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This CSS Cyberdefense Project Report looks at the structure, organization, development, and challenges of reserve forces in military cybersecurity in Estonia, Finland, France, Israel, Switzerland and the US. The study shows that while all countries mentioned are developing cyber units based on their reserve forces, their development remains a work in progress. Furthermore, the use of such forces is contextually dependent and country specific. Meaning, it is difficult for one country to successfully copy the reserve model of another country. Finally, cyber reserves are a feasible way to close the cybersecurity workforce gap for the armed forces. Cyber reserves enable armed forces to create a large pool of experts at low cost and attract experts who would not have applied to active-duty military job. ; Dieser Bericht des CSS Cyberdefense Projects befasst sich mit der Struktur, Organisation, Entwicklung, und den Herausforderungen der Reservekräfte in der militärischen Cybersicherheit in Estland, Finnland, Frankreich, Israel, der Schweiz, und den USA. Die Studie zeigt auf, dass alle genannten Länder die Entwicklung von Cybereinheiten auf der Grundlage ihrer Reservekräfte anstreben und dass diese Entwicklung noch nicht abgeschlossen ist. Darüber hinaus hängt der Einsatz solcher Kräfte vom länderspezifischen Kontext ab. Dies bedeutet, dass es für ein Land schwierig ist das Reservemodell eines anderen Landes erfolgreich zu kopieren. Abschliessend wird darauf verwiesen, dass der Aufbau von Cyberreserven eine guter Weg ist, um gut ausgebildete Arbeitskräfte im Bereich Cybersicherheit für die Streitkräfte zu gewinnen. Cyberreserven ermöglichen es den Streitkräften einen großen Pool an Experten zu geringen Kosten aufzubauen und Experten anzulocken die sich sonst nicht für einen Arbeitsplatz im aktiven militärischen Dienst beworben hätten.

The Hotspot Synthesis identifies trends from three recent CSS Hotspot Analyses on cyber-activities in Asia. It also highlights how these trends underscore the lack of agreement on the use of cyberspace and what constitutes legitimate and illegitimate behavior in cyberspace. In particular, the three trends identified are 1) that North Korea uses cybercriminal activities to fund its nuclear program or government, bypassing international sanctions; 2) events in South Asia show that non-state actors are involving themselves in geopolitical events via cyberspace, and 3) Western nations affected by cyberattacks originating from Asia have difficulties in formulating effective strategic responses to them. The text also reflects on trends identified in Hotspot Synthesis 2017. ; Die Hotspot Synthese identifiziert Trends aus den drei CSS Hotspot Analysen zu den Cyber-Aktivitäten in Süd-, Südost- und Ostasien. Die Synthese unterstreicht das Fehlen einer Übereinkunft zur Nutzung des Cyberspace, sowie einer Differenzierung zwischen legitimen und illegitimen Verhalten. Die drei Trends zeigen, dass 1) die Demokratische Republik Nordkorea cyberkriminelle Aktivitäten durchführt, um ihr Nuklearprogramm zu finanzieren und die internationalen Sanktionen zu umgehen; 2) nichtstaatliche Akteure in geopolitischen Ereignissen in Cyberspace eingreifen, wie Vorkommnisse in Südasien zeigten; 3) westliche Staaten, die von Cyberangriffen aus Asien betroffen sind, Schwierigkeiten haben angemessene strategische Antworten zu formulieren. Im Text werden auch die identifizierten Trends in der Hotspot Synthese 2017 reflektiert.

This Hotspot Analysis examines state-sponsored cyber-activities regarding Iran. It outlines that Iran uses cyberspace to surveil dissidents and control information within the country. On the international level, Iran considers cyber-operations to form a part of its asymmetrical warfare against the US and its allies, providing a way to harass adversaries with limited risks of retaliation. However, Iran's scarce resources limit its cyber-operations, leading the country to focus on easier targets. Iranian cyber-activities also appear to follow international events. For instance, Iranian cyberattacks against the US decreased following the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but increased after President Trump's withdrawal from the agreement. The discovery of the US-Israeli developed Stuxnet in 2010 demonstrates how Iran is on the receiving end of cyberattacks. However, the lack of information on cyber-incidents within Iran curtails effective assessments of such attacks.

