Suchergebnisse

Applied to Cambodia, the notion of the prebendary state refers to the capacity of political elites to organize the internal market on the basis of concessions reserved for those in their immediate circle and contracts signed with foreign investors entailing the exchange of financial gifts for legal deregulation and the privatization of violence. In the domain of industrial policy, this authoritarian form of patrimonial domination is embodied by special economic zones. These zones underscore the agreements reached between public actors and private investors, the Tayloristic organization of labor within firms and the absence of professional relations. As a result, these zones are very weakly linked to regional development flows in the Mekong Basin, suggesting that the Cambodian case be seen as a degraded instance of 'developmentalism'. Adapted from the source document.

The enlargements in the 1990's and the 2000's of both ASEAN and EU have led to considerable changes of these regional organisations. In both cases, the new member states were considered to be "backward states" and "weak states". However, far from being marginalized, new member states were paradoxically able to reinforce their sovereignty. In this context, this article argues that new member states were able to limit the hegemony exerted by old member states, by insisting on shared regional values and identities. Thereby, they transformed their initial "weakness" into "strength". Adapted from the source document.

An analysis of privatization policies in Central and Eastern Europe highlights the passage from predatory capitalism in the early days of transition from communism to a more legally regulated form of capitalism that has served as an indicator of the increasing rationalization of the economic, political and administrative playing field. In this regard, the European Union has performed an important role by strengthening regulatory agencies. This transition did not arise out of any internal necessity that might have led to an irreversible evolution from one form of capitalism to another, nor has it produced identical forms adopted there which would justify speaking of an "East European" type of market capitalism. Adapted from the source document.

In Polen wie in der früheren DDR bedeutete das Ende des kommunistischen Systems zugleich die Notwendigkeit der Etablierung neuer Spielregeln und Akteure. Thema und Ausgangspunkt des vorliegenden Beitrages ist die häufig vorgenommene Gegenüberstellung der außengesteuerten Integration Ostdeutschlands und der endogenen Transformationsdynamik in Polen. In Ostdeutschland konnte auf ein stabiles und grundsätzlich bewährtes System von Regeln, das westdeutsche, zurückgegriffen werden. Die verfolgte Einigungsstrategie sah im Grundsatz eine Übertragung dieser Regelungen auf Ostdeutschland vor. In Polen wie in den anderen mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern fehlte demgegenüber ein vergleichbarer externer Referenzpunkt. Die Frage ist dann, welche Auswirkungen diese unterschiedlichen Reformmuster gehabt haben. Das ostdeutsche wie das polnische Beispiel zeigen, daß die neuen Spielregeln, die im Zuge der Transformation geschaffen worden sind, nicht einfach eine Schöpfung ex nihilo sind. In beiden Ländern sind sie von den gegebenen Akteuren und ihren spezifischen Erfahrungen und Kenntnissen geprägt worden. In beiden Ländern hat sich die Transformation konflikthaft vollzogen. Jedoch unterscheiden sich diese Konflikte deutlich hinsichtlich ihrer Ausrichtung und den aus ihnen resultierenden Konfigurationen. In Ostdeutschland sind die Konflikte um die Anpassung der westdeutschen Regeln Teil eines kollektiven Lernprozesses gewesen. Den Ostdeutschen haben sie die Artikulation von Erfahrungen erlaubt. Zugleich aber sind im Zuge dieser Konflikte neue Akteure und Identitäten entstanden. Dagegen zeugen in Polen die beobachtbaren Konflikte eher von einem hohen Maß an Kontinuität. (ICE)

The main objective of this article is to question the hypothesis of the role of transport infrastructures in regional economic growth by comparing Central Eastern Europe (supported by the EU structural and cohesion funds) and the Greater Mekong Subregion (mainly supported by the economic corridors of the ADB). Three main components of trade efficiency are scrutinized and compared: (1) the historical development of trade agreements, (2) the supra-national (regional) capacity of trade regulation, and (3) the micro level of governance between the different actors involved in trade. The comparison between CEE and the GMS is all the more warranted because of two paradoxes that need to be explained: The first one results from the existing link between transport and growth in the case of the GMS, and the lack of a link in the case of CEE. The second paradox insists on the fact that despite their very different institutional frameworks, both subregions continue to face similar challenges concerning the implementation of trade agreements and the exchange of facilities at the local level pointing towards the issue of governance. Adapted from the source document.