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The topic of this dissertation is the maritime strategy of four regional powers – China, India, Iran, and Brazil – from 2001 to 2015. These are regional powers by virtue of their prominence in military power, influence, and economics in their given region, but are also rising powers that have greatly increased the size of their armed forces and accelerated the modernization of said armed forces since the end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 era. The purpose of the dissertation is to test the explanatory power of neoclassical realism regarding the growth of the maritime power and the shape of maritime strategy in these four regional powers. Neoclassical realism is a strand of realist theory that accepts the neorealist dictum that the systemic balance of power is the chief explanatory variable in the international system and relations between states, but also introduces state-level intervening variables, in effect unpacking the monolithic "black box of the state" as posited by earlier types of realism. Thus neoclassical realism bridges the gap between realism and foreign policy analysis. The dissertation tests two neoclassical models. The first is Lobell's complex threat assessment model, which posits that a state's foreign policy executive is far more sensitive to sudden shifts in power rather than broad trends, and that this executive balances threats at the international, regional and domestic levels. Furthermore, it may only effectively balance in the presence of a foreign policy coalition composed of domestic elites. The second is Taliaferro's model of the resource extractive state. This model posits that each state has a certain capacity to extract or mobilize resources from its territory, defined as state power. Furthermore, each state faces a certain level of threat determined by distance, intent, and offensive capabilities. Thus, states choose different approaches in dealing with rivals. States with high state power and high threat emulate the most successful states in the international system, states with high state power and low threat innovate for the far future, and all other states persist in existing strategies, unwilling or unmotivated to do more. Modern maritime theory has three broad classes of strategy. The most basic is coastal defense, which uses few resources and contents itself with protecting the shore and fulfilling constabulary duties; this strategy requires few ships and specialized systems, and corresponds to a strategy of persistence in Taliaferro's model. Next up is sea control, which focuses on defeating the enemy, gaining control of the sea, and projecting power ashore. This strategy is based on carriers and a powerful surface navy, and it corresponds to a strategy of emulation, as it copies American maritime strategy. Finally there is sea denial, which seeks to deny access to large tracts of ocean to opposing forces using submarines and long-range aircraft. This is a strategy of innovation, as it draws upon entirely new technologies and institutions. In the analysis, Brazil and India were found to pursue emulatory strategies, while China and Iran, focused upon the perceived threat of superior American power projection, and chose to implement sea denial and thus innovative strategies, much like the Soviet Union and interwar Germany did before when faced with superior maritime power. Furthermore, the Brazilian foreign policy executive was constrained in implementing its chosen strategy, as elites deserted it in the wake of recession and corruption scandals starting in 2010. Thus a strong level of support was found for Lobell's method, but significantly less so for Taliaferro's, as states with high state power and high threat were actually likely to adopt innovation, especially in the case of continental powers facing a superior maritime rival. Aside from testing the models, there are a number of other valuable conclusions. Prestige remains a very valid motivation for foreign policy, and maritime power remains the premier choice for regional powers to express their new status, though today that is less through gunboat diplomacy and more through humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. Furthermore, if prestige maximization does not tempt a state to "overbalance", the lure of industrialization through military modernization might. This is most evident in China, where advances in electronics and other industrial fields are driven through dual-use technology and the promotion of an advanced military, especially the navy and naval aviation. ; Thema dieser Dissertation sind die maritimen Strategien von vier Regionalmächten - China, Indien, Iran und Brasilien - von 2001 bis 2015. Bei diesen Staaten handelt es sich aufgrund ihrer herausgehobenen regionalen militärischen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Stellung um Regionalmächte, gleichzeitig aber auch um aufsteigende Mächte, die seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges ihre Streitkräfte umfassend aufgestockt und modernisiert haben. Ziel der