Publication Year: 2018 In 2014, the world discovered that a North Korean hacker group had illegally accessed Sony Entertainment Pictures' network, deleted content from several computers and leaked stolen information on the internet. In 2017, ransomware named WannaCry was found to have affected more than 200,000 computers across the world. This was also attributed to North Korean actors. On the face of things, North Korea appears to be disconnected from much of the internet. The reality is, however that it has extensive cyber capabilities. These capabilities are an additional tool in Pyongyang's asymmetric strategy, a strategy derived from its development of nuclear weapons. North Korea has been developing its cyber capabilities in parallel to its nuclear weapons program. The latter has brought a great deal of international attention to North Korea but has also resulted in several rounds of international sanctions. However, the advantage to North Korea of the use of its cyber capabilities is that it may attract international attention but with a reduced risk of sanctions. Another important difference between the North Korean cyber and nuclear programs is that Pyongyang also uses its cyber capabilities for financial gain. Hacker groups associated with the North Korean government have targeted financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges to generate revenue for the regime.

This CSS Hotspot Analysis provides an overview of five cyber-related conflicts recently reviewed by the CSS. These include 1) the US-Russia cyber rivalry; 2) cyber and information warfare in the Ukrainian conflict; 3) cyber activities in the Syrian civil war; 4) tensions in US-China relations over cybersecurity; and 5) cyber and information warfare in European elections. Through this review, the analysis also identifies key trends, including those relating to the politicization of cyberspace; how context shapes the use of cybertools; and disagreements between states regarding legitimate uses of cyberspace.

India and Pakistan have been regional rivals ever since they achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1947. They compete militarily and economically and this regional rivalry has manifested itself through provocations, skirmishes and open conflicts. Both states have integrated new technologies in their strategies extending their regional rivalry to cyberspace. This Hotspot Analysis examines the dynamic of the India-Pakistan regional rivalry in cyberspace. Both states have developed cyber capabilities and are using them primarily to spy on the other. Cyberespionage campaigns seem often poorly coordinated and unsophisticated. However, the lack of sophistication in cybertools did not prevent advanced persistent threats likely sponsored by India or Pakistan from achieving their strategic goals. At a lower level, non-state actors such as hacktivists and patriotic hackers used cyberspace to promote their patriotic sentiments. Such actions increase the risk of misperceptions in cyberspace and escalation of the rivalry to physical conflict.

In 2018, Switzerland released its second national cybersecurity strategy. To put the Swiss approach into perspective, this CSS study compares the strategies, policies and governmental structures of Germany, Finland, France, Israel, Italy and the Netherland to highlight similarities and differences and to discuss the relevant challenges and further implications for Switzerland. The results show that, despite their national idiosyncrasies in terms of structures, all states underline the need for a holistic and integrated approach to cybersecurity focused on developing capabilities, awareness and education, while fostering international and public-private cooperation. In addition, they all face challenges that are inherently crosscutting, ranging from issues of policy integration and coordination to crisis management and legislative harmonization.

This Cyber Defense Trend Analysis argues that while cyber sovereignty is regularly referenced in political, economic and legal discussions, the concept has no fixed definition. In response to this, as well as to highlight why using the term in the same way as strategic autonomy is a misnomer, our authors analyze references to cyber sovereignty in national cybersecurity strategies, current academic discussion and debates on sovereignty in other domains. Baezner and Robin also explore the similarly ill-defined concept of data sovereignty, outlining why control over data depends more on how it is stored than where.

The US Presidential elections of 2016 were marked by the breaches into the Democratic National Committee's computer network. This report describes the details and techniques of the hack, their victims and the actors involved, including Russian actors. The research does not focus only on the DNC hack, but also on older and related hacks that were attributed to Russia. The report analyzes the effects of these hacks on US society, US internal politics, economy and the international relations. Finally the paper suggests recommendations for states to prevent the occurrence of such events in their own elections.

