Suchergebnisse

In the aftermath of the Cold War, American intelligence caught three high-profiles Russian spies: Aldrich Ames, Edward Lee Howard, and Robert Hanssen. However, rumors have long swirled of another mole, often referred to as the Fourth Man. Former CIA operative Robert Baer tells the full story of the CIA investigation launched after the Ames arrest to make sure there wasn't another mole in their ranks

Prologue -- 1. The Iranian paradox -- 2. How Iran beat America -- - 3. The master plan: how Iran found a reliable, secret blueprint for building an empire -- 4. From guerillas to statesmen: why Iran swapped the stick for the carrot -- 5. Lethal and elusive: why Iran's weapons and tactics make it unconquerable--even without nukes -- 6. Seizing the world's energy corridors: why Iran will shortly control the most vital oil and gas trade routes -- 7. In Iran's gun sights: how Iran plans to seize the oil from the Persian Gulf's teetering sheikhdoms -- 8. The white Shia knight: how Iran has become a hero to the Palestinian Sunnis--and may lead them in a mass uprising -- 9. Winner take all: why strategic Shias are prevailing over radical Sunnis in a battle for Islam's soul--and the chance it may offer America -- 10. Ultimate sacrifice: how martyrs and suicide bombers confound Islam's enemies -- 11. Memories that don't fade: what Iran really wants -- Epilogue -- Glossary

For the past three decades Robert Baer has been analyzing the Islamic world. This brilliant CIA operative & longtime field officer in the Middle East left the Agency in 1997 to become an independent analyst. His brash opinions often go against the grain of American political strategy in the region. This certainly applies to his vision of Iran. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 -- and even more so since the country launched its nuclear program -- Iran has been seen by Washington as a threat & an enemy, even an evil power requiring a radical & specific treatment. But Robert Baer invites the new administration to see Iran as a perfectly rational agent, with precise & narrow goals (increase its influence on neighboring states), & as past masters in the art of haggling. Baer's conclusion is that the regime should be treated like any other, notably by negotiating with it. Adapted from the source document.

Offers some suggestions as to how the CIA can improve its Directorate of Operations (DO). Changes include reforming the promotion system to reward overseas service that results in recruitment of sources; require that senior analysts responsible for final assessment are provided with the identity, affiliation, & reporting record of sources; integrate federal, state, & local databases for counterterrorism work; actively recruit on college campuses; lower the retirement age to 45 for field offices; stop relying on foreign governments for intelligence collection; establish a security clearance system with distinct levels; & recruit human intelligence sources from among the enemy. J. Zendejas

Offers some suggestions as to how the CIA can improve its Directorate of Operations (DO). Changes include reforming the promotion system to reward overseas service that results in recruitment of sources; require that senior analysts responsible for final assessment are provided with the identity, affiliation, and reporting record of sources; integrate federal, state, and local databases for counterterrorism work; actively recruit on college campuses; lower the retirement age to 45 for field offices; stop relying on foreign governments for intelligence collection; establish a security clearance system with distinct levels; and recruit human intelligence sources from among the enemy.