Dissertation ist die Untersuchung der Erklärungskraft des Neoklassischen Realismus für den Anstieg der Seemacht und die Ausgestaltung der maritimen Strategien dieser vier Regionalmächte. Bei Neoklassischem Realismus handelt es sich um eine Variante der Theorie des Realismus in den Internationalen Beziehungen, die das Neorealistische Diktum systemischen Machtgleichgewichts als Haupterklärungsvariable für XYZ akzeptiert, gleichzeitig aber auch intervenierende Variablen auf Länderebene einführt, wodurch die von älteren Spielarten des Realismus' postulierte "Black Box" staatlichen Handelns der Untersuchung geöffnet wird. Hierdurch wird die Lücke zwischen Realismus und außenpolitischer Analyse geschlossen. Die Dissertation untersucht zwei Neoklassische Modelle. Beim ersten handelt es sich um das Modell der komplexen Bedrohungseinschätzung nach Lobell, demzufolge die außenpolitische Führung eines Staates weitaus sensibler für plötzliche Machtverschiebungen als für allgemeine Trends ist, und zudem Bedrohungen auf internationaler, regionaler und innenpolitischer Ebene austariert. Zudem kann eine solche Reaktion auch nur erfolgen, wenn eine von innerstaatlichen Eliten gebildete außenpolitische Koalition existiert. Beim zweiten verwendeten Modell handelt es sich um Taliaferros Konzept des ressourcenextrahierenden Staats. Diesem Modell zufolge hat jeder Staat eine gewisse Kapazität, Ressourcen aus seinem Territorium zu gewinnen oder zu mobilisieren, was als staatliche Macht definiert wird. Weiterhin sieht sich jeder Staat einer gewissen Bedrohung durch andere Staaten ausgesetzt, die sich aus deren Offensivkapazitäten, ihrer Distanz, und der Einschätzung ihrer Absichten ergeben. Als Folge wählen Staaten unterschiedliche Ansätze, um sich Rivalen zu erwehren: Staaten mit großem Machtpotential und hohen direkten Bedrohungen emulieren die erfolgreichsten Staaten im internationalen System, Staaten mit großem Machtpotential und niedriger Bedrohungslage prägen innovative, zukunftsgerichtete Strategien, und alle anderen beharren auf ihren bestehenden Strategien, da sie nicht willens oder in der Lage sind, diese zu ändern. Analog hierzu nennt die moderne Maritime Theorie nennt drei Arten von Strategien. Die grundlegendste ist die Küstenverteidigung, die wenig Ressourcen benötigt und sich damit begnügt, die Küste zu schützen und Polizeiaufgaben wahrzunehmen; diese Strategie benötigt wenige Schiffe oder Spezialsysteme und korrespondiert damit der Strategie des "Beharrens" in Taliaferros Modell. Etwas anspruchsvoller ist die Seekontrolle, die sich auf das Besiegen des Gegners, der Gewinnung von Kontrolle über die See, und der Machtprojektion in Küstengebieten konzentriert. Diese Strategie basiert auf dem Einsatz von Flugzeugträgern und einer mächtigen Eskorte und korrespondiert der "Emulation" des derzeitigen Ansatzes der US-Marine. Schließlich steht auch eine sogenannte "Denial"-Strategie zur Auswahl, die darauf abzielt, durch den Einsatz von Unterseebooten und Langstreckenraketen gegnerischen Kräften den Zugang zur See zu verwehren. Hierbei handelt es sich um eine innovative Strategie, die sich neuen Technologien und Institutionen bedient. Auf Grundlage der Untersuchung zieht die Dissertation den Schluss, dass Brasilien und Indien eine Strategie der Emulation verfolgen, wohingegen sich China und Iran angesichts der wahrgenommenen Bedrohung einer überlegenen amerikanischen Kapazität zur Machtprojektion auf die Implementation einer innovativen "Denial"-Strategie verlegten, was dem Verhalten der Sowjetunion und Deutschlands zwischen den Weltkriegen gleicht. Außerdem war die außenpolitische Führung Brasiliens in der Implementierung ihrer bevorzugten Strategie eigeschränkt, da sich innenpolitische Eliten seit 2010 in der Folge einer Rezession und Korruptionsskandalen von ihr abwandten. Demzufolge stützt die Untersuchung die Annahmen des Lobellschen Modells, jedoch weniger der von Taliaferro vorgeschlagenen Alternative, da Staaten mit großen Machtpotential und hoher Gefährdung sich tatsächlich für die Ausübung von Innovation entschieden, besonders im Falle von Kontinentalmächten, die sich einen überlegenen Gegner zur See gegenübersahen. Neben der Überprüfung dieser Modelle lassen sich eine Reihe weiterer, wertvoller Schlüsse ziehen: Prestigegewinn bleibt eine hochrelevante Motivation der Außenpolitik, und der Aufbau einer Flotte bleibt die erste Wahl, durch die Regionalmächte ihren neugewonnenen Status zur Schau stellen, auch wenn dies heutzutage nicht mehr durch "Kanonenbootdiplomatie", sondern durch humanitäre Interventionen und Friedenssicherung stattfindet. Und auch wenn die Maximierung des eigenen Prestiges einen Staat nicht zu überzogenen Reaktionen auf äußere Bedrohungen verleitet, so könnte dies dennoch durch den Anreiz einer Industrialisierung durch militärische Modernisierung geschehen. Dies wird besonders im Falle Chinas deutlich, wo Innovationen in der Elektrotechnik und anderen Industriezweigen durch militärisch nutzbare Technologien und den Aufbau fortgeschrittener Streitkräfte verfolgt werden, besonders der Marine und der seegestützten Luftstreitkräfte.

