate that, instead, local elections have increased the influence of local groups whose interests do not always coincide with those of the central government. In response, the central government has instituted several changes to the intergovernmental finance system that are likely to increase central government authority and continue to move Ukraine towards a system in which local governments carry a heavy service-delivery load with limited autonomy.

The author examines the orientation of Ukrainian local governments to their local economic development responsibilities and uses theory on local regimes, fiscal stress, and organizational capacity to explain differential tax burdens across local governments. Results of ordinary least squares regression on tax implementation by Ukrainian local governments in 1997 indicate that all three theories provide insight into the dynamics of local economic development and taxation.

This article examines the factors that promote and inhibit contracting out by local governments in transitioning nations. Specifically, this article analyzes the effect of a variety of factors on the decision by Ukrainian local governments to contract out public services. The article uses Logit techniques to analyze the results of a 72-city survey undertaken in Ukraine in 1997 and 1998. Analysis of the data indicates that the presence of a technical assistance program in particular increases the likelihood that a local government will engage in contracting out. The findings also demonstrate the importance of factors identified by contracting out models of local governments in advanced industrialized contexts.

Prescriptions for improving contracting focus on how public managers can negotiate, implement, and monitor contracts to enhance service delivery and save costs. Yet, the well‐functioning markets that effective contracting requires cannot be taken for granted. All markets risk failure. Consequently, public managers must manage the market to ensure competition and the flow of information about vendor performance, effective contract practices, and so on. We supplement transaction‐cost theory with scholarship on public management networks to evaluate refuse services in nine governments in the Columbus, Ohio, metropolitan area. Our analyses reveal that even in the case of refuse collection, where nonspecific asset investments and easily measured service outputs and outcomes enhance contracting success, public managers looking to improve service delivery still must manage the market and the network supporting it.