Stuxnet was a malware first discovered in 2010 on an Iranian computer. It was designed to specifically to sabotage centrifuges in the Iranian nuclear facility of Natanz. The discovery of Stuxnet raised awareness of cybersecurity issues for critical infrastructures around the world. The goal of this report is to retrospectively analyze the very specific case of Stuxnet to better understand its effects. The Hotspot Analysis examines the specific features of Stuxnet, its targets and its creators. It analyzes the effects of the malware on the Iranian society and politics, its economy and the technology. It also looks at the influence that Stuxnet had on international relations. Finally, the report suggests several recommendations for states to decrease the risks of becoming victim of such malware as Stuxnet.

The conflict in Syria developed from civilian protests against the government in 2011 to a civil war. The hostilities were not limited to the physical realm, but also took place in cyberspace. The goal of this report is to understand the mechanisms of the use of cybertools in the context of a civil war. It examines the various actors, tools and targets observed during the conflict. It analyzes the effects of cyber activities on the Syrian society, the economy, technology. The Hotspot Analysis also looks at the internationalization of the conflict through the use of the internet and the fact that cyber activities always remained of low intensity. Finally, the report suggests some recommendations for states to implement to reduce the risks of similar attacks.

The Ukrainian conflict started with the invasion of Crimea by Russian troops. As the conflict continued Ukrainian and Russian hackers engaged in tit-for-tat cyberattacks while maintaining them at low intensity. In December 2015 and December 2016, the cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power grid showed that cyber capabilities could be used to escalate the conflict. This report examines the various methods used in the numerous cyberattacks in the context of the Ukrainian conflict, as well as the categories of victims and the possible perpetrators. The report analyzes the effects of the cyberattacks on Ukrainian society, politics, economy, technology and international relations. Finally, it proposes a series of recommendations for states to minimize the effects of the cyber-activities resulting from the Ukrainian conflict.

This volume examines the cybersecurity policies and architecture of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Singapore and the United Kingdom. By doing so, it sheds light on how cyberdefense is embedded in these states' cybersecurity postures. The authors find that these countries' approaches have notable differences, including in their understanding of cybersecurity. However, the text also highlights common trends, including a move toward civilian leadership and oversight as well as the centralization of control and implementation responsibilities for cybersecurity and cyberdefense. ; Dieser Band untersucht und vergleicht die Politik und institutionelle Architektur im Bereich Cybersicherheit in Österreich, Finnland, Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien, den Niederlanden, Singapur, und dem Vereinigte Königreich. Dabei steht die Frage im Vordergrund, welche Rolle Cyberdefense in den Cybersicherheitsstrategien dieser Staaten spielt. Die Autoren stellen fest, dass in allen Ländern trotz unterschiedlicher Ansätze sowohl ein Trend zur zivilen Führung und Aufsicht als auch zur Zentralisierung der Kontroll- und Umsetzungsverantwortung für Cybersicherheit und Cyberdefense zu erkennen ist.

This edited volume by CSS' Myriam Dunn Cavelty and CSS director Andreas Wenger, examines new and challenging political aspects of cyber security and presents it as an issue defined by socio-technological uncertainty and political fragmentation. The first part looks at the current use of cyber space in conflictual settings, while the second focuses on political responses by state and non-state actors in an environment defined by uncertainties. Within this, it highlights four key debates that encapsulate the complexities and paradoxes of cyber security politics from a Western perspective. This book will be of much interest to students of cyber security, global governance, technology studies, and international relations. ; Dieser Sammelband, herausgegeben von CSS Forscherin Myriam Dunn Cavelty und CSS Direktor Andreas Wenger, untersucht neue und herausfordernde politische Aspekte der Cybersicherheit und präsentiert sie als eine Problematik, welche durch sozio-technologische Unsicherheit und politische Fragmentierung definiert ist. Der erste Teil befasst sich mit der aktuellen Nutzung des Cyberraums in Konfliktsituationen, während sich der zweite Teil auf politische Reaktionen staatlicher und nichtstaatlicher Akteure in einem von Unsicherheiten geprägten Umfeld konzentriert. Darin werden vier Schlüsseldebatten hervorgehoben, welche die Komplexität und Paradoxa der Cybersicherheitspolitik aus westlicher Perspektive zusammenfassen. Dieses Buch wird von grossem Interesse für Studierende der Cybersicherheit, Global Governance, Technologiestudien und internationalen Beziehungen sein.