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In the same manner as the Third Reich, IS uses law, terror and propaganda as 'techniques of governance' that serve to advance their political aims: securing themselves in power, preparing and waging war, and fostering the idea of an Islamic State. IS have successfully used the print and radio media systematically for the dissemination of lethal ideas and for the mobilization of the population on a grand scale in order to materialise these ideas. When such propaganda is laced with the dolus specialis of the crime of genocide, the severity of the mass action it brings about can be disastrous. This paper analyses the hate propaganda used in the online publications of IS. Evidence will then bring to light the fact that their hate propaganda amounts to direct and public incitement of others to commit genocide and the propagandists could, thus, be prosecuted for this crime at national or international courts.

The rise of different strands of political Islam in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East since the 1970s and the lack of a robust political alternative during the Arab Spring have paved the way for the widespread issuance of 'accusations of unbelief' (takfīri 'fatwas'), i.e. pronouncements of unbelief against individuals, groups of people or even institutions by Islamist movements. These fatwas fit into the broader context of radical Islamist ideologies spread by systematic hate propaganda and together form a deadly combination amounting to instigation to murder. A need to address this particular form of incitement, together with the spread of terrorist ideology in general, has arisen in states with large Muslim populations in order to protect the essential human rights impacted by such speech and to fulfil the obligations imposed by UN Security Council Resolutions. Tunisia has chosen a head-on approach to addressing this problem by criminalising accusations of takfīr and incitement to religious hatred and loathing as terrorist offences. Such an approach can be seen as an encroachment upon the right to freedom of expression, yet it has to be balanced against states' positive obligations in protecting essential competing human rights. Drawing on the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR and the African Commission of the ACHPR as well as literature in the field of human rights, this paper demonstrates the interrelation between the right to life, freedom from fear, security of the person and the right to dignity and their violation through unfettered takfīrism.

Political interest in territorial integrity and state sovereignty has always been to the fore in decisions made by governments faced with those who rebel. Thus, rebellion has been considered as an integral part of internal armed conflict rather than expanding it as part of external or international armed conflict. In this way, public international law has not only limited its scope of application but also failed to provide an effective legal framework for rebels who are not categorised as a party to international armed conflict. The enormous political support for "state sovereignty" and lack of necessary political will to recognise the right of rebellion at the international level have played a vital role in this failure. Attempts to overcome the failure have never been successful due to the fear of ruling authorities that recognition of the right of rebellion might provide legitimacy to opponents and put their authority at risk. The political power has always triumphed over the necessity to recognise the right of rebellion, and this has resulted in the underdevelopment of this area of law. Furthermore, the rebels have denied their accountability for asymmetrical use of force against state authorities based on their disadvantageous position under public international law. This unequal position between rebels and state authorities has created a "gap" in the current international legal framework.

Cultural property has been destroyed, looted and trafficked throughout history, particularly during conflict situations. In many instances, the property that is destroyed belongs to, and / or represents, minority groups and its destruction impacts significantly on minority culture. ISIS, and related jihadist groups, have, in recent times, actively engaged in the deliberate destruction of cultural property in numerous States, including Iraq, Syria, and Mali. This has been described as 'cultural cleansing' by the Director-General of UNESCO, as jihadist groups aim to eradicate all signs of 'other' cultures within its newly formed State. The destruction of cultural property is now a strategy of war, with the objective being to eliminate cultural diversity and pluralism, 'erase all sources of belonging and identity, and destroy the fabric of society.' The International Criminal Court (ICC) recently (2016) heard the case of Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, which focused specifically on the destruction of cultural property in Mali during a non-international armed conflict. The defendant was charged, under Article 8 of the ICC Statute, with the war crime of directing attacks against cultural property. Mr Al Mahdi, a member of the fundamentalist Islamic group, Ansar Dine, had been in charge of the Hisbah, the morality brigade set up in Timbuktu. One of his roles was to oversee the destruction of a number of religious monuments and mausoleums in the city. The decision to attack these sites was made by the Ansar Dine leadership, as a result of their Wahabi interpretation of the Islamic concept of ziyara, or 'visitation'. They believed that the visitation and veneration of burial monuments, which was a common practice among the local minority Sufi Muslim population, was idolatrous and, therefore, contravened Islam. The rationale behind Mr Al Mahdi's and Ansar Dine's actions in attacking these sites was to halt the religious practices of the local religious minority population of Timbuktu and destroy their culture and history because it differed from its own. The ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression. However, destruction of cultural property falls only within the remit of war crimes under the Statute. A question that arises from the recent spate of destruction of cultural property is, does the war crime of directing attacks against cultural property adequately represent the impugned behaviour? Prior to the enactment of the ICC Statute, the protection of cultural property was included in a number of international legal instruments, as well as in customary law, and had also been analysed before international criminal tribunals. Despite the many legal sources which seek to regulate attacks on cultural property, there have been divergent approaches to how cultural property should be dealt with under the legal framework. Some international instruments seek to proscribe attacks on cultural property because such property constitutes civilian property, while other instruments highlight the need to protect cultural property as a result of its importance to humanity. The former approach does not include any consideration of the value of property destroyed to a particular culture or minority group, but rather focuses explicitly on the characterisation of the property as civilian or military, and classifies such attacks as war crimes. However, cultural property is not attacked just because of its status as civilian property; rather it is generally attacked as it is symbolic of, or represents, a particular group or culture, as is clearly illustrated in the actions of groups such as ISIS and Ansar Dine. This article submits that a better characterisation of such behaviour would be a crime against humanity, as this would encompass the motivations of the attacks, as an act of persecution against the civilian population, and the impact on the victims. Section 2 of the article sets out the history of the legal framework on the protection of cultural property, prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute. Section 3 then focuses on the legal framework concerning the destruction of cultural property at the ICC and analyses the case of Al Mahdi, and Section 4 looks at the cultural renaissance currently occurring in Mali.