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I study how a revolutionary vanguard might use violence to mobilize a mass public. The mechanism is informational-the vanguard uses violence to manipulate population member's beliefs about the level of antigovernment sentiment in society. The model has multiple equilibria, one equilibrium in which there may be revolution and another in which there is certain not to be. In the former, structural factors influence expected mobilization, whereas in the latter they do not. Hence, the model is consistent with structural factors influencing the likelihood of revolution in some societies but not others, offering a partial defense of structural accounts from common critiques. The model also challenges standard arguments about the role of revolutionary vanguards. The model is consistent with vanguard violence facilitating mobilization and even sparking spontaneous uprisings. However, it also predicts selection effects-an active vanguard emerges only in societies that are already coordinated on a participatory equilibrium. Hence, a correlation between vanguard activity and mass mobilization may not constitute evidence for the causal efficacy of vanguards-be it through creating focal points, providing selective incentives, or communicating information. Adapted from the source document.

I study how a variety of structural and strategic factors affect terrorist mobilization, the likelihood of a splinter faction forming, and the positions adopted by terrorist leaders. The factors considered include the state of the economy, the viability of institutions for the nonviolent expression of grievance, the ability of the factional leaders to provide nonideological benefits, and the risks associated with splintering. The model highlights that, for strategic reasons, changes in the structural environment often entail trade-offs between decreasing terrorist mobilization and increasing extremism. For instance, strengthening the economy or institutions for the nonviolent expression of grievance is found to decrease terrorist mobilization, increase the extremism of terrorist factions, and decrease the likelihood of a splinter faction forming. These results suggest competing micro-level effects of such changes on the expected level of violence that, because they are offsetting, might not be observed in macro-level data analyses, which have been the mainstay of empirical studies of terrorism. Adapted from the source document.

The author models the relationship between a government & former terrorists as a game with both moral hazard & learning. The government is uncertain about both the former terrorists' ability & skill at providing counterterrorism aid. The government has the option -- after observing the success or failure of counterterrorism -- of replacing the former terrorist leadership with a new negotiating partner. This study demonstrates that the threat of replacement, in addition to promised concessions, provides incentives for former terrorists to exert counterterrorism effort, particularly when the potential replacements are of moderate ability. Furthermore, the author identifies conditions under which governments are likely to replace the former-terrorist leadership with which it has been negotiating. The model also has implications for the effect of counterterrorism successes on future concessions & the impact of the government's ability to consider replacing the former terrorists on concessions & counterterrorism. 1 Appendix, 13 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2005.]

Was sind die Bestimmungsfaktoren von terroristischer Gewalt, denen oft Konzessionen der Regierung folgen? Warum versöhnen sich Regierungen überhaupt mit Terroristen? Das Modell ergibt folgendes: Konzessionen der Regierung erreichen eine stärkere Militarisierung terroristischer Gruppen, da nur gemäßigte Terroristen Konzessionen akzeptieren. Dennoch halten Regierungen an Konzessionen fest, da dadurch ihre Fähigkeiten der Terrorismusbekämpfung steigen weil sie moderate Terroristen durch geheime Absprachen zur Abkehr bewegen. Dies erhöht die Glaubwürdigkeit des Antiterrorkampfes. Betrachtet werden auch die Ausgaben für den Antiterrorkampf, die Bedingungen von Verhandlungslösungen, die Dauer des Konfliktes, Anreize für Abtrünnige und Anreize für die Regierungen zu bestimmten Handlungen. Illustriert wird dies am Beispiel des Nahostkonfliktes zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern

I present a model of the interaction between a government, a terrorist organization, & potential terrorist volunteers in which, as a result of an endogenous choice, individuals with low ability or little education are most likely to volunteer to join the terrorist organization. However, the terrorist organization screens the volunteers for quality. Consequently, the model is consistent with two seemingly contradictory empirical findings. Actual terrorist operatives are not poor or lacking in education. And yet lack of economic opportunity & recessionary economies are positively correlated with terrorism. The model also endogenizes the effect of government counterterrorism on mobilization. Government crackdowns have competing effects on mobilization: they decrease the ability of terrorists to carry out effective attacks (making mobilization less attractive), & they foment ideological opposition to the government & impose negative economic externalities (making mobilization more attractive). This provides conditions under which government crackdowns increase or decrease mobilization. 1 Appendix, 49 References. Adapted from the source document.

An introduction to data science or statistics shouldn't involve proving complex theorems or memorizing obscure terms and formulas, but that is exactly what most introductory quantitative textbooks emphasize. In contrast, Thinking Clearly with Data focuses, first and foremost, on critical thinking and conceptual understanding in order to teach students how to be better consumers and analysts of the kinds of quantitative information and arguments that they will encounter throughout their lives. Among much else, the book teaches how to assess whether an observed relationship in data reflects a genuine relationship in the world and, if so, whether it is causal; how to make the most informative comparisons for answering questions; what questions to ask others who are making arguments using quantitative evidence; which statistics are particularly informative or misleading; how quantitative evidence should and shouldn't influence decision-making; and how to make better decisions by using moral values as well as data. Filled with real-world examples, the book shows how its thinking tools apply to problems in a wide variety of subjects, including elections, civil conflict, crime, terrorism, financial crises, health care, sports, music, and space travel.

How do different types of motivation influence the politics of collective action? We study a model of endogenous rebellion and repression to understand how different types of individual motivation affect participation, state repression, and the mechanisms by which state violence affects political contention. Unlike psychological rewards, material rewards are divided among successful rebels. Thus, in material rewards settings, repression that decreases mobilization and chances of success also increases participants' share of the rewards, reducing repression's effect. Consequently, materially rather than psychologically motivated groups are less affected by repression and face less repression, but they are also less able to turn early failures into future successes. Moreover, because repression is more effective and used more when rebels are psychologically motivated, rebel motivations are a confounder in estimates of the relationship between repression and mobilization. This can lead to overestimation of repression's effect and to more statistically significant results exactly when repression is more effective.