Published online: 9 November 2016 ; What drives processes of institution building within regional international organizations? We challenge those established theories of regionalism, and of institutionalized cooperation more broadly, that treat different organizations as independent phenomena whose evolution is conditioned primarily by internal causal factors. Developing the basic premise of 'diffusion theory' - meaning that decision-making is interdependent across organizations - we argue that institutional pioneers, and specifically the European Union, shape regional institution-building processes in a number of discernible ways. We then hypothesize two pathways - active and passive - of European Union influence, and stipulate an endogenous capacity for institutional change as a key scope condition for their operation. Drawing on a new and original data set on the institutional design of 34 regional international organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010, the article finds that: (1) both the intensity of a regional international organization's structured interaction with the European Union (active influence) and the European Union's own level of delegation (passive influence) are associated with higher levels of delegation within other regional international organizations; (2) passive European Union influence exerts a larger overall substantive effect than active European Union influence does; and (3) these effects are strongest among those regional international organizations that are based on founding contracts containing open-ended commitments. These findings indicate that the creation and subsequent institutional evolution of the European Union has made a difference to the evolution of institutions in regional international organizations elsewhere, thereby suggesting that existing theories of regionalism are insufficiently able to account for processes of institution building in such contexts.

What drives processes of institution building within regional international organizations? We challenge those established theories of regionalism, and of institutionalized cooperation more broadly, that treat different organizations as independent phenomena whose evolution is conditioned primarily by internal causal factors. Developing the basic premise of 'diffusion theory' — meaning that decision-making is interdependent across organizations — we argue that institutional pioneers, and specifically the European Union, shape regional institution-building processes in a number of discernible ways. We then hypothesize two pathways — active and passive — of European Union influence, and stipulate an endogenous capacity for institutional change as a key scope condition for their operation. Drawing on a new and original data set on the institutional design of 34 regional international organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010, the article finds that: (1) both the intensity of a regional international organization's structured interaction with the European Union (active influence) and the European Union's own level of delegation (passive influence) are associated with higher levels of delegation within other regional international organizations; (2) passive European Union influence exerts a larger overall substantive effect than active European Union influence does; and (3) these effects are strongest among those regional international organizations that are based on founding contracts containing open-ended commitments. These findings indicate that the creation and subsequent institutional evolution of the European Union has made a difference to the evolution of institutions in regional international organizations elsewhere, thereby suggesting that existing theories of regionalism are insufficiently able to account for processes of institution building in such contexts.

What drives processes of institution building within regional international organizations? We challenge those established theories of regionalism, and of institutionalized cooperation more broadly, that treat different organizations as independent phenomena whose evolution is conditioned primarily by internal causal factors. Developing the basic premise of 'diffusion theory' — meaning that decision-making is interdependent across organizations — we argue that institutional pioneers, and specifically the European Union, shape regional institution-building processes in a number of discernible ways. We then hypothesize two pathways — active and passive — of European Union influence, and stipulate an endogenous capacity for institutional change as a key scope condition for their operation. Drawing on a new and original data set on the institutional design of 34 regional international organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010, the article finds that: (1) both the intensity of a regional international organization's structured interaction with the European Union (active influence) and the European Union's own level of delegation (passive influence) are associated with higher levels of delegation within other regional international organizations; (2) passive European Union influence exerts a larger overall substantive effect than active European Union influence does; and (3) these effects are strongest among those regional international organizations that are based on founding contracts containing open-ended commitments. These findings indicate that the creation and subsequent institutional evolution of the European Union has made a difference to the evolution of institutions in regional international organizations elsewhere, thereby suggesting that existing theories of regionalism are insufficiently able to account for processes of institution building in such contexts. ; peerReviewed

What drives processes of institution building within regional international organizations? We challenge those established theories of regionalism, and of institutionalized cooperation more broadly, that treat different organizations as independent phenomena whose evolution is conditioned primarily by internal causal factors. Developing the basic premise of 'diffusion theory' — meaning that decision-making is interdependent across organizations — we argue that institutional pioneers, and specifically the European Union, shape regional institution-building processes in a number of discernible ways. We then hypothesize two pathways — active and passive — of European Union influence, and stipulate an endogenous capacity for institutional change as a key scope condition for their operation. Drawing on a new and original data set on the institutional design of 34 regional international organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010, the article finds that: (1) both the intensity of a regional international organization's structured interaction with the European Union (active influence) and the European Union's own level of delegation (passive influence) are associated with higher levels of delegation within other regional international organizations; (2) passive European Union influence exerts a larger overall substantive effect than active European Union influence does; and (3) these effects are strongest among those regional international organizations that are based on founding contracts containing open-ended commitments. These findings indicate that the creation and subsequent institutional evolution of the European Union has made a difference to the evolution of institutions in regional international organizations elsewhere, thereby suggesting that existing theories of regionalism are insufficiently able to account for processes of institution building in such contexts.