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After a short historical survey of philosophical views on property, the
article contains an analysis of the argument which justifies property by
referring to the universal respect due to anyone?s right to use any thing for
any purpose. Usage of things for the realization of set ends (or goals) is
among the conditions of action/ agency. The capacity of freedom as a specific
causal power in real world is dependent on the possibility of using things as
means. However, without a real prospect to finish the process of realization
of set goals, this causal power would not be real. Property is a scheme
within which this prospect becomes a real possibility. Property is thus a
condition of effective successful purposeful agency. In property the
normative position of all others, besides the owner, has been changed, as
they do not have the right to use things possessed for their ends, although
they have a right to use any non-possessed thing as a means for whichever end
they might set. As a right, property entails, first, the obligation to
respect the fact of any established possession, and, second, an obligation to
accept and recognize the established possession as ownership, which does not
depend on the fact of factual physical control of the property. Ownership is
therefore a guarantee of future possession. For this to be established there
is a need for an explicit recognition from all others; however this
recognition is normatively necessary for everybody, as no-one has a right to
withdraw the recognition of a legitimate right to property. This comes from
the ontological and axiological difference between persons and things:
persons have a right to use and possess unpossessed things as means for
realization of ends they set.

Neuro-ethics is probably fastest growing part of applied ethics. The main
thesis is that certain natural processes in brain and nerves produce certain
moral, and immoral, behaviors. All these processes can be explained causally,
and (if this is so) neuro-ethics might be the final result of neuroscience.
There are some metaphysical and ethical pitfalls to be considered, however,
like the (incorrect) conflation of causal explanation and rational
justification in definingvalues, not only non-moral values but moral values
as well. Certainly, the knowledge of how neurological processes function
could help to enhance the quality of human life, not only in coping with
defects but also in improving the so-called ?normal life?. This implies that
neuroethics is instrumental, dealing with values which are instrumental as
well. However, neuroethics, it seems, aspires to go further than that: to
explain how goals come into existence and what their articulation should look
like. All of this should be causally explained, or at least explainable; and
the main focus of the paper is an analysis of this aspiration. The analysis
refers to some important distinctions like the distinction between causes and
reasons, explanation and justification, or the one between means and ends. At
the end of the paper there is a section about applications, where some of the
benefits and risks are summarily indicated, with a conclusion that
neuroethics surely might help in advancing the overall quality of human life,
individual and social.

The so called ?non-culpable ignorance? is an instrument to justify participating in a war on a defeated side, on condition that fighters sincerely believe that they are defending a just cause and had some valid reasons to believe in having a chance to win. Within the just war theory this instrument is needed to make both sides prima facie right, otherwise the theory would imply that those who lose are guilty in advance, especially if they are the weaker side. However, in contemporary context of criminalizing war the very concept of war is changing and becoming extremely vague. As wars are more and more ?asymmetric?, just war theory might face serious challenges regarding incorporation of ?non-culpable ignorance? within its scope, as well as difficulties in showing that justice goes with the victory, opening thus the issues of articulation of a just peace.

The article begins with a list of possible meanings of work, based in a suitable definition of life as an activity of setting goals and their materialization. The value of work is instrumental (although it has an intrinsic value as well), and its articulation and distribution is the subject of ethical scrutiny in the remainder of the article. The issues of social roles in this distribution have been discussed in more detail, along with issues of justice, rights, and moral restraints regarding work. The article ends with a projection of contemporary capitalism, which shows a very strong tendency to enhance its scope in so far uncovered parts of social life.

The issue of whether war crimes should be considered as a moral, legal, or political category is addressed. It is initially contended that only "crimes against peace" should be considered war crimes since other traditional categories of war crimes (eg, violations of human rights) remain criminal in nature outside the context of war. Moreover, it is claimed that crimes against peace possess specific moral & legal difficulties since defeated parties are generally labeled war criminals. The tendency to equate military success in war with absolution from blame is subsequently questioned on moral & legal grounds; specifically, it is argued that prosecuting those who achieve military victory may infringe on a state's universal right to self-defense. Moreover, the capacity to bring charges of war crimes against parties regardless of the outcome of war is deemed problematic since such reasoning suggests that certain entities have a right to victory during war. Consequently, it is maintained that only aggressor states that are defeated during war can legitimately be prosecuted. It is concluded that prosecutions of parties accused of committing war crimes ultimately constitutes a political act. J. W. Parker

Argues that forgiveness needs to be morally justified so that it does not contradict the requirements of moral integrity. Forgiveness is characterized as being a morally correct act if it is carried out by the victim & if it upholds universal respect for any person as a moral agent. Distinctions are drawn between forgiveness & mercy, & it is held that forgiveness without mercy can be positive in that it allows redressive punishment to take place. The benefits of viewing forgiveness as a self-centered act that lets victims overcome the ill will they feel toward a certain source of evil are discussed. D. Weibel