This is an examination of how the political design for restoring Russia's 'greatness' has been shaped by the increase of its profile as a key energy supplier and the continuing decline of its military might.
This is an examination of how the political design for restoring Russia's 'greatness' has been shaped by the increase of its profile as a key energy supplier and the continuing decline of its military might.
This study of the Russian Army and how it has fared in the uncertain transitional period since independence in December 1991 provides the basis for understanding its present and potential future role in the new political developments within Russia. Starting with a historical overview of Russia's security agenda and an examination of the Russian/Soviet army's tradition of involvement in politics, 'The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles' examines Russia's current security interests and the role of the army in protecting them.
In: Asia policy: a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 30-38
Die russische Führung hegt Ansprüche auf den Status einer »maritimen Großmacht«, doch sieht das Staatliche Rüstungsprogramm bis 2027 beträchtliche Kürzungen bei der Finanzierung von Schiffsbauten vor. Oberste Priorität wird der Vollendung der Serie von acht strategischen U-Booten der »Borej«-Klasse gegeben. Dem neuen Plan zur Entwicklung atomgetriebener U-Boote wird viel politische Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet. U-Boote unterschiedlicher Typen werden die Hauptstreitmacht der russischen Kriegsmarine stellen, doch sind viele Fähigkeiten (amphibische Operationen, Kriegsführung gegen U-Boote) im Niedergang begriffen. Die konstanten strategischen Anforderungen, um den wahrgenommenen Bedrohungen auf den vier potentiellen Kriegsschauplätzen (Nordpolarmeer, Ostsee, Schwarzes Meer und Pazifik) zu begegnen, verlangen hohe Risikobereitschaft und erhöhen die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Unfällen.
Russia has been following an Arctic policy that is highly heterogeneous, combining efforts at preserving cooperation with Western neighbors with commitment to building up its own strength. Three distinct policy modes can be identified: realist/militaristic, institutional/cooperative, and diplomatic management. Each mode is based on a particular interpretation of Russia's various interests in the High North/Arctic: nuclear/strategic, geopolitical, economic/energy-related, and symbolic. Examination of policy modes and interests shows that each combination contains some elements that focus on preserving the status quo in the Arctic, while other elements push for changes in Russia's favor. This article finds that revisionist elements have been gaining in strength, but that current policy still attaches high value to sustaining traditional patterns, even if they demand more resources and provide fewer advantages and revenues.
Russia has been following an Arctic policy that is highly heterogeneous, combining efforts at preserving cooperation with Western neighbors with commitment to building up its own strength. Three distinct policy modes can be identified: realist/militaristic, institutional/cooperative, and diplomatic management. Each mode is based on a particular interpretation of Russia's various interests in the High North/Arctic: nuclear/strategic, geopolitical, economic/energy-related, and symbolic. Examination of policy modes and interests shows that each combination contains some elements that focus on preserving the status quo in the Arctic, while other elements push for changes in Russia's favor. This article finds that revisionist elements have been gaining in strength, but that current policy still attaches high value to sustaining traditional patterns, even if they demand more resources and provide fewer advantages and revenues.
Russia's reaction to the dramatic collapse of the firmly entrenched regime in Armenia, which is one of its few formal and real allies, was subtle and demonstratively neutral. Contact with the opposition was minimal, but the idiosyncratic counter-revolutionary stance was abandoned. This unusual self-restraint may be the result of Russia's entrapment in Syria, and it may also be due to a mistake caused by the overload of rigidly centralized leadership.