Suchergebnisse

The place of planning in military enterprises is manifest, if not inescapable. Equally obvious is the fact that we must rely upon written plans in our present and future operations as forces become increasingly interdependent.

Opinion in essays by the Brazilian military elite, published in their professional journals, is analyzed-prior to the military takeover, and at regular intervals during their 21 years of political control-to consider aspects and patterns of ideologic differences concerning national development strategy. This study finds one major and another minor faction existed, in addition to the recognized moderate and hard-line groups that alternatively headed Brazil's military regimes. Using their articles as a data base, the author detects the rising importance of an independence-minded nationalist cadre in the 1970s, which was also divided between those with authoritarian and democratic attitudes. Neither was dominant and in fact had to share ruling power with a moderate, internationalist faction to preserve necessary unity. The democratic nationalists, initially suppressed in the wake of purges of the reformist, leftist faction who had been Goulart appointees, gained strength during the presidencies of Geisel and Figuereido, thereby influencing and sustaining the promised transition toward civilian rule and democratic political processes. Development strategy did not shift toward the independent, nationalist direction, however, because of adverse external factors, the prior successes of the first military regimes, and the continuing need to preserve armed forces unity.

1964-84; conference paper. Differences among the various military elite regimes in carrying out plans to alter the existing political system while promoting an integrated development policy.

When a military regime undertakes rule over a country for a lengthy period, stresses over policies and political succession place great strains upon the unity within the ranks and between the branches of the services. This unity, which is a prerequisite to peaceful transition to civil authority, is examined in Brazil's case by comparative tests of the military elite ideology in three key areas : development, internal security, and international relations. Using as a means the essays of the service authors in their professional journals, the study concludes that the range of differences has not reached the limits of threatened fracture, and that stable transition remains possible