The third edition of Contemporary Russia is fully revised to provide a comprehensive introduction to the society, politics and culture of one of the most important countries in global affairs today. The author details Russia's historical background as well as the nation's current concerns and distinctive features in this accessible analysis.
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Zeit lässt sich in der Politik auf verschiedene Art messen. Während einschneidende Ereignisse in nur kurzer Zeit die politische Landschaft verändern können, zeigt uns Präsident Putin, was er in den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten für ein beständiger Staatsführer gewesen ist, was er unter Stabilität versteht, welche Veränderungen er bei den Vorstellungen hinsichtlich der Identität vorgenommen hat, und was Familienwerte damit zu tun haben. Mit Hilfe der Datenbank Worte des Präsidenten, erfahren wir, welche Worte des Präsidenten aktuell Gewicht haben, und welche verschwunden sind.
Zeit lässt sich in der Politik auf verschiedene Art messen. Während einschneidende Ereignisse in nur kurzer Zeit die politische Landschaft verändern können, zeigt uns Präsident Putin, was er in den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten für ein beständiger Staatsführer gewesen ist, was er unter Stabilität versteht, welche Veränderungen er bei den Vorstellungen hinsichtlich der Identität vorgenommen hat, und was Familienwerte damit zu tun haben. Mit Hilfe der Datenbank Worte des Präsidenten, erfahren wir, welche Worte des Präsidenten aktuell Gewicht haben, und welche verschwunden sind.
AbstractNationalism theory has long acknowledged that in its relation to nationalism, "religion" can refer both to a reflexive identity attached to a people group, and to a reasoned value-based position articulated by an élite. Even this bifurcation remains insufficiently precise. Religio-nationalisms reasonedex patria—that is, beginning with the nationalist and proceeding from there to incorporate religion—tend toward values of exclusivity and animosity toward "the other". They have been charged with hijacking religion as an identity while being at odds with those who actively practice that religion or lead its practicing community. The exploratory case of the relationship between Russian Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism allows a comparison ofex patriareligio-nationalism with itsex religiocounterpart. It supports the hypothesis that when reasoned religio-nationalism begins with the religious and proceeds to the nationalist, emphases such as inclusivity and benevolence—rather than exclusivity and animosity—are to the fore.
Russia's ruling regime, dominated by Vladimir Putin since he first became president in 2000, is often seen as presenting a consistent and coherent narrative and allowing little space for plurality of opinions. While it is the case that at the level of metanarrative, a consistent official story of a Russia resurgent both domestically and internationally has been told, analysis of the work of think tanks within the purview of Russia's political leadership reveals that conflicting narratives remain at play within the regime's political tent. Analysis of a decade of think tank activity shows that the Medvedev presidency (2008–2012) saw the rise and then decline of the liberal INSOR think tank, while the most prominent think tank in Putin's third term as president (2012–2018) was the anti-liberal Izborskii Club, which followed a similar pattern of waxing and waning prominence. From the point of view of Russia's leadership, the existence of these think tanks has a functionalist explanation, allowing what is essentially a non-ideological regime to engage with and adopt different positions according to its proximate requirements. Such a functionalist approach runs the risk of undermining the coherence and persuasiveness of the regime's narrative(s). From the point of view of the political science classification of the extant Russian regime, Russia's post-Soviet 'transition' remains to be resolved in terms of its chosen course even a quarter of a century on from the collapse of Communism.
The growth of applied politics teaching in recent years is often conflated by academics, institutions, and professional associations with the employability agenda increasingly promoted by government. Many academics – politics faculty to the fore – object to the imposition of neo-liberal values on universities, the commodification of higher education, and a focus on employability in their teaching. These developments, coupled with a sense that the teaching of practical politics lacks intellectual rigour, undermine the growth of applied politics courses and programmes. There is, however, no reason why applied politics teaching must embrace neo-liberal norms. Nor is the alternative the introduction, as has happened in a few institutions, of courses teaching the practice of radical activism. Norms and values in applied politics can come from students, producing content and knowledge as they develop skills and approaches to practical politics. Applied politics itself represents a bridge between political science and political life beyond the university and serves the needs of students across the 'careerist-activist' spectrum. Far from being intellectually light, a values-focused approach to applied politics has a pedagogical depth beyond that offered in much of the current politics curriculum. It offers a pedagogy not just of information but of formation and transformation.
When former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych decided to postpone an EU Association Agreement, few would have predicted that this would lead to a prolonged conflict in Europe's borderland. Since the beginning of the confrontation, a lot has been written about its root causes, the motivations of the main actors, and possible scenarios for the future. However, few have looked at what came to be called the 'Ukraine crisis' from the point of view of Russo-Ukrainian relations, and grasped the perspectives of various groups involved, as well as the discursive processes that have contributed to the developments in and interpretations of the conflict. The authors of this Edited Collection each present a facet of the intense and dangerous turmoil provoked by the breakdown in relations, and thus contribute to a deeper understanding of a crisis that now afflicts both European and global affairs.
Any observer looking at Russian politics at the end of 2014 cannot fail to be struck by the magnitude of change over the course of that year. 2014 saw Russia expand its territory by the absorption of Crimea, taking to itself the land of a neighbouring state against the wishes of that state's government. It saw Russians fighting in a conflict against the Ukrainian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine. It saw Russia's relatively stable, albeit fractious, relationship with the western powers dramatically worsen, with sanctions imposed by the US and the EU on many of those close to President Putin. It saw economic decline, as the rouble and oil prices fell dramatically and official Russian forecasts posited recession in 2015. Few, if any, analysts predicted these developments. A year earlier, in December 2013, the headlines from Russia were different. An official amnesty in December 2013 mandated the release of the highest profile prisoners in Russia – oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Pussy Riot members Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alekhina – all of whom had been the subjects of sustained campaigns for their freedom in the West. A few months earlier, in September 2013, leading opposition figure Aleksei Navalny performed strongly in Moscow's mayoral election, as other opposition candidates across the country gained a handful of seats and mayoralities, including that of Russia's fourth largest city, Yekaterinburg. Even in early 2014, Russia's global image was burnished by a successful Winter Olympics in Sochi in February. The ominous turn of events in 2014 reveals the complexities of forecasting Russia's path of development. A tendency to polarisation and preconception can lead to insufficient attention to nuance and competing voices within Russia. My recent research has focused on two particular approaches to assessing political developments within Russia, namely, political narratives and political forecasting (Bacon 2012a; Bacon 2012b). This article sets out how narrative analysis helps us to discern Russia's key interests from the perspective of the ruling regime, and then draws on these findings to consider the complexities of scenario building as Russia moves into the second half of this century's